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Abstract 
Infectious Disease Epidemiology in the Asia-Pacific Region 
Julia Maguire, BSc, MSci(Epi) 
My Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) placement at the National Centre for 
Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) focused on various vaccine preventable 
diseases from a state, national and international lens.  
In response to a rise in invasive meningococcal serogroup W disease in Australia, I performed a 
comprehensive epidemiological review of the disease. My findings informed the decision of 
the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation to support the addition of the 
quadrivalent meningococcal vaccine onto the National Immunisation Program, providing 
immunity for meningococcal serogroups A, C, W and Y in infants and young adults. 
A small outbreak of varicella among children in an outside of school hours care facility 
provided the opportunity to conduct an outbreak investigation and a vaccine effectiveness 
study. Although underpowered, this study demonstrated the occurrence of breakthrough 
varicella despite high one-dose coverage among primary school-aged children, and evidence 
for consideration of a two-dose nationally funded program.  
I performed another vaccine effectiveness study following a state-wide outbreak of rotavirus in 
New South Wales in 2017. This was accompanied by an epidemiological analysis of rotavirus 
notifications and a genetic profile analysis of hospitalised rotavirus cases. The rotavirus 
outbreak occurred despite high vaccine effectiveness and vaccine coverage. The findings 
indicated that rotavirus is increasing among the older population who do not have vaccine-
induced immunity. 
I conducted the first evaluation of the Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) 
system. PAEDS is an NCIRS-led initiative and actively finds hospitalised cases of serious 
childhood conditions and adverse events following immunisation. I evaluated this system using 
a mixed methods study design involving data analysis and stakeholder questionnaires. This 
evaluation provided practical recommendations for the progression and continuation of PAEDS 
in a time where the future of PAEDS is unknown. 
As part of the international response to the diphtheria outbreak among refugees in 
Bangladesh, I assisted the response of the World Health Organization in Cox’s Bazar. As an 
epidemiologist, I analysed communicable disease alerts and trends in the refugee camps as 
well as investigated disease reports and conducted risk assessments. I gained further 
international experience by assisting in an applied field epidemiology research study: 
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‘Surveillance and Monitoring to Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis and Scabies from Samoa’. I 
conducted field visits to dozens of households in remote villages of Samoa to collect 
mosquitoes for testing the prevalence of lymphatic filariasis antibodies and antigens. 
The works within this thesis fulfil the requirements of the MAE. This thesis reports analyses of 
the epidemiology of invasive meningococcal disease in Australia, vaccine effectiveness of 
varicella among highly vaccinated children in Brisbane, epidemiology and vaccine effectiveness 
of rotavirus in New South Wales, evaluation of a surveillance system of serious childhood 
conditions in Australia, as well as describes the response to a humanitarian emergency in 
Bangladesh and assistance in a field research study in Samoa. These projects contribute to the 
work of NCIRS in informing the National Immunisation Program and vaccine policy and 
practice, as well as to the evidence base of vaccine preventable diseases and international 
epidemiological research. 
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Overview  
I began my Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) placement at the National 
Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) in Westmead on 13 March 2017. 
NCIRS is located in the Kids Research building next door to The Children’s Hospital at 
Westmead in Western Sydney, New South Wales (NSW). 
NCIRS was established over twenty years ago, in August 1997, by the Australian Government 
Department of Health and Ageing (now the Australian Government Department of Health).1 
NCIRS was created as part of the Immunise Australia program and its ‘Seven Point Plan’ in 
order to conduct research, surveillance and evaluation of evidence for vaccinations. Immunise 
Australia is a program intended to increase national immunisation rates through funding 
vaccination programs, introducing the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register (now the 
Australian Immunisation Register) and educating the general public via dissemination of 
information.2  
The National Immunisation Program (NIP) and the National Immunisation Strategy are 
priorities for NCIRS who provide contributions to various NIP areas; ‘immunisation coverage, 
vaccine safety monitoring, development of effective communication about immunisation, and 
strengthening the monitoring and evaluation of the NIP’. NCIRS performs analysis and 
dissemination of data from the Australian Immunisation Register.3  
Being an academic research institute, NCIRS provided many opportunities to learn about the 
research of others. The monthly NCIRS Seminar Series, the Annual Marie Bashir Institute 
Colloquiums, Journal Clubs, Academic Meetings, Infection and Immunity Seminars, NSW 
Health Bug Breakfast and the NCIRS Meningococcal Workshop were a handful of the many 
extra-curricular learning opportunities in which I was able to participate. More so, I was able to 
attend professional development classes such as EndNote training and a publication writing 
workshop at the University of Sydney. 
Once arriving at NCIRS I was immediately presented with an interesting project to describe the 
evolving epidemiology of invasive meningococcal disease in Australia (Chapter 2). This data 
analysis project was particularly pertinent at the time due to the changes in dominant 
meningococcal serogroups around Australia and the world, which had great impact on the 
vaccination programs funded by states, territories and the Commonwealth.  
Also in my first year, I conducted an unorthodox retrospective outbreak investigation and 
vaccine effectiveness study of varicella among children in a child care facility (Chapter 3). 
Further outbreak experience was gained when I was able to spend some time in the Western 
Sydney Public Health Unit located at Cumberland Hospital next door to The Children’s Hospital 
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at Westmead. I assisted with contact tracing and interviewing during a measles outbreak in 
Western Sydney, in addition to interviewing cases of probable foodborne illnesses.  
I was seconded to the Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases Team, Communicable Disease Branch of 
Health Protection NSW located in the Ministry of Health in North Sydney where I completed 
my third major MAE project. For my epidemiological study, I investigated the unexpected 
increase of rotavirus notifications in NSW in 2017 and calculated vaccine effectiveness 
estimates (Chapter 4). This temporary placement provided additional exposure to the front 
line of investigations of disease clusters and outbreaks. All of these experiences have added to 
my practical public health knowledge of communicable disease outbreaks. 
My fourth, and largest, project was the evaluation of the Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease 
Surveillance (PAEDS) system, an NCIRS-led hospital-based active surveillance system of serious 
childhood conditions (Chapter 5). This project was particularly challenging due to pressures of 
evaluating an NCIRS system which was facing uncertainty in government funding. Hence the 
findings of my evaluation were set to have funding implications and influence the future 
existence of PAEDS.  
For a time, I had a fifth major project which initially served as my epidemiological study. I was 
to use several linked datasets from NSW and Western Australia of children born between 2000 
and 2013 to calculate the vaccine effectiveness of Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) and the 
impact of the Hib vaccine on both Hib disease and meningococcal serogroup B disease. Due to 
time constraints following international deployments, this project was dropped in favour of 
the NSW rotavirus epidemiological study to fulfil the MAE core competency. 
NCIRS was a fully supportive environment and encouraged me to volunteer for any fieldwork 
experiences that presented themselves. As a result, I was deployed to Bangladesh by the 
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) and the Australian Response MAE 
(ARM) network as an epidemiologist with the World Health Organization for four weeks. I was 
able to gain invaluable real-world experience in a humanitarian crisis during the diphtheria 
outbreak among the Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh (Chapter 6). I also had the 
opportunity to gain further international experience in a much different setting. I assisted in an 
applied field epidemiology research study: ‘Surveillance and Monitoring to Eliminate 
Lymphatic Filariasis and Scabies in Samoa’ led by the Australian National University and various 
international stakeholders. As an epidemiologist and team lead, I conducted field visits with 
Samoan Ministry of Health and Samoan Red Cross field workers to dozens of households in 
remote villages of Samoa. We collected samples of mosquitoes for testing the prevalence of 
lymphatic filariasis antibodies and antigens via molecular xenomonitoring. These two 
international experiences were very different while both being educational and enriching on 
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professional and personal levels. I am grateful to have had these opportunities and hope to 
continue international public health work in the future. I presented a summary of each of the 
deployments to staff at NCIRS describing the situations, activities performed and lessons 
learnt. 
I was able to attend a number of public health conferences during my MAE. In September 
2017, I travelled to Wellington, New Zealand, to present results from my invasive 
meningococcal disease epidemiology analysis at the 10th New Zealand Immunisation 
Conference. In June 2018, I attended the 16th Public Health Association of Australia National 
Immunisation Conference in Adelaide as well as the annual PAEDS face-to-face meeting in 
Brisbane in August 2018. I presented my rotavirus epidemiology and vaccine effectiveness 
study findings at the 9th Southeast Asia & Western Pacific Bi-regional Training Programs in 
Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) Scientific Conference in 
November 2018 in Vientiane, Laos.  
In addition to these education activities, I fulfilled the teaching requirements of the MAE by co-
presenting to the first year MAE scholars regarding the ethical considerations of study 
participation: a topic which my group and I believed would particularly assist the scholars in 
the beginning of their projects (Chapter 7). I conducted a ‘lesson from the field’ session for a 
group of fellow MAE scholars as well as participating in lessons that each of them had 
prepared. My session focused on linked data analysis including the data linkage process, 
ethical considerations when linking data and uses for linked data. Participating in these 
exercises provided insight into topics that I did not come across in my own projects and gave 
me the opportunity to assess and solidify my own knowledge of my topic of choice.  
These past two years have developed my theoretical and practical epidemiological skills, as 
well as established a strong foundation for my future work in public health, both nationally 
and internationally. I feel fortunate to be joining the ever growing MAE alumni community. 
From my experience to date, this community is professionally supportive and also a friendly 
group of like-minded people with whom I look forward to working in the future.   
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Prologue 
Study rationale 
Surveillance over the past few years has detected an increase in invasive meningococcal 
disease (IMD) cases above the expected number, particularly in serogroups B (MenB), W 
(MenW) and Y (MenY). This increase is essential to investigate as vaccines are available to 
protect against these serogroups, although as of January 2018, these vaccines were not funded 
as part of the National Immunisation Program (NIP) in Australia. This chapter describes the 
epidemiology of invasive meningococcal disease over the past two decades as well as 
characterising the increase of MenW cases in Australia since 2013 to inform IMD vaccination 
policy. My role 
This project was suggested to me during my first meeting at the National Centre for 
Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) in March 2017. Before I arrived, it had been 
identified as a project for a Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) scholar due to 
the relevance at the time and potential to inform the vaccine schedule in Australia.  
I acquired the IMD notifications core dataset from the National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System (NNDSS) as well as the dataset of hospitalisations from the National 
Hospital Morbidity Database. The focus areas for my analyses were determined in 
collaboration with Dr Clayton Chiu and Ms Cyra Patel (NCIRS) as part of the work required by 
the Meningococcal Working Party of the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation 
(ATAGI). The additional analyses that I performed for my chapter were determined with my 
academic supervisor, Associate Professor Katie Glass (Australian National University) and my 
primary field supervisor, Dr Helen Quinn (NCIRS). Following advice from Ms Han Wang, Dr Aditi 
Dey (NCIRS) and Helen, I conducted the appropriate data cleaning, recoding, rate calculations 
and other statistical analyses. I drafted and re-drafted the report with feedback from my 
supervisors. 
I presented my research findings at the 10th New Zealand National Immunisation Conference in 
Wellington, New Zealand, 8–9 September 2017. Lessons learned 
This project has allowed me to further develop my data analysis skills for large datasets in both 
Stata and Excel. Initially it was obvious that I needed to refresh my Stata abilities, but this was 
overcome relatively quickly and painlessly. The feeling of your code (finally) working correctly 
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is one of the greatest that a budding epidemiologist can experience. Throughout this project I 
became quite familiar with NNDSS data as well as hospitalisation data, and I learnt the 
strengths and limitations associated with these datasets, particularly regarding data 
completeness, and the importance of getting to know your data before proceeding with any 
analyses. More so, it is important to check that your output makes sense rather than blindly 
trusting your coding. 
My IMD analysis for my MAE thesis chapter was intertwined with the NCIRS work for the 
ATAGI Meningococcal Working Party. This was great due to the large overlap in content but at 
times was difficult since my time was spent on analyses that were not directly connected to my 
thesis. It was very interesting and informative to participate in the ATAGI Meningococcal 
Working Party and become privy to the internal workings of immunisation policy making. 
I must emphasise how much I have learned about IMD. I had little scientific or epidemiological 
knowledge of IMD before embarking upon this analysis. I hope that now I know much more 
than the average person. I was fortunate to be able to work on IMD, particularly by informing 
ATAGI, at such a volatile time in IMD epidemiology in Australia. Public health implications 
The study findings regarding the increase in MenB, MenW and MenY provided evidence for 
the need for additional meningococcal vaccines to be added to the NIP and for other changes 
in recommendations regarding the use of meningococcal vaccines. My investigation into target 
populations such as young children, young adults and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
populations helped inform ATAGI regarding MenACWY and MenB vaccine funding and 
recommendations for use in such populations. 
It was announced in July 2018 that the quadrivalent meningococcal ACWY vaccine would be 
funded on the NIP as a single dose at the 12 month schedule point. It was later announced that 
as of April 2019 the MenACWY vaccine would also be funded on the NIP as a single dose for 
adolescents aged between 14 and 19 years. Extensive updates to the meningococcal vaccine 
recommendations in the Australian Immunisation Handbook were made due to the work 
presented in this chapter.1  
From my involvement in the vaccine policy space, I feel that surveillance and analysis of 
vaccine preventable diseases is important due to its impact on the public, in terms of disease 
burden, but also regarding vaccine administration and the government resources allocated to 
the immunisation schedule.  
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Abstract 
Introduction 
Invasive meningococcal disease (IMD) is endemic in Australia. Following the introduction of a 
meningococcal C (Men C) vaccination program in 2003, meningococcal serogroup B (MenB) 
was the dominant serogroup for more than a decade until 2016. Notifications of IMD cases 
caused by meningococcal W (MenW) and Y (MenY) are noted to have increased since 2013. 
Trends in the epidemiology of IMD were examined to inform immunisation strategies.  
Methods 
IMD cases notified to the Australian National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System and 
hospital admissions recorded in the National Hospital Morbidity Database between 1 January 
1999 and 30 June 2016 were analysed. Notification rates and trends by IMD serogroup, age, 
jurisdiction and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status were analysed, and case-fatality 
ratios (CFR) calculated. 
Results and discussion  
Nationally, total IMD notifications declined from 2003 and reached a nadir in 2013, largely due 
to a decrease in MenB and MenC notifications. MenW and MenY IMD notifications were rare. 
However, from 2013 to 2016, the MenW notification rate rose from 0.05 to 0.45 per 100,000 
population, and rates of MenW and MenY progressively increased each quarter of 2016. In 
2016, MenW exceeded MenB as the dominant IMD serogroup (44% vs. 37%, respectively). The 
initial rise of MenW occurred in older adults, but in 2016–2017 MenW rates were highest in 
those aged <5, 15–24 and ≥65 years which peaked at age 70–74 years. As with MenB, the 
MenW notification rate was higher in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children aged <5 
years than in other Australian children in the period 2012–2017 (risk ratio 9.21, 95% 
confidence interval: 4.31–18.82, p<0.001). However, for those aged 15–24 years, there were 
52 notifications among non-Indigenous Australians but none among Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Australians. Between 2012 and 2017, the CFR for MenW was 8.1%, including 
seven deaths in both 2015 and 2016, as compared to 4.3% for MenB, including four deaths in 
2015 and two deaths in 2016 (MenW vs. MenB CFR, p=0.028).  
Conclusions 
There has been a rising trend in MenW IMD in Australia. Age groups with peak notifications 
include young children, late adolescents to young adults, and adults aged ≥65 years. These 
epidemiological observations have informed the initiation of national strategies for controlling 
invasive meningococcal disease, including the use of funded vaccines in 2018 and 2019.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
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Introduction 
Neisseria meningitidis, the bacterium that can cause invasive meningococcal disease (IMD), is 
endemic in Australia.2 There were surges in disease following the world wars due to a large 
population living in military barracks and post-war migration, and it peaked again in the 1990s. 
Incidence of N. meningitidis continues to vary in Australia, by serogroup and by age group 
most commonly affected.3 Meningococcal serogroup B (MenB) had been the dominant 
serogroup in Australia until recently, when it was replaced by meningococcal serogroup W 
(MenW) in 2016. 4,5 Reviews of IMD epidemiology have reported increases in MenW and 
meningococcal serogroup Y (MenY) cases since 2013.4,5 In 2015, the Communicable Diseases 
Network Australia initiated a working group to investigate the rise in MenW disease across 
Australia.4 The majority of MenW cases in Australia are genetically related to clusters in the 
United Kingdom and South America where MenW has been endemic since 2009.4  
Humans are the only natural host of N. meningitidis which is carried in the throat and nose. 
Asymptomatic carriers of the bacterium are unlikely to develop IMD. Transmission of N. 
meningitidis follows prolonged close contact with an asymptomatic carrier of the bacterium 
and cases are usually sporadic.3 These types of contacts include those who share close living 
arrangements with a carrier such as in a household, school, university dormitory or military 
barracks, as well as intimate contacts of a carrier, and certain healthcare professionals and 
childcare workers in contact with a carrier.3 The incubation period of IMD is usually one to 
seven days although it can infrequently last up to ten days. IMD is typically seasonal with peaks 
in winter from June to September.6,7 
IMD is a serious disease that can lead to permanent severe sequelae and death. It 
characteristically presents as meningitis or septicaemia or, more commonly, both.3 IMD can 
also present as pneumonia, septic arthritis or pericarditis.3 IMD can be treated with antibiotics 
but, despite this, the case fatality ratio ranges between 5–10%, in addition to the 10–30% of 
children and adolescents who develop sequelae such as limb deformity, skin scarring, deafness 
and neurological deficits following IMD infection.3,8,9  
People of all ages can be affected by IMD, however it is most common in children aged 0–4 
years and in older adolescents and young adults aged 15–24 years, hence generally displays a 
bimodal age distribution.3 The age distribution of cases differs by IMD serogroup, with MenB 
mainly affecting the classic age groups, 0–4 and 15–24 years, whereas MenW is additionally 
seen in those aged ≥55 years. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are 
disproportionately affected by IMD compared to people who do not identify as Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander.3  
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As of January 2018, there is one nationally funded vaccine available in Australia, which 
protects against meningococcal C (MenC vaccine). One dose of the conjugate MenC vaccine in 
combination with Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) vaccine (Hib-MenC vaccine, brand name 
Menitorix®) is part of the NIP for children at 12 months of age. The introduction of a MenC 
vaccine on the NIP in 2003 resulted in a substantial reduction in IMD cases caused by 
serogroup C, subsequently changing the epidemiology of meningococcal infection in Australia.3 
This was not only due to the one infant dose, but also due to the broad catch-up scheme in 
which all Australians aged ≤19 years were offered the vaccine from 2003 to 2008. 
The MenACWY vaccine, which protects against four meningococcal serogroups; A, C, W and Y, 
has been available nationally through private prescription, and from January 2017, some 
Australian states and territories have funded it, independent of the NIP. The vaccine became 
available to specific student groups in New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and 
Western Australia. There are three brands that have different age group-specific registration: 
brand names Menactra®, Menveo® and Nimenrix®. These vaccines provide 80–85% 
effectiveness after one dose.1 Immunity has been shown to wane following these vaccines; 
protective antibodies may last up to three years in children and five years in adolescents and 
adults (except for serogroup A which wanes earlier).1 MenACWY vaccine was used in 
September-October 2017 in response to an outbreak of MenW disease in several communities 
in the Northern Territory.10 
Similarly, MenB vaccine, brand name Bexsero®, is largely available via private prescription. 
However in April 2017, a study commenced in South Australia for students in years 10, 11 and 
12 (aged 15–19 years) who were enrolled in a two year study, ‘B Part of It’, and received the 
MenB vaccine.3 This vaccine protects against multiple strains of MenB disease as it contains 
the four major protein antigens that are highly conserved across serogroup B strains; however 
there are limited data on the duration of protection.3 The vaccine is not on the NIP nor is it 
funded in a state-wide program. 
Several groups of people are recommended to be vaccinated against IMD, such as people at 
increased risk, people in age groups with high carriage rates and travellers.3 People at 
increased risk of IMD include those with asplenia, immunocompromising conditions, or 
occupational exposure, and should be vaccinated with MenB and MenACWY vaccines.3 High 
risk age groups differ by serogroup however typically include infants aged ≤2 years and 
adolescents aged 15–19 years. People travelling to areas with increased risk of exposure such 
as the ‘meningitis belt’ of sub-Saharan Africa and those attending the Hajj should also be 
vaccinated. The changes to the IMD vaccine program since 2003 are described in Table 1, 
below.  
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Table 1. Nationally funded and state funded meningococcal vaccination programs in 
Australia (as of January 2018) 
Year 
launched 
Funding 
body 
Program Target age groups  / year level 
2003 National 
National 
MenC vaccine 
MenC vaccine (catch-up program until 2008) 
Aged 12 months 
All children aged 1–19 years 
2013 National Hib-MenC vaccine Aged 12 months 
2017 National 
State 
 
 
State 
 
 
State 
Hib-MenC vaccine 
MenACWY vaccine in Western Australia  
 
 
MenACWY vaccine in New South Wales 
 
 
MenACWY vaccine in Victoria, Tasmania & 
Queensland 
Aged 12 months 
High school years 10–12 in 2017 
Aged 18–19 years in 2017 
High school year 10 in 2018–19 
High school years 11–12 in 2017 
Aged 15–19 years in 2018 
High school year 10 in 2019 
Aged 15–19 years in 2017–18 
2018 State 
 
State 
MenACWY vaccine in Australian Capital 
Territory 
MenACWY vaccine in Western Australia  
Aged 16–19 years in 2018 
 
Aged 1–4 years in 2018 
Note. Table reproduced using information from Factsheet: Meningococcal disease, by the National 
Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance, 2017.3 Significant events in meningococcal 
vaccination practice in Australia, by the National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance, 
2015.11 Meningococcal W Disease, by the Australian Government Department of Health, 2018.5  
Hib-MenC vaccine – Meningococcal conjugate C-Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) vaccine, 
MenACWY vaccine – Meningococcal quadrivalent serogroups ACWY conjugate vaccine, MenC vaccine – 
Meningococcal conjugate C vaccine. All vaccines follow a one dose schedule. 
Changes in diagnostic testing may have had some impact on the number of IMD notifications. 
Neisseria meningitidis can be confirmed via a number of laboratory tests such as culture and 
nucleic acid amplification test (NAAT) for blood samples as well as NAAT, microscopy and 
culture for cerebrospinal fluid samples isolated from a normally sterile site.12,13 Phenotyping, to 
determine serogroup and subserogroup, is performed by National Neisseria Network 
laboratories by batching and testing of isolates.13 Genotyping is available via pulsed field gel 
electrophoresis, porA/porB sequencing and multilocus sequence typing where the chosen 
technique depends on the objective of the testing. Whole genome sequencing is being used to 
identify N. meningitidis serogroup strains and lineage to enhance IMD surveillance.14 
The Australian Meningococcal Surveillance Programme as established by the National 
Neisseria Network has consolidated IMD laboratory data from around Australia since 1994.15 
National Neisseria Network laboratories phenotype all isolates of suspected IMD in Australia. 
Data collected in the Australian Meningococcal Surveillance Programme are pooled from 
jurisdictions and support IMD surveillance to inform IMD epidemiology, particularly the 
distribution of age by serogroup.  
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This analysis provides a detailed overview of Australian IMD trends nationally and by 
jurisdiction, serogroup, age group, gender and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status from 
1999 to 2017, with a focus on the recent rise in MenW from 2012 to 2017. The aim of the 
study was to identify at-risk populations, and to inform vaccine policy and vaccination 
scheduling. Methods 
Study type 
A retrospective analysis was conducted of IMD cases reported to the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) core dataset by all Australian states and territories 
between 1 January 1999 and 30 June 2017. Hospital admission data obtained from the 
National Hospital Morbidity Database maintained by the Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare were also analysed. Patients discharged from public and private hospitals between 1 
January 1999 and 30 June 2016 with meningococcal infection as the primary or secondary 
diagnosis, were included.  Case definition 
There have been changes to the case definition used for IMD notifications reported in NNDSS 
as summarised in Table 2. The NNDSS case definition for confirmed and probable IMD is 
described in Figure 1. 
Table 2. Rules of reclassifying invasive meningococcal disease case notifications from a 
status of ‘probable’ to ‘confirmed’, NNDSS, 1991–2011 
Rule 1 
 
For cases notified from New South Wales, Northern Territory and Queensland, if a 
laboratory diagnostic method was recorded for an individual case, then the case was 
assumed to have received a positive result for that respective test. This rule was not 
applicable to cases from other jurisdictions.* 
Rule 2 
 
If a case was captured as ‘probable’, but recorded an assumed positive (as per Rule 1) 
definitive or suggestive laboratory diagnostic method, as per the case definitions in 
use at the time of reporting, then the case was reclassified as ‘confirmed’. 
Rule 3 
 
If a case was captured as ‘probable’, but had been assigned a phenotype, then the 
case was reclassified as ‘confirmed’, unless contradicting Rule 2 (i.e. when a 
laboratory diagnostic method did not fulfil the confirmed case definition in use at the 
time of reporting, e.g. antigen testing in specific years or jurisdictions). 
Note. Table reproduced from Appendix to the ATAGI pre-submission advice to PBAC regarding 4-
component Meningococcal B vaccine (4CMenV) Bexsero (CONFIDENTIAL), by the National Centre for 
Immunisation Research and Surveillance, 2013.16 
* Laboratory diagnostic method data from Victoria includes both negative and positive results, which 
cannot be differentiated in the NNDSS dataset. Jurisdictional authorities from South Australia and 
Western Australia reported a negative result for all probable cases for whom a laboratory diagnostic 
method was captured. No probable cases with laboratory diagnostic method data were identified from 
the Australian Capital Territory or Tasmania. NNDSS – National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System. 
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Figure 1. Reporting invasive meningococcal disease using NNDSS case definition, updated 28 
August 2006 
Note. Information from Meningococcal disease (invasive) surveillance case definition V1.4, by the 
Australian Government Department of Health, 2010.17  
DNA – deoxyribonucleic acid, IgG – immunoglobulin G, IgM – immunoglobulin M, NNDSS – National 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System. Data sources and collection 
Notifications 
Both confirmed and probable cases are notifiable in all jurisdictions in Australia.13 Data were 
extracted from the NNDSS on 12 September 2017.  
Diagnostic testing for N. meningitidis has changed and improved over the last two decades and 
differs by jurisdiction (Table 3). Culture has remained the gold standard for definitive diagnosis 
of N. meningitidis. Polymerase chain reaction or NAAT methods have become more acceptable 
over time, evolving from non-use, to suggestive evidence, to definitive evidence since 2007. 
Confirmed case 
- Laboratory definitive evidence; 
OR 
- Laboratory suggestive evidence AND 
clinical evidence. 
Probable case 
- Clinical evidence. 
Laboratory definitive evidence 
- Isolation of Neisseria meningitidis from a normally sterile site; 
OR 
- Detection of specific meningococcal DNA sequences in a specimen from a normally sterile 
site by nucleic acid amplification testing. 
Laboratory suggestive evidence 
- Detection of Gram-negative diplococci in Gram stain of specimen from a normally sterile 
site or from a suspicious skin lesion; 
OR 
- High titre IgM or significant rise in IgM or IgG to outer membrane protein antigens of N. 
meningitidis. 
Clinical evidence (confirmed case) 
- Disease which in the opinion of the 
treating clinician is compatible with 
IMD. 
Clinical evidence (probable case) 
- Absence of evidence for other causes of 
clinical symptoms; 
AND EITHER 
- Clinically compatible disease including 
haemorrhagic rash, OR clinically 
compatible disease and close contact 
with a confirmed case within the 
previous 60 days. 
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Bacteria detection via microscopy of a Gram stain has remained suggestive, as has serology. 
Antigen detection has not been an acceptable method for N. meningitidis diagnosis since 2007. 
Table 3. Evolution of the NNDSS invasive meningococcal disease case definition criteria for 
laboratory-suggestive and laboratory-definitive evidence for case confirmation 
Note. Table reproduced from Appendix to the ATAGI pre-submission advice to PBAC regarding 4-
component Meningococcal B vaccine (4CMenV) Bexsero (CONFIDENTIAL), by the National Centre for 
Immunisation Research and Surveillance, 2013.16 
*In the Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and Victoria: antigen testing was not listed in the criteria 
for confirmation – 1994 National Health and Medical Research Council case definitions used. In New 
South Wales, Northern Territory and Western Australia: a positive antigen test alone was indicative of a 
probable/presumptive case. In Queensland: a positive antigen test was indicative of a confirmed case. 
DNA – deoxyribonucleic acid, IgM – immunoglobulin M, IgG – immunoglobulin G, NNDSS – National 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System. Hospitalisations 
Hospital admissions with the International Classification of Disease and Related Health 
Problems, Tenth Revision, Australian Modification (ICD-10-AM) code A39 (meningococcal 
infection) listed as a diagnosis were eligible; including A39.0 (meningococcal meningitis), A39.1 
(Waterhouse-Friderichsen syndrome), A39.2 (acute meningococcaemia), A39.3 (chronic 
meningococcaemia), A39.4 (meningococcaemia, unspecified), A39.5 (meningococcal heart 
disease), A39.8 (other meningococcal infections) and A39.9 (meningococcal infection 
unspecified). Hospitalisation data were analysed by date of admission. Double counting of 
cases can occur as readmissions and transfers are logged as separate records.  Mortalities 
Mortality due to IMD was reported in the NNDSS core dataset as ‘died from disease’ and in the 
hospitalisation dataset as ‘separation mode’. The deaths reported in the NNDSS dataset and 
the hospitalisation dataset were analysed separately and not pooled. 
Laboratory finding Pre- 
2004 
2004 to 
Oct 2007 
Post- 
Oct 2007 
Culture isolation of Neisseria meningitidis from a normally 
sterile site  
Definitive Definitive Definitive 
Detection of specific meningococcal DNA sequences in a 
specimen from a normally sterile site by nucleic acid 
amplification testing 
Not 
applicable 
Suggestive Definitive 
Detection of Gram-negative diplococci in Gram stain of 
specimen from a normally sterile site or from a suspicious 
skin lesion 
Suggestive Suggestive Suggestive 
High titre IgM or significant rise in IgM or IgG titres to outer 
membrane protein antigens of N. meningitidis  
Suggestive Suggestive Suggestive 
Positive polysaccharide antigen test in cerebrospinal fluid Variable by 
jurisdiction* 
Suggestive No longer 
accepted 
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Population estimates 
Mid-year population estimates and population predictions by jurisdiction, age and Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander status were obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.18  Data cleaning 
In the NNDSS core dataset, when a case did not have a date of birth supplied (n=5) they were 
included in overall and subgroup analyses but were excluded from age analyses.  
The rules described in Table 2 were developed in 2013 in consultation between NCIRS and the 
Vaccine Preventable Diseases Surveillance Section of the Australian Government Department 
of Health, which manages the NNDSS. Due to inconsistencies within the NNDSS core dataset, 
these rules use strong evidence to reclassify cases from ‘probable’ to ‘confirmed’; note that 
these rules do not reclassify cases from ‘confirmed’ to ‘probable’.  Data analysis 
Rates were calculated using the mid-year estimated resident populations by sex, age, gender, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status, as released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
for the period 1999–2015 and population projections were used for the period 2016–2017 as 
denominators.18 Notification rates in 2017 were annualised. The analysis focused on IMD 
notifications between 2012 and 2017 since this period encompasses the rise in MenW cases. 
Annual rates are presented per 100,000 population. Secular trends of IMD notifications by 
serogroup and jurisdiction in Australia were explored. Subgroup analyses only include 
confirmed IMD cases.  
In relevant analyses, years were grouped based on vaccine introduction, serogroup dominance 
and serogroup emergence as: 1999–2003, 2004–2011, 2012–2014, 2015 and 2016–2017. 
Jurisdictions were grouped due to few notifications in some states and territories, and the 
groupings were based on geographical location and serogroup similarities; as a result, 
Tasmania was grouped with Victoria, and the Australian Capital Territory was grouped with 
New South Wales. Various age groupings were created for different analyses particularly 
focusing on several age groups in young children where disease was more common, such as 
five-year age groups and age by month up to 24 months. 
Notifications with Indigenous status recorded as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander were 
grouped as ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander’ and notifications with Indigenous status 
recorded as not Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, unknown or not stated were collectively 
grouped as ‘other Australians’. 
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Poisson 95% confidence intervals (CI) are presented for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
age comparison rates and binomial 95% CIs were calculated for CFR. Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-
sample tests were used to test for equality of distributions by age and serogroup over time.  
The analysis was conducted using Stata 14.0 and Microsoft Excel 2010.19 Ethics approval 
The study was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the Australian National 
University (2017/696). Results 
Study population 
A total of 6,646 notifications of IMD, including confirmed and probable cases, were reported to 
the NNDSS in the period 1 January 1999 to 30 June 2017 (Figure 2, Table 4). One hundred and 
fifty-two probable cases were reclassified as confirmed cases based on the rules previously 
described (Table 2). Confirmed notifications (6320/6646) were classified into serogroup 
categories; A, B, C, W, X, Y, non-groupable and not grouped. 
 
Figure 2. Flow chart illustrating the application of data cleaning methods and assumptions, 
and the resulting classification of notified invasive meningococcal disease cases by status 
and serogroup, NNDSS, Australia, 1999–2017  
NNDSS – National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System. 
152 cases recoded  
as “confirmed” 
NNDSS Dataset 
N=6,652 
Original status: Probable 
n=433 
Original status: Confirmed 
n=6,219 
Confirmed N. meningitidis 
n=6,371 
True probable 
n=281 
Serogroup A 
n=5 
Serogroup B 
n=3,803 
Serogroup C 
n=1,098 
Serogroup W 
n=351 
Serogroup Y 
n=250 
Non-groupable 
n=118 
Not grouped 
n=744 
Serogroup X 
n=2 
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Table 4. Characteristics of confirmed invasive meningococcal disease cases, Australia, 1999–
2017 
Characteristics Confirmed notifications 
N=6,371 (%) 
Age, median in years (range) 17 (0–102) 
Sex 
      Males 
 
3,378 (53.0) 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 529 (8.3) 
Serogroup 
      A 
      B 
      C 
      W 
      X 
      Y 
      Non-groupable 
      Not grouped 
 
5 (0.1) 
3,803 (59.7) 
1,098 (17.2) 
351 (5.5) 
2 (0.0) 
250 (3.9) 
118 (1.9) 
744 (11.7) 
State or territory 
      Australian Capital Territory 
      New South Wales 
      Northern Territory 
      Queensland 
      South Australia 
      Tasmania 
      Victoria 
      Western Australia 
 
78 (1.2) 
2,090 (32.8) 
120 (1.9) 
1,285 (20.2) 
471 (7.4) 
182 (2.9) 
1,460 (22.9) 
685 (10.8) 
Country of acquisition 
      Australia 
      Overseas 
      Unknown 
 
3,551 (55.7) 
24 (0.4) 
2,796 (43.9) Diagnostic method 
Completeness of diagnostic test data recorded in the NNDSS has improved over the last two 
decades from 64% of notifications recording diagnostic method in 1999 to 99% in 2016. 
Diagnosis via culture has been the dominant method since 1999. Secular trends 
Between 1 January 1999 and 30 June 2017, the average annual IMD notification rate was 1.7 
per 100,000 population, ranging from a high of 3.5 in 2001 to a low of 0.6 in 2013 (Figure 3). 
After this low in 2013, the annual rate increased in 2014 to 0.7 and further increased to 1.04 in 
2016. To date, there were 137 IMD notifications in Australia in 2017 (1.11 per 100,000); 
consisting of 37% MenB (51/137, 0.4 per 100,000), 34% MenW (46/137, 0.4 per 100,000) and 
19% MenY (26/137, 0.2 per 100,000). The steady rate increase since 2014 has been 
predominantly due to MenW and, to a lesser extent, MenY. The MenC notification rate is 
currently very low with 0.01 notifications per 100,000 annualised population in 2017. 
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MenB had been the dominant IMD serogroup for two decades, however it was temporarily 
exceeded by MenW from mid-2016 to early-2017. The percentage of confirmed notifications 
without a serogroup and either classified as ‘not grouped’ or ‘non-groupable’ decreased 
substantially from 28% (165/584) in 1999 to 5% (7/137) in 2017.  
IMD notifications follow a seasonal pattern with peaks in the winter months (e.g. quarter three 
in Figure 3 inset). However, recently IMD notifications have increased in the ‘off-season’ during 
the warmer months of the year, in quarter four of 2016 and quarter one of 2017, primarily due 
to the increase in MenW and MenY cases.
 
Figure 3. Secular trends in the invasive meningococcal disease notification rate by serogroup 
and year, Australia, 1999–2017 
Trends not shown for serogroups A (n=5) and X (n=2).  Age and sex distribution 
IMD notification rates for the period 2016–2017 were highest in children aged <5 years (3.5 
per 100,000) and in people aged 15–24 years (2.4 per 100,000) (Figure 4). The bimodal age 
distribution has been evident for the past two decades and continues to be present. However, 
more recently this pattern evolved with the emergence of MenW and MenY, with adults aged 
≥65 years also at high risk of disease (rate of 1.4 per 100,000) (Appendix 3, Appendix 4).  The 
highest notification rate for MenY was among those aged ≥55 years and the peaks in younger 
age groups were less pronounced (Appendix 5). MenB remained dominant in those aged <30 
years (Appendix 6). 
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The proportion of total IMD notifications in those aged ≥65 years increased from 4% in 1999 to 
18% in 2017 (Figure 5, Appendix 7, Appendix 8). Approximately 41% of MenB notifications 
were in those aged <15 years, compared to 17% of MenW notifications and less than 15% of 
MenY notifications (Appendix 5, Appendix 7).  The majority of MenB cases were aged 15–24 
years, while the majority of MenW and MenY cases were aged ≥65 years.  
Figure 4. Invasive meningococcal disease notification rate by five-year age group and 
serogroup, Australia, 2016–2017 
 
Figure 5. The proportion of invasive meningococcal disease notifications in each age group, 
0–4, 15–24 and ≥65 years, Australia, 1999–2017 
The MenW notification rate steadily increased over the period 2012–2017, particularly in those 
aged <5 years, 15–24 years and ≥65 years. In 2016, there was a steep increase in MenW 
notifications and notification rate in all age groups except for those aged 10–14 years. The 
initial emergence of MenW can be seen in the older population (aged ≥65 years) in 2013, with 
notifications roughly doubling each year from 2012 to 2015 and tripling from 2015 to 2016. 
The MenW emergence was not clearly noticeable in younger populations until 2016.  
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The MenW notification rate for the population aged <1 year increased four-fold from 0.65 in 
2015 to 2.86 per 100,000 population in 2016, however to date in 2017, this age group had only 
one MenW notification (Figure 6, Figure 7).  
Figure 6. Age-specific invasive meningococcal disease notifications and notification rate 
caused by serogroup W, Australia, 2012–2017 
 
Figure 7. Age-specific invasive meningococcal disease notification rate per year for age 
groups 0–4, 15–24 and ≥65 years caused by serogroup W, Australia, 1999–2017 
The percentage of notifications in males varied by serogroup, with a higher proportion of male 
MenB notifications (p<0.001) and a higher proportion of female MenY notifications (p<0.001).  Geographical variation 
In the period 2012–2017, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory (together) had 
the highest total number of IMD notifications (n=302); however in 2017 alone, Victoria and 
Tasmania (together) had the most notifications (n=41) (Table 5, Figure 8, Table 6). South 
Australia was the state with the highest notification rate in 2017 with 1.62 per 100,000 
population.  
Chapter 2  Data Analysis 
31 
Table 5. Annual invasive meningococcal disease notifications and notification rate, n (rate 
per 100,000 population), by jurisdiction, Australia, 2012–2017 
ACT – Australian Capital Territory, NSW – New South Wales, NT – Northern Territory, Qld – Queensland, 
SA – South Australia, Tas – Tasmania, Vic – Victoria, WA – Western Australia. 
 
                                (1) Serogroup B                                                                     (2) Serogroup Y 
 
                                (3) Serogroup W                                                                 (4) Serogroups ACWY 
 
Figure 8. Invasive meningococcal disease notification rate by serogroup and jurisdiction, 
Australia, 2014–2017 
Y-axis scales are different. Rates for Northern Territory are not shown due to small numbers. 
In 2017 the jurisdictional rates were unstable and varied substantially by quarter (Figure 8). 
Queensland and Victoria/Tasmania (together) experienced an emergence of MenY, while the 
notification rate for MenW increased in all states and territories since 2015. Hence, all 
jurisdictions experienced an increase in the proportion of IMD notifications due to MenACWY 
(Figure 9). In 2017, the dominant IMD serogroup was MenW in Victoria, Tasmania and 
Western Australia, MenW and MenY notifications were equal in the Northern Territory, Men B 
and MenY notifications were equal in Queensland, serogroup B remained dominant in New 
South Wales and South Australia, and the Australian Capital Territory did not have any IMD 
cases (Table 6). 
Year NSW+ACT NT Qld SA Vic+Tas WA Australia 
2017  31 (0.8) 2 (1.6) 34 (1.4) 14 (1.6) 41 (1.2) 14 (1.0) 136  (1.1) 
2016 73 (0.9) 2 (0.8) 44 (0.9) 27 (1.6) 84 (1.3) 21 (0.8) 251 (1.0) 
2015 46 (0.6) 1 (0.4) 31 (0.6) 29 (1.7) 58 (0.9) 17 (0.7) 182 (0.8) 
2014 39 (0.5) 3 (1.2) 40 (0.8) 33 (2.0) 35 (0.6) 18 (0.7) 168 (0.7) 
2013 48 (0.6) 2 (0.8) 32 (0.7) 20 (1.2) 28 (0.4) 15 (0.6) 145 (0.6) 
2012 65 (0.8) 4 (1.7) 63 (1.4) 29 (1.8) 42 (0.7) 18 (0.7) 221 (1.0) 
Total notifications 302 14 244 152 288 103 1,103 
Average rate 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 
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Table 6. Invasive meningococcal disease notifications by jurisdiction and serogroup, 
Australia, 2017 
Australian Capital Territory did not have any cases in 2017. NSW – New South Wales, NT – Northern 
Territory, Qld – Queensland, SA – South Australia, Tas – Tasmania, Vic – Victoria, WA – Western 
Australia. 
 
Figure 9. Proportion of invasive meningococcal disease notifications caused by serogroup B 
and serogroups ACWY by jurisdiction, Australia, 2004–2017 
Tables contain number of notifications. ACT – Australian Capital Territory, NSW – New South Wales, NT 
– Northern Territory, Qld – Queensland, SA – South Australia, Tas – Tasmania, Vic – Victoria, WA – 
Western Australia. Invasive meningococcal disease in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status was known for 89% (5686/6371) of confirmed IMD 
cases from 1999 to 2017. The IMD notification rate was higher in the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander population, particularly in those aged <5 years (Table 7, Figure 10). In children 
aged <5 years, the MenW notification rate in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people was 
2.77 (95% CI: 1.47–4.73) compared to 0.30 (95% CI: 0.19–0.45) per 100,000 population for 
other Australians (risk ratio 9.21, 95% CI: 4.31–18.82, p<0.001) for the period 2012 to 2017. 
MenB and MenW rates were higher in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people aged <10 
years (p<0.001) compared to other Australians. 
Serogroup NSW NT Qld SA Tas Vic WA Australia 
B 17 0 12 8 2 8 4 51 
C 3 0 0 0 0 2 1 6 
W 5 1 8 4 5 16 7 46 
Y 3 1 12 2 0 7 1 26 
Non groupable 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Not grouped 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 6 
Probable 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 31 2 35 14 7 34 14 137 
Chapter 2  Data Analysis 
33 
Table 7. Invasive meningococcal disease notification rate ratio by serogroup, 2012–2017 
*Rate per 100,000 population. 
(a) Serogroup B 
 
(b) Serogroup Y 
 
 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians 
Other 
Australians 
Rate 
ratio 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
p-value 
Serogroup n Rate* n Rate*   
B 82 2.1 574 0.5 4.5 3.6–5.6 <0.001 
C 4 0.1 29 0.0 4.4 1.2–11.2 0.021 
W 17 0.4 206 0.2 2.6 1.5–4.2 <0.001 
Y 4 0.1 127 0.1 1.0 0.3–2.6 0.938 
All IMD 111 2.8 992 0.8 3.6 2.9–4.3 <0.001 
0 
0.0 
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(c) Serogroup W 
 
(d) Serogroups ACWY 
 
Figure 10. Invasive meningococcal disease notification rate (95% confidence interval) for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians and other Australians by serogroup and age 
group, Australia, 2012–2017  
Tables contain number of notifications. *Statistically significant difference, p<0.05, between age-specific 
invasive meningococcal disease notification rate among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians 
and other Australians.  
0.0 
0.0 
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Severe morbidity and mortality Notifications 
From 1999 to 2017, 301 notified cases, confirmed (297/301) and probable (4/301), were 
reported to have died due to IMD with 57 deaths since 2012 (Appendix 9). Of these, 46% 
(26/57) were male, 14% (8/57) were Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander, and the mean and 
median ages were 34 years and 23 years, respectively. Thirty percent (17/57) were aged <5 
years, 26% (15/57) were aged 15–24 years and 25% (14/57) were aged ≥65 years.  
During the period 2012–2017, 57 notified cases were reported to have died from IMD resulting 
in a CFR of 5.2% (Table 8, Appendix 10). The age group with the highest CFR was persons aged 
≥65 years with 8.9% (14/157). The overall CFR for MenW was 8.1% for this period with 18 of 
the 223 notified cases reported to have died from MenW IMD. Cases aged 25–49 years had the 
highest CFR for MenW whereas cases aged 15–24 years had the highest CFR among MenY 
notifications. However, in the relevant study periods for MenC and MenB, the highest CFR was 
among those aged ≥65 years with both over 12%. In 2016 and 2017, there were 20 deaths (CFR 
5.2%) with the highest CFR among those aged 1–4 years with 7.3% (3/41). The CFR for MenW 
was significantly greater (p=0.0276) than MenB during the 2012–2017 period. 
Twenty-eight percent (16/57) of the deaths among IMD notifications between 2012 and 2017 
were in NSW (Appendix 11). There were no deaths among IMD notifications recorded in the 
Australian Capital Territory in this time period.  
Table 8. Invasive meningococcal disease case-fatality ratio by age group and serogroup, 
Australia (NNDSS)  
Age Group 
(years) 
Serogroup B 
2004–2017 
Serogroup C  
1999–2002 
Serogroup W  
2012–2017 
Serogroup Y 
2012–2017 
CFR 95% CI CFR 95% CI CFR 95% CI CFR 95% CI 
<1 7.0 4.8–9.8 11.5 2.4–30.2 6.3 0.2–30.2  0 - 
1–4 3.5 2.0–5.7 0 - 4.8 0.1–23.8 0 - 
5–14 0.8 0.1–3.0 4.3 1.2–10.6 0 - 0 - 
15–24 2.6 1.5–4.0 5.8 3.4–9.3 11.5 4.4–23.4 9.1 1.1–29.2 
25–49 4.3 2.3–7.3 12.0 7.0–18.8 12.1 3.4–28.2 0 - 
50–64 8.5 4.6–14.1 13.2 4.4–28.1 0 - 0 - 
≥65 12.8 6.8–21.2 15.2 5.1–31.9 9.7 3.6–19.9 7.5 2.1–18.2 
Total 4.4*‡ 3.6–5.3 7.1‡ 5.3–9.3 8.1* 4.9–12.5 4.6 1.7–9.7 
2012–2017 4.3† 2.9–6.1 12.1 3.4–28.2 8.1* 4.9–12.5 4.6 1.7–9.7 
Note year period varies by serogroup, and one death caused by MenB had unknown age. 
CFR – case fatality ratio (%), CI – confidence interval, NNDSS – National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System.  
* MenW (2012–2017) CFR was greater than MenB (2004–2017) CFR, p=0.014,  
† MenW (2012–2017) CFR was greater than MenB (2012–2017) CFR, p=0.028,  
‡ MenC (1999–2002) CFR was greater than MenB (2004–2017) CFR, p=0.004. 
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Hospitalisations 
From 1 January 1999 to 30 June 2016, there were a total of 68,249 hospital bed days (average 
3,900 per year) for patients with a meningococcal diagnosis, and a total of 55,476 hospital bed 
days (average 3,170 per year) for patients with meningococcal infection as their primary 
diagnosis. Eighty-seven percent (7991/9136) of hospitalisations had meningococcal infection 
as the primary diagnosis. Thirty-five percent of those with a primary diagnosis of 
meningococcal infection (2819/7991) did not have a secondary diagnosis recorded (Table 9). 
Table 9. Top 10 secondary diagnoses of meningococcal disease hospitalisations, Australia, 1 
January 1999–30 June 2016 
The proportion of hospitalisations with meningococcal infection coded as the primary 
diagnosis was highest among children aged 1–4 year (95%) and lowest among those aged ≥65 
years (59%). The median length of stay was five days (Figure 10). Of the hospitalisations with 
meningococcal infection as any diagnosis, 302 (3.3%) were recorded as dying during their 
hospital stay; 264 (2.9%) had meningococcal infection coded as their primary diagnosis. The 
proportion of meningococcal infection hospitalisations (as any diagnosis) that died during the 
hospital stay varied across age groups from 1% in persons aged 5–14 years to 11% in adults 
aged ≥65 years. 
Children aged <5 years had the highest rate of hospitalisations and highest mortality rate in 
hospitalised cases between 1999 and 2016. However, the longest average length of hospital 
stay was seen in the older age groups (≥50 years) and was almost double that of children aged 
<5 years. 
Secondary diagnosis 
Top 10 
Proportion of primary meningococcal 
hospitalisations (N=9,136) 
n % 
Meningitis in bacterial diseased classified elsewhere 1,201 13% 
Unavailability and inaccessibility of healthcare facilities 587 6% 
Tobacco use, current 504 6% 
Acute kidney failure, unspecified 335 4% 
Volume depletion 320 4% 
Coagulation defect, unspecified 313 3% 
Hypotension, unspecified 282 3% 
Acidosis 246 3% 
Hypokalaemia 230 3% 
Meningococcaemia, unspecified 216 2% 
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Table 10. Meningococcal disease hospitalisations, length of stay and mortality by age group, 
Australia, 1 January 1999–30 June 2016 
^ Principal diagnosis (hospitalisations), *Average annual age-specific rate per 100,000 population, LOS – 
length of stay in hospital, † Mortality in hospitalisations. 
The average annual hospitalisation rate was 2.5 per 100,000 population and the hospitalisation 
pattern generally reflected the notification rate with both rates declining between 2007 and 
2013. During the period 1999–2016, the Northern Territory had the highest average rate of 
hospitalisations (3.7 per 100,000 population), the Australian Capital Territory had the lowest 
rate (1.5 per 100,000 population) while the remaining states and territories had very similar 
hospitalisation rates between 2.3–2.5 per 100,000 population. 
 
Figure 11. Invasive meningococcal disease notification rate and meningococcal disease 
hospitalisation rate by year of diagnosis/admission and case fatality ratio of invasive 
meningococcal disease notifications, Australia, 1999–2016 
The rate of hospitalisations due to meningococcal disease was typically higher than the IMD 
notification rate (Figure 11). Both the IMD notification rate and the rate of hospitalisations due 
to meningococcal infection decreased from 1999 to 2016. However, the CFR varied from a low 
of 2.6% in 1999 to a high of 6.6% in 2015.  
Age Group, 
years 
Hospitalisations LOS per admission, days Mortality† 
n (^) Rate* (^) Median  (^) n % Rate* 
<1 1,277 (1,198) 26.7 (25.1) 6  (6) 52 4.1 1.1 
1–4 1,726 (1,647) 9.1 (8.7) 4  (4) 34 2.0 0.2 
5–14 1,263 (1,193) 2.6 (2.5) 4  (4) 18 1.4 0.0 
15–24 2,286 (2,080) 4.8 (4.2) 6  (6) 47 2.0 0.1 
25–49 1,289 (1,065) 1.0 (0.8) 6  (6) 59 4.6 0.0 
50–64 651 (486) 1.1 (0.8) 8  (7) 31 4.8 0.1 
≥65 544 (322) 1.1 (0.7) 10  (9) 61 11.2 0.1 
Total 9,136 (7,991) 2.5 (2.2) 5 (5) 302 3.3 0.1 
Year 
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Discussion 
The invasive meningococcal disease notification rate declined almost five-fold from 1999 to 
2013, with this reduction attributed to the MenC immunisation program implemented in 2003. 
However, emergence of IMD serogroups W and Y caused the average IMD notification rate to 
increase 1.8 times from the lowest rate recorded, in 2013, to mid-2017. In Australia, there 
were more MenW notifications in 2016 than any other IMD serogroup. In the first half of 2017 
there were more MenB notifications than MenW notifications. MenW has displayed similar 
patterns internationally with reports of MenW emergence in the United Kingdom and Chile as 
early as 2009.2 In 2014 to 2015, 25% of all IMD cases in the United Kingdom were due to 
MenW, while in Chile MenW comprised 59% of cases in 2012.20,21 In South America, the 
proportion of IMD cases caused by serogroup W has increased since the mid-2000s in Brazil 
and Argentina. Several Scandinavian countries have experienced MenY emergence in recent 
years with serogroup Y causing half of all IMD cases from 2011 to 2013.22 The proportion of 
MenY cases also increased in England and Wales each year from 2007 to 2009.22  
The emerging strains, MenW and MenY, were initially observed in older Australians and 
subsequently spread to affect young infants and adolescents. This contrasting age pattern to 
the bimodal age distribution of meningococcal serogroups B and C has been reported in other 
settings around the world such as Europe and the United States of America.22,23 
IMD can be treated with antibiotics, however the morbidity and mortality associated with IMD 
is substantial.3 For the relevant study periods, the case fatality ratio was greater among MenW 
cases than MenB cases (p=0.028), which could partially be explained by the higher median age 
of MenW cases compared to MenB, 37 years and 18 years respectively. The MenW cases in 
the United Kingdom have a high CFR (12%) that is consistent with our data (MenW CFR of 9% 
in 2017).21,22 The burden of MenB disease was much higher among young people while the 
burden of MenW and MenY disease lies in older populations. 
The state with the greatest number of MenW cases was Victoria, which had 42% of all MenW 
cases in 2016–2017. Victoria also had the greatest increase in MenW notifications from zero 
notifications in 2012 to 64 notifications in 2016–2017. The MenW notification rate increased in 
all states and territories since 2015. The greatest increase in MenY notifications was seen in 
Queensland from five notifications in 2012 to 25 notifications in 2016–2017. Three of the five 
MenA cases and the two serogroup X cases notified between 1999 and 2007 were reported in 
Queensland. 
The number of hospitalisations coded with a meningococcal-related diagnosis was higher than 
the number of IMD notifications due to the severity of disease causing cases to almost always 
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seek medical treatment, and the high rate of readmission and transfer to a higher care facility. 
This is aided by good notification practices resulting in nearly complete IMD notification data. 
The ratio of hospitalisations to notifications was usually between 1.4 and 1.6, with 2007 and 
2012 as notable exceptions. This pattern is consistent with cases having more than one 
recorded hospital stay during their illness. 
N. meningitidis carriage rates are found to be higher in males, which is supported by MenB 
disproportionately affecting males more than females (p<0.001), however MenY appears to 
affect more females than males (p<0.001).24,25 Consistent with previous studies, IMD also 
disproportionately affects Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people compared to people 
who do not identify as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander.26,27 The significantly higher 
notification rate among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children has potential implications 
for targeting vaccination policies for IMD caused by MenB and MenACWY serogroups, 
especially for children aged <5 years.  
Meningococcal vaccination schedules have changed substantially in 2017 and 2018, with five 
states and territories independently funding the MenACWY vaccine for the late adolescent and 
young adult age group. The various changes and the status of IMD vaccinations offered are 
described in Table 1. Evaluation of the state-based MenACWY immunisation programs will 
provide evidence for a potential adolescent national program as part of the NIP in 2019.  
There are a number of limitations of this study, particularly due to data completeness and 
robustness. The vaccination status field was not well recorded in the NNDSS dataset; hence an 
estimation of vaccine effectiveness was not possible. In the National Hospital Morbidity 
Database, single meningococcal cases were counted several times due to cases having been 
readmitted or transferred, resulting in additional hospital admissions. ICD-10-AM codes used 
to identify meningococcal diagnosis in this analysis have not been validated and do not 
necessarily represent a case of IMD. Furthermore, the hospitalisation dataset does not include 
diagnosis confirmation or IMD serogroup. These are commonly reported issues in hospital 
analyses of communicable diseases.28 Hospital length of stay is likely to be an underestimate 
from 2012 onwards since at this time the recording of length of stay in the dataset was capped 
at a maximum of 30 days, regardless of whether the case stayed longer in hospital. Some 
subgroup analyses dealt with few notifications and resulted in non-significant results. 
Although IMD remains rare in Australia, notifications have risen due to an increase in disease 
caused by serogroups W and Y. The variation of dominant IMD serogroup between states and 
territories has implications for appropriate selection of national vaccination strategies.  
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Appendices  Appendix 1. Abstract accepted for oral presentation at the 10th New Zealand National Immunisation Conference 2017 
Title: The changing epidemiology of invasive meningococcal disease in Australia, continuing 
rise in meningococcal W disease 
Presenter: Julia Maguire, National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance 
Authors: Julia Maguire, Cyra Patel, Clayton Chiu, Helen Quinn 
Introduction: Invasive meningococcal disease (IMD) is endemic in Australia. Meningococcal 
serogroup B (MenB) has been the dominant serogroup for more than a decade before 2016, 
especially since the introduction of a Meningococcal C conjugate vaccination program in 2003. 
Notifications of IMD cases caused by meningococcal W (MenW) and Y (MenY) are noted to 
have increased since 2013. We examined recent trends in the epidemiology of IMD to inform 
potential immunisation strategies.  
Methods: We analysed IMD cases notified to the Australian National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System (NNDSS) between 01 January 1999 and 30 June 2017. Notification rates 
and trends by IMD serogroup, age, jurisdiction and Indigenous status were analysed, and case-
fatality ratios (CFR) calculated. 
Results and discussion: Nationally, total IMD notifications have declined from 2003 and 
reached a nadir in 2013, largely due to a decrease in MenB and MenC notifications. MenW and 
MenY IMD were rare. However, from 2013 to 2016, the MenW notification rate rose from 0.05 
to 0.45 per 100,000, and rates of MenW and MenY progressively increased over each quarter 
of 2016. In 2016, MenW exceeded MenB as the dominant IMD serogroup (44% vs. 37%, 
respectively). Initial rise of MenW occurred in older adults, but in 2016–17 MenW rates were 
highest in those aged <5, 15–24 and ≥65 years which peaked at age 70–74 years. As with 
MenB, MenW notification rate was higher in Indigenous children aged <5 years than their non-
Indigenous counterparts for 2012–2017 (rate ratio 9.6, 95% CI: 4.5–19.8, p<0.001). However, 
for those aged 15–24 years, there were 44 notifications among non-Indigenous but none 
among Indigenous Australians. Between 2012 and 2017, the CFR for MenW was 6.9% (95% CI: 
3.8–11.2), including seven deaths in both 2015 and 2016, as compared to 4.3% (95% CI: 2.8–
6.1) for MenB, including four deaths in 2015 and two deaths in 2016 (MenW vs. MenB, p=0.9).  
Conclusion: There is a rising trend in MenW IMD in Australia. Age groups with peak 
notifications include young children, late adolescents to young adults, and older individuals 
aged ≥65 years. These epidemiological observations inform considerations of national 
strategies for controlling meningococcal disease, including the potential use of vaccination.  
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Appendix 2. Oral presentation slides for the 10th New Zealand National Immunisation Conference 2017, Wellington, New Zealand (8th September 2017) 
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Appendix 3. Invasive meningococcal disease notification rate by age group and diagnosis year, Australia, 1999–2017 
Year 
Age group, years 
<1 1–4 5–14 15–24 25–49 50–64 ≥65 
2017 9.8 2.2 0.5 2.1 0.5 0.9 1.3 
2016 8.6 2.2 0.3 2.2 0.5 0.7 1.4 
2015 6.2 2.1 0.3 1.8 0.2 0.4 1.0 
2014 10.8 1.5 0.5 1.8 0.2 0.3 0.6 
2013 7.7 1.8 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 
2012 9.8 3.1 0.7 1.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 
2011 11.4 2.8 0.8 2.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 
2010 10.8 4.2 0.9 1.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 
2009 15.9 3.7 1.1 2.3 0.5 0.4 0.2 
2008 18.5 4.0 1.1 2.6 0.7 0.4 0.3 
2007 15.1 5.9 1.1 3.1 0.4 0.6 0.5 
2006 22.1 4.9 1.0 3.0 0.7 0.4 0.5 
2005 21.4 6.7 1.8 3.2 0.8 0.9 0.7 
2004 23.4 6.6 1.4 3.7 0.9 1.2 0.9 
2003 24.1 9.1 2.6 5.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 
2002 27.7 9.1 3.2 7.9 1.3 1.3 0.9 
2001 31.4 9.9 3.4 6.0 1.6 1.0 1.3 
2000 29.1 11.9 3.0 7.1 1.2 1.1 0.6 
1999 35.1 11.6 2.9 6.5 1.1 0.9 1.1 
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Appendix 4. Age-specific invasive meningococcal disease notification rate for age groups 0–4, 15–24 and ≥65 years, Australia, 1999–2017 
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Appendix 5. Invasive meningococcal disease notification rate per 100,000 population by age group for serogroups B, W and Y, Australia, 2012–2017 
Age Group, years Serogroup B Serogroup W Serogroup Y Serogroups ACWY 
<1 6.5 0.9 0.3 1.4 
1–4 1.6 0.3 0.0 0.4 
5–9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 
10–14 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 
15–24 1.3 0.3 0.1 0.5 
25–49 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 
50–64 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 
≥65 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 
Total 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 
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Appendix 6. Invasive meningococcal disease notification rate by age and serogroup for ages 0–30 years and 0–23 months (inset), Australia, 2016–2017 
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Appendix 7. Cumulative incidence of invasive meningococcal disease notifications by age group and serogroup, Australia, 2012–2017 
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Appendix 8. Proportion (%) of invasive meningococcal disease notifications by age group for serogroups B, W and Y, Australia, 2012–2017 
Age Group, years Serogroup B Serogroup W Serogroup Y 
<1 17 7 4 
1–4 17 9 2 
5–9 4 2 2 
10–14 3 1 2 
15–24 33 23 17 
25–49 13 15 15 
50–64 7 15 20 
≥65 6 28 40 
Total 100 100 100 
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Appendix 9. Invasive meningococcal disease mortality by age group, Australia, 2012–2017 (NNDSS) 
NNDSS – National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System.  
Age Group, years 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Total Average 
<1 1 - - 4 - 3 8 1.3 
1–4 1 2 - 2 1 3 9 1.5 
5–14 - - - - - - - - 
15–24 2 3 4 1 1 3 15 2.5 
25–49 1 3 2 - 1 1 7 1.2 
50–64 2 - 1 - 1 - 4 0.7 
≥65 2 3 5 1 1 2 14 2.3 
Total 9 11 12 8 5 12 57 9.5 
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Appendix 10. Invasive meningococcal disease mortalities and case-fatality ratio by age group and serogroup, Australia (NNDSS)  (a) Serogroup B and serogroup C 
Age Group 
(years) 
Serogroup B 2004–2017 Serogroup C 1999–2002 
n N CFR 95% CI n N CFR 95% CI 
<1 31 441 7.0 4.8–9.8 3 26 11.5 2.4–30.2 
1–4 16 453 3.5 2.0–5.7 - 90 - - 
5–14 2 237 0.8 0.1–3.0 4 93 4.3 1.2–10.6 
15–24 18 698 2.6 1.5–4.0 16 275 5.8 3.4–9.3 
25–49 13 301 4.3 2.3–7.3 16 133 12.0 7.0–18.8 
50–64 13 153 8.5 4.6–14.1 5 38 13.2 4.4–28.1 
≥65 12 94 12.8 6.8–21.2 5 33 15.2 5.1–31.9 
Total 105 2,378 4.4*# 3.6–5.3 49 688 7.1# 5.3–9.3 
2012–2017 28 656 4.3^ 2.9–6.1 4 33 12.1 3.4–28.2 (b) Serogroup W and serogroup Y 
Age Group 
(years) 
Serogroup W 2012–2017 Serogroup Y 2012–2017 
n N CFR 95% CI n N CFR 95% CI 
<1 1 16 6.3 0.2–30.2   5 - - 
1–4 1 21 4.8 0.1–23.8 - 2 - - 
5–14 - 6 - - - 4 - - 
15–24 6 52 11.5 4.4–23.4 2 22 9.1 1.1–29.2 
25–49 4 33 12.1 3.4–28.2 - 19 - - 
50–64 - 33 - - - 26 - - 
≥65 6 62 9.7 3.6–19.9 4 53 7.5 2.1–18.2 
Total 18 223 8.1* 4.9–12.5 6 131 4.6 1.7–9.7 
Note year period varies by serogroup, and one death caused by MenB had unknown age. 
CFR – case fatality ratio (%), CI – confidence interval, NNDSS – National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System.  
* MenW (2012–2017) CFR was greater than MenB (2004–2017) CFR, p=0.014,  
^ MenW (2012–2017) CFR was greater than MenB (2012–2017) CFR, p=0.028,  
# MenC (1999–2002) CFR was greater than MenB (2004–2017) CFR, p=0.004. 
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Appendix 11. Invasive meningococcal disease mortality by residential state and territory, Australia, 2012–2017 (NNDSS) 
ACT – Australian Capital Territory, NSW – New South Wales, NNDSS – National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System, NT – Northern Territory, Qld – Queensland, SA – South Australia, Tas – Tasmania, 
Vic – Victoria, WA – Western Australia. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA Australia 
2017 - 2 - - 1 1 3 2 9 
2016 - 4 - - 1 - 3 3 11 
2015 - 3 1 5 1 - 1 1 12 
2014 - 2 - 2 1 - 1 2 8 
2013 - 2 - - 1 - 1 1 5 
2012 - 3 1 3 1 - 1 3 12 
Total deaths - 16 2 10 6 1 10 12 57 
Average number of deaths 
per year (2012–2017) - 2.7 0.3 1.7 1.0 0.2 1.7 2.0 9.5 
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Prologue Study rationale 
A chickenpox outbreak occurred over the 2016–2017 summer school holiday period among 
vaccinated children at an outside school hours care facility (OSHC) in Queensland and was 
declared over on 27 February 2017. In April 2017, I was contacted to conduct a vaccine 
effectiveness (VE) study since there is limited evidence regarding varicella one-dose VE in 
Australia. The Australian Immunisation Handbook recommends two doses of varicella vaccine, 
the first dose at 18 months of age and the second dose in children under 14 years of age, 
however the second dose is unfunded and uptake is known to be low.1 
After a decade of a nationally funded one-dose strategy in Australia, evidence obtained via 
enhanced varicella surveillance and outbreak investigations would assist an assessment for the 
potential inclusion of a second vaccine dose on the National Immunisation Program (NIP) to 
improve varicella control. This chapter describes the chickenpox outbreak and the subsequent 
VE study.  My role 
Dr Megan Young from Metro North Public Health Unit (PHU) in Queensland provided guidance 
with the study methods, ethics approvals and the draft study proposal. Ms Kim Langfeldt, a 
public health nurse at Metro North PHU, coordinated the recruitment with the OSHC, and 
provided the Australian Immunisation Register (AIR)/Australian Childhood Immunisation 
Register (ACIR), Queensland Health Notifiable Conditions System (NOCS), Vaccination 
Information and Vaccination Administration System (VIVAS) and clinical data. I wrote the study 
materials (Appendix 1, Appendix 2) including study protocol, participant questionnaire and 
participant information sheet, I coordinated the ethics applications, collected questionnaire 
results from Survey Monkey, analysed results, and wrote the epidemiological report, this 
chapter, and the lay summary (Appendix 3) that was sent to interested participants, the OSHC 
and the study investigators. Lessons learned 
I have learnt many valuable lessons throughout this project, most before it had even started. 
Firstly, I had never before submitted an ethics application to a Human Research Ethics 
Committee. The entire ethics process took many months and surprised me with the level of 
bureaucracy at each step along the way. We first submitted a Low/Negligible Risk application 
to the Prince Charles Hospital in Queensland, as advised by my co-investigators at Metro North 
PHU. Three weeks later this Low/Negligible Risk application was approved. I began the Site 
Specific Assessments that were required at each site – Metro North PHU in Queensland and 
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National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) via the Sydney Children’s 
Hospital Network in New South Wales. During this process it became apparent that I was not 
able to complete a Site Specific Assessment for New South Wales on the Online Form (the 
ethics application online system) for a Low/Negligible Risk application that was lodged in 
Queensland. As a result, I was required to submit a National Ethics Application Form. I 
subsequently completed the National Ethics Application Form and this, along with the 
Australian National University Human Research Ethics Committee application, was approved. I 
resumed the Site Specific Assessments and submitted them, with help from Megan Young who 
took the reins on the Queensland-specific application. A Research Collaboration Agreement 
between the two sites was also required due to the multi-state nature of the study. I started 
the ethics process in late April 2017 and we were ready to begin recruitment almost six 
months later in mid-October 2017. In addition to learning a lot about ethics applications, I also 
learnt how to write a study protocol, a participant information sheet and a participant 
questionnaire using Survey Monkey.  
While conducting the study, I learnt that flexibility is important. The delay in participant 
recruitment impacted the response rate and I was forced to alter the study design from a 
cohort study to a case-control study. I learnt how to calculate VE using both methodologies. As 
we did not achieve statistically significant results, due to the small sample size and 
homogeneity of vaccination status, the final recommendations were not as strong as initially 
planned. 
Although this project did not allow me to immediately investigate a communicable disease 
outbreak, I was still able to put the ten steps of outbreak investigation into practice. From 
confirming the varicella diagnosis and the existence of an outbreak, defining and counting 
cases, examining time, person and place, and planning and conducting a study to test my 
hypothesis. 
Collaborating with the co-investigators was also important, as was making use of experts in the 
network such as Professor Martyn Kirk, the former Master of Philosophy in Applied 
Epidemiology (MAE) course director, for ad hoc advice on study design.  Public health implications 
The study adds to the evidence base of the effectiveness of a one-dose policy and highlights 
the continued occurrence of breakthrough varicella despite high vaccine coverage. 
Participating in this study and receiving the lay summary of study findings hopefully increased 
awareness of breakthrough chickenpox and the availability of a second vaccine dose for the 
parents and staff of the OSHC. 
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Abstract 
Introduction 
A chickenpox outbreak in vaccinated children attending an outside school hours care (OSHC) 
facility in Brisbane presented the opportunity to add to the literature regarding varicella 
vaccine effectiveness (VE). To our knowledge there have not been any similar studies 
conducted in Australia since 2007.  
Methods 
A case-control study was conducted to estimate varicella VE during an outbreak in children 
who attended the OSHC between 11 August 2017 and 29 October 2017. We performed an 
incremental VE calculation comparing one dose to two doses of varicella vaccine, using 
responses to a questionnaire administered to parents of children who regularly attended the 
OSHC.   
Results 
There were approximately 249 regular attendees of the OSHC during the outbreak period. We 
received 47 complete questionnaire responses, of which a total of seven children were 
diagnosed with chickenpox between 1 September 2017 and 8 October 2017. Two doses of 
varicella vaccine were not found to be more protective than one dose; this study was 
underpowered to identify a significant difference in VE. The odds ratio of developing varicella 
among vaccinated children with two doses compared to one dose was 1.45 (95% confidence 
interval: 0.24–8.92, p=0.689).  
Conclusion  
We identified high one-dose varicella vaccine coverage within the cohort however coverage 
was not high enough to prevent the outbreak of breakthrough varicella from occurring. It must 
be considered whether a two-dose varicella vaccine schedule, funded on the National 
Immunisation Program (NIP), would successfully prevent such outbreaks. Breakthrough 
varicella outbreaks are likely to continue occurring in the absence of high two-dose vaccine 
coverage. 
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Introduction  
Chickenpox is a highly contagious disease which is usually mild and of relatively short duration 
in healthy children. Complications such as pneumonia and secondary skin infections causing 
scarring can occur in approximately 1% of cases.2 However, the disease is more severe in 
adults and can cause serious or even fatal illness, especially in those whose immune systems 
are weakened by disease or medical treatments.2-4 
Chickenpox is an acute illness characterised by fever and a generalised, pruritic, vesicular rash 
of up to 800 lesions lasting for up to four days followed by granular scabs.5,6 The incubation 
period is usually 14–16 days but can be as long as 21 days.6  Breakthrough varicella, defined as 
infection with wild-type varicella more than 42 days after vaccination, usually results in mild 
disease with fewer lesions and either lack of fever or milder fever.5,6 Complications of disease 
often involve bacterial infection of lesions causing scars, necrotising fasciitis or septicaemia.7 
Severe complications include pneumonia, encephalitis, chronic illnesses such as joint defects 
and calcification, thrombocytopenia, anaemia, as well as death.7,8 Varicella is very contagious 
and has been shown to infect 90% of susceptible close contacts of a case.4,6 
A single dose of varicella vaccine was recommended in Australia in 2003 (Table 1). It was 
subsequently funded and introduced to the Australian National Immunisation Program (NIP) in 
November 2005.9 There are two monovalent varicella vaccines (Varilrix® and Varivax 
Refrigerated®) and two quadrivalent measles-mumps-rubella-varicella (MMRV) vaccines 
(Priorix-Tetra® and ProQuad®) registered in Australia.10 These are live attenuated vaccines.1 
Vaccine effectiveness (VE) of one-dose varicella-containing vaccine has been estimated to be 
between 80% and 85% against all varicella and between 95% and 98% against 
moderate/severe varicella, with waning immunity over time.1,11 The severity of disease is 
reduced in cases of breakthrough varicella.12 The little evidence available indicates that two 
doses of varicella vaccine (VV) provides significantly higher protection against any varicella 
compared to one dose.1  
Since its introduction, there have been a limited number of Australian publications discussing 
the effectiveness of one-dose varicella vaccine. A Western Australian study of a varicella 
outbreak in a child care centre in 2007 estimated an overall VE of 78% and a VE against 
moderate to severe disease of 100%.9  Two studies undertaken in the United States both 
concluded that two doses of varicella vaccine in school aged children induced higher 
protection against disease than one dose, and estimated one-dose VE of 83% and 76%, two-
dose VE of 94% and incremental (one-dose versus two-dose) VE of 64% and 88%.13,14 Thomas 
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et al also estimated a significant decline in one-dose VE from 93% in <5 years post-vaccination 
compared to a VE of 81.8% ten years post-vaccination.13 
Breakthrough cases of varicella (chickenpox in vaccinated children) are commonly reported 
and occur in Australia despite the one-dose vaccination program. In Australia, a cost-
effectiveness assessment in 2008 of the potential addition of a second vaccine dose (given as 
MMRV vaccine) to the NIP showed unfavourable incremental cost-effectiveness based on 
assessment of direct costs only, resulting in no change to the single dose schedule. From 2008, 
the Australian Immunisation Handbook recommended a second dose of varicella vaccine to 
increase protection against breakthrough varicella. However, this is not funded under the NIP 
and two-dose coverage has been estimated to be very low.15 
Table 1. Varicella vaccination in children aged <14 years, Australia 
Year Funded or 
recommended 
Vaccine Target age groups  
2003 Recommended VV Aged 18 months 
Aged 10–13 years with no history of 
varicella vaccination or clinical disease 
2005 Nationally funded VV Aged 18 months 
2006-
2016 
Nationally funded 
catch-up 
VV Aged 10–13 years with no history of 
varicella vaccination or clinical disease 
2013 Nationally funded 
 
Recommended 
MMRV 
 
MMRV or VV 
Aged 18 months 
 
Second dose in children aged <14 years 
Note. Table reproduced from Significant events in varicella vaccination practice in Australia, by the 
National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance, 2013.16  
MMRV – Measles-mumps-rubella-varicella vaccine, VV – Monovalent varicella vaccine, all funded 
vaccines follow a one-dose schedule. 
Before varicella vaccine was added to the NIP, Australia had an estimated 240,000 cases, 1,500 
hospitalisations and 7–8 deaths each year from varicella infection, with the highest rate of 
hospitalisations in children aged <5 years.1 The nationally funded vaccine program 
substantially decreased varicella incidence and hospitalisations with the greatest reduction 
occurring in the first few years post-implementation.1,17 
After a decade of a one-dose strategy in Australia evidence obtained via enhanced varicella 
surveillance and outbreak investigations would assist assessment of potential inclusion of 
second vaccine dose on the NIP to improve varicella control. 
A chickenpox outbreak in vaccinated children attending an outside school hours care (OSHC) 
facility in Brisbane presented the opportunity to add to the literature regarding varicella VE. To 
our knowledge there have not been any similar studies recently conducted in Australia. The 
aim was to measure the effectiveness of one dose of varicella vaccine during a notified 
outbreak in attendees of an OSHC.  
Chapter 3  Outbreak Investigation 
74 
Methods 
Setting 
The outbreak occurred at an OSHC co-located with a primary school in metropolitan Brisbane, 
Queensland. Initially, I performed a retrospective cohort study to estimate varicella VE during 
an outbreak in children who attended the OSHC between 1 December 2016 and 28 February 
2017. Ten cases were reported (three confirmed in Queensland Health Notifiable Conditions 
System [NOCS]) including eight children and two staff members. Staff members were excluded 
due to presumed history of natural infection and hence this study was limited to children 
within the OSHC. Parents of children who attended the OSHC during the chickenpox outbreak 
were invited to participate in a questionnaire regarding their child’s varicella history (Appendix 
1). Approximately 249 children were estimated to have attended the OSHC during this period.  
Due to low response rate, the study methodology was changed post-recruitment and post-
data collection to a case-control study. Only one case from the initial outbreak period was 
successfully recruited, making VE calculations impossible. Fortunately, a second cluster of 
varicella cases among these children was found to have occurred later in the year and was 
captured in the questionnaire. 
The new study time period was determined to be eleven weeks, 11 August 2017 to 29 October 
2017, and included the 2017 September spring school holidays. The initial case began to show 
symptoms on 1 September 2017 and symptoms in the final case began on 8 October 2017. 
Although the initial recruitment included only children who attended the OSHC in December 
2016 to February 2017, the cohort of children did not change greatly throughout the year. 
Approximately 95% of the children who attended in the summer 2016–2017 period were still 
attending the OSHC in the spring 2017 period. Data sources and collection 
Metro North Public Health Unit (PHU) was notified of the initial varicella outbreak via a phone 
call from the OSHC in early February 2017. At that time, eight cases were reported including 
seven children and one staff member. Prior to notification to the PHU, the OSHC Director 
responded by emailing families of attending children with information from the ‘Staying 
Healthy in Child Care’ guidelines produced by the Australian Government aimed to prevent 
infectious diseases in early childhood education and care services.18 Additional advice was 
provided by the PHU once they were notified, regarding exclusion from child care, vaccination, 
and seeking medical advice and testing. The PHU also provided a chickenpox fact sheet, a 
hand, foot and mouth disease factsheet and a letter to the parents and staff. 
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Parents of each child who attended the OSHC were invited to complete a questionnaire 
regarding their child (Appendix 2). The five minute questionnaire was conducted via an online 
survey tool, Survey Monkey, sent out by the OSHC administrators on behalf of the study 
investigators.19 The questionnaire included questions about varicella history, vaccination 
history and medical history.20 For cases, further details about the course of infection were 
obtained via the questionnaire such as date of illness onset, symptoms, treatment and medical 
attention sought. We also requested additional consent from the parent, as well as their child's 
full name, to access the child's varicella notification data from the Queensland NOCS and the 
child's vaccination history from the Australian Immunisation Register (AIR).  
In the initial contact email regarding the study, from the OSHC administrator to the study 
cohort, it was made clear that participation was voluntary and did not affect the relationship 
between the OSHC and participants, as the OSHC would be unaware of participation beyond 
the point of invitation. A reminder email was sent to participants two weeks and three weeks 
post initial invitation. The survey remained open from 16 October 2017 until 13 November 
2017. Responses to this questionnaire were used to identify the second outbreak among these 
children in spring 2017. 
Thirty (68% of completed survey responses) parents provided the name of their child which 
enabled validation of vaccination status and confirmation of pathological diagnosis when 
specimens had been collected. We used the non-validated parental responses when database 
validation could not be obtained. Case definition and exclusion criteria 
Parents of regular attendees of the OSHC facility during the outbreak period were invited to 
participate in the study. The case definition was initially based on the notification criteria for 
varicella infection in Queensland to NOCS (Figure 1). However, due to the low response rate, 
the dominance of parental diagnosis in favour of clinical or laboratory confirmation, and the 
low completion rate of parents providing their child’s name, we were unable to verify the 
varicella notification of five of the seven cases. Hence, for this study, a case was defined as 
varicella diagnosis between 11 August 2017 and 29 October, one incubation period prior to the 
first case and following the final case, including laboratory confirmed diagnosis, clinically 
confirmed diagnosis and parental diagnosis. Cases were excluded if they had reported a 
previous varicella diagnosis before 11 August 2017. 
Chapter 3  Outbreak Investigation 
76 
 
Figure 1. Reporting varicella infection using Queensland Health Notifiable Conditions System 
case definition, updated 8 August 2017 
Note. Figure reproduced from Varicella-zoster infection, by Queensland Health, 2008.21  Statistical analysis 
Participant questionnaire responses were collected on Survey Monkey and exported to Stata 
V14.2 for analysis.22 Fisher’s exact tests were used for comparisons of proportions of 
characteristics between cases and non-cases, and student’s t test were used for comparison of 
means. All p-values were two-sided with a significance level of p<0.05. 
Vaccine coverage was calculated and defined by the proportion of eligible children who had 
received the vaccine at least 14 days before the start of the outbreak. 
Epidemiological evidence 
An epidemiological link is established when there is: 
- Contact between two people involving a plausible mode of transmission at a time 
when: 
a.  one of them is likely to be infectious; 
AND 
b.  the other has illness ten to 21 days after contact; 
AND 
- At least one case in the chain of epidemiologically-linked cases is laboratory confirmed. 
Clinical evidence 
- Acute onset of a diffuse maculopapular rash developing into vesicles within 24–48 hours 
and forming crusts (or crusting over) within five days.  
Laboratory definitive evidence 
- Isolation of varicella-zoster virus from a skin or lesion swab. If the case received 
varicella vaccine between five and 42 days prior to the onset of rash the virus must be 
confirmed to be a wild type strain; 
OR 
- Detection of varicella-zoster virus from a skin or lesion swab by nucleic acid testing. If 
the case received varicella vaccine between five and 42 days prior to the onset of rash 
the virus must be confirmed to be a wild type strain; 
OR 
- Detection of varicella-zoster virus antigen from a skin or lesion swab by direct 
fluorescent antibody. If the case received varicella vaccine between five and 42 days 
prior to the onset of rash the virus must be confirmed to be a wild type strain; 
OR  
- Detection of varicella-zoster virus-specific immunoglobulin M in an unvaccinated 
person. 
Confirmed case 
- Laboratory definitive evidence AND clinical evidence; 
OR 
- Clinical evidence AND epidemiological evidence. 
Chapter 3  Outbreak Investigation 
77 
The following VE calculation method would have been performed based on the original cohort 
study methodology if recruitment of cases was more successful (Equation 1). Attack rates for 
unvaccinated children (ARU) and vaccinated children (ARV) would have been calculated by 
dividing the number of cases by the number of susceptible children. VE and 95% confidence 
intervals (CI) would have been calculated using the cohort method as follows:23 
Equation 1. Formula for vaccine effectiveness calculated in a cohort analysis 
𝑉𝐸 = ARU − ARVARU × 100 = 𝑏(𝑏 + 𝑑) − 𝑎(𝑎 + 𝑐)𝑏(𝑏 + 𝑑) × 100 
Where:  Vaccinated Unvaccinated Case a b Non-case c d 
For the subsequent case-control study methodology, VE was calculated as follows:24  
Equation 2. Formula for vaccine effectiveness calculated in a case-control analysis 
𝑉𝐸 = (1 − Odds ratio) × 100 = (1 − 𝑎𝑑
𝑏𝑐
 ) × 100 
This methodology, as with the cohort methodology, requires both unvaccinated and 
vaccinated participants, however, this method could not be performed since all children were 
vaccinated.  
Instead, we performed an incremental VE calculation comparing one dose to two doses of 
varicella vaccine. In this method, participants with one dose were treated as ‘unvaccinated’ 
and participants with two doses were treated as ‘vaccinated’. We were then able to use the 
case-control methodology to assess VE associated with a second dose of vaccine (Equation 2). 
With a higher response rate, subsequent VE analyses would have been conducted in which 
disease would be categorised by severity as characterised by the number of lesions at the 
height of infection, also by time since vaccination and age.  Ethics approval 
This study was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the Australian National 
University (2017/368 and 2017/909) and The Prince Charles Hospital (HREC/17/QPCH/220) as 
well as Site Specific Assessments from the Sydney Children’s Hospital Network 
(SSA/17/SCHN/288) and The Prince Charles Hospital (SSA/17/QPCH/319). A Research 
Collaboration Agreement was agreed and approved by each site. Following the study, we 
provided the OSHC and interested participants with a summary of the study outcomes 
(Appendix 1). 
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Results 
There were approximately 249 regular attendees of the OSHC during the outbreak period. The 
overall response rate for the study was 19.7% (49/249), however there were two incomplete 
questionnaires submitted, resulting in a response rate of 18.9% (47/249) (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Participant flow chart 
Study population 
We received 47 complete responses for this study (Table 2), of which a total of seven children 
were diagnosed with chickenpox between 1 September 2017 and 8 October 2017. Three 
controls were excluded from the analysis due to reporting a history of varicella disease before 
11 August 2017. 
Table 2. Participant characteristics 
Characteristic Case n=7 
Control 
n=37 p-value
  
Age, years 7 (7–8) 7 (6–8) 0.644† 
Male 6 (86%) 20 (54%) 0.211‡ 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 0 0 - 
Vaccinated 
   1 dose 
   2 doses 
 
5 (71%) 
2 (29%) 
 
29 (78%) 
8 (22%) 
 
- 
0.649‡ 
Untimely vaccination* 3 (43%) 20 (54%) 0.542 
Immunocompromised 
   Paediatric Acute-Onset Neuropsychiatric Syndrome  
 
1 (14%) 
 
0 
 
- 
Medical conditions    
    Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
    Autism spectrum disorder 
0 
0 
1 (3%) 
1 (3%) 
- 
- 
    Brown’s syndrome 
    Environmental allergies 
0 
0 
1 (3%) 
1 (3%) 
- 
- 
Median (25th, 75th percentile) or number (percentage) are reported  
* Received varicella vaccine before or after 18 months of age 
† Student t-test  
‡ Fisher’s exact test 
49 responses 
7 cases 37 controls 
5 exclusions: 
2 incomplete responses 
3 previous varicella infections 
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Outbreak description 
The outbreak period was determined to be 11 August 2017 until 29 October 2017 and 
therefore took place over an eleven week period. The first case reported onset of symptoms 
on 1 September 2017, five days later the second and third cases reported onset of symptoms 
on 6 September (Figure 3). The subsequent cases reported onset between 8 September 2017 
and 8 October 2017.  
The time between first vaccination and onset of symptoms ranged from approximately five 
years to seven years among cases. There was no association between years since vaccination 
and varicella diagnosis (p=0.968). There was no association between varicella diagnosis and 
age (p=0.700), number of varicella vaccination doses (p=0.696) or age at first dose of 
vaccination (p=0.448). 
 
Figure 3. Epidemic curve of outbreak cases by number of varicella vaccinations received, 
2017 Incremental vaccine effectiveness 
Two doses of varicella vaccine were not found to be more protective than one dose. The odds 
ratio of developing varicella among vaccinated children with two doses compared to one dose 
was 1.45 (95% CI: 0.24–8.92, p=0.689).  
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Discussion 
A case-control study was conducted to estimate varicella VE during an outbreak in children 
who attended the Brisbane OSHC between 11 August 2017 and 29 October 2017. Of the 249 
parents invited to participate on behalf of their children, seven cases and 37 controls were 
included in this study. All children had received at least one dose of varicella vaccine and ten 
had received two doses. Vaccine failure, or breakthrough disease, is assumed to be the cause 
of the outbreak due to the 100% one-dose vaccine coverage among the participating children. 
This is higher that the Australian coverage estimate for one-dose varicella vaccination of 93.0% 
(93.4% in Queensland) for children at 24 months of age.25 
Serological studies have shown that up to 15% of children who receive the vaccine do not have 
the required antibody levels to protect them from acquiring the disease, allowing for 
breakthrough disease.26 The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
reported in 2010 that half of the varicella cases notified at their sentinel sites were 
breakthrough disease.27 
The unexpectedly high one-dose and two-dose coverage in our study population has likely 
skewed the results and would require an increase in the sample size for sufficient power to be 
gained. Lower vaccination coverage among cases was expected and would have increased VE 
estimates, whereas lower vaccination coverage among controls would have decreased VE 
estimates. Previous studies found the second dose of varicella vaccine to be highly effective in 
preventing infection, estimating incremental VE of 63.6% in an outbreak setting and 87.5% 
from active surveillance.13,14  
A robust and meaningful incremental VE estimate could not be calculated due to the small 
cohort and low response rate. A sample size of 551, comprising of 459 control and 92 cases, 
was necessary for sufficient power to detect an expected odds ratio of 0.36 in the relative VE 
calculation with the sampled 5:1 control to case ratio, or a sample size of 254 with a 1:1 
control to case ratio (Appendix 4). Such large sample sizes are unlikely in an outbreak of 
varicella in a childcare setting in Australia where the vaccination coverage is high. These 
sample sizes are more likely in other countries, such as America and China, where studies have 
exceeded the required 127 outbreak cases and have presented significant results.13,28 
Varicella-containing vaccine has been on the NIP since 2005 however, despite high vaccination 
coverage, a one-dose varicella vaccination program has been shown to have a higher risk of 
breakthrough disease in child care and school settings than a two-dose program.29-31 The 
relatively high cost, a minimum of AUD$55, may influence the uptake of second dose varicella 
vaccine in Australia as well as the low perceived risk of varicella infection.32-34 
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In this study, one of the excluded controls reported varicella diagnosis during the initial 
outbreak period (5/01/2017) and also reported a previous diagnosis (1/07/2013) before the 
outbreak period. The parents reported laboratory diagnosis for both infections which could 
not be validated in the absence of the child’s name. The occurrence of two varicella infections 
in an eleven year old child would be quite uncommon unless the child was 
immunocompromised or was a young infant when first infected.35,36 This could point to a 
possible unconfirmed shingles diagnosis rather than the typical chickenpox diagnosis expected 
at that age, or could be inaccurate parental recall.  
Many parents did not seek medical treatment for their child’s varicella infection and hence did 
not obtain a formal diagnosis or NOCS notification, instead parental diagnosis was the most 
common diagnostic method (3/7). Incorrect varicella diagnosis via parental diagnosis may lead 
to an incorrect VE estimate. 
The unorthodox decision to change the study methodology post recruitment may have 
introduced bias into the study, particularly selection bias. However, selection bias was limited 
as the OSHC confirmed that most (95%) parents who were recruited had their children attend 
the OSHC during the updated outbreak period (August-September 2017). Another potential 
source of selection bias was volunteer bias in which parents of children with recent varicella 
diagnosis may be more likely to participate, as potentially would those with highly vaccinated 
children. 
The major limitation of this study was the low response rate which prevented the initial study 
we had planned. The low response was anticipated due to recruitment taking place ten 
months after the beginning of the initial outbreak period. The low response rate and resulting 
small sample size meant the power of the study was limited. The low question completion rate 
among submitted surveys resulted in the inability to comprehensively characterise or 
sufficiently validate the varicella cases. We aimed to reduce the impact of the low response 
rate and measurement bias by validating the vaccination status on the Vaccination Information 
and Vaccination Administration System and AIR, the notification on NOCS and the clinical 
diagnosis on Queensland Health’s The Viewer – a service which provides summary patient 
healthcare details to registered health practitioners. However, many parents did not provide 
their child’s name as was required for the validation to occur (4/7 cases and 11/37 controls). 
We did not collect detailed information about the interaction of cases and controls within or 
outside the OSHC, except that children attending the OSHC are not separated by age. We could 
not determine the presence of clustering by clinic or vaccine provider because we did not 
collect that information. There was no common link identified between vaccine batch 
numbers.  
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The inclusion of additional questions on the participant questionnaire would have increased 
the knowledge regarding varicella vaccination. Collecting information such as country of birth 
would have provided insight into vaccination status of children born overseas or collecting 
information regarding the school the child attends could have helped identify the cause of the 
outbreak. It would have been useful to collect more information from the OSHC regarding days 
of exposure, by collecting the number of days each child spent at the OSHC during the 
outbreak period.  
We aimed to provide an estimate of VE among primary-school aged children during a varicella 
outbreak. This aim was unable to be accomplished due to many issues primarily stemming 
from the low response rate of the questionnaire. We identified high varicella vaccine coverage 
within the cohort, however coverage was not high enough to prevent the outbreak from 
occurring. It must be considered whether a two-dose varicella vaccine schedule, funded on the 
NIP, would successfully prevent such outbreaks. Breakthrough varicella outbreaks are likely to 
continue occurring in the absence of high two-dose vaccine coverage. Future varicella 
outbreaks should be used to successfully obtain VE estimates. 
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Appendices Appendix 1. Participant information sheet 
Participant Information Sheet 
Non-Interventional Study 
National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) 
 Metro North Public Health Unit, Queensland Health 
 
Part 1  What does my participation involve? 
1 Introduction 
You are invited to take part in this research project to assess chickenpox vaccine effectiveness 
in an outbreak. We are contacting you because your child was attending Wavell Heights Out of 
Hours School Care Program between 1st December 2016 and 28th February 2017 while there 
were children attending the centre who developed chickenpox, also known as varicella. The 
research project is aiming to inform chickenpox vaccination policy in Australia as well as 
measure the effectiveness of one dose of chickenpox vaccine in an outbreak situation. 
This Participant Information Sheet tells you about the research project. It explains the 
questionnaire and research involved. Knowing what is involved will help you decide if you want 
to take part in the research. 
Please read this information carefully. Ask questions about anything that you don’t understand 
or want to know more about by contacting the chief investigator, Ms Julia Maguire at 
Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au for questionnaire assistance or information regarding the 
study or contact associate investigator Dr Megan Young at megan.young@health.qld.gov.au 
for clinical information.   
Participation in this research is voluntary.  
If you decide you want to take part in the research project, you will be giving your consent. By 
giving consent you are telling us that you: 
• Understand what you have read in this information sheet 
• Agree to complete the questionnaire 
• Agree that we can use the information you provide for the purposes of this study 
Title Effectiveness of varicella vaccine during an outbreak 
of chickenpox in a school-based setting 
Protocol Number HREC/17/QPCH/220 
Principal Investigator Ms Julia Maguire 
Associate Investigators 
 
Dr Megan Young 
Associate Professor Stephen Lambert 
Ms Kim Langfeldt 
Associate Professor Kathryn Glass 
Dr Helen Quinn 
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2  What is the purpose of this research? 
Chickenpox is a highly contagious disease that can cause serious illness and occasionally can be 
fatal. A single dose of chickenpox vaccine was introduced to the Australian National 
Immunisation Program (NIP) in 2005. Since its introduction, there have been a limited number 
of studies that have measured the effectiveness of the vaccine – that is, how well it prevents 
chickenpox disease.  Overseas studies have shown that two doses of chickenpox vaccine is 
more protective against infection than one dose. Chickenpox in vaccinated children is quite 
commonly reported in Australia. 
The recent outbreak of chickenpox among children attending Wavell Heights Out of Hours 
School Care Program between 1st December 2016 and 28th February 2017 presents the 
opportunity to measure how well the vaccine protects children from developing chickenpox 
and therefore inform policy regarding a two dose vaccine schedule in Australia. 
The results of this research will be used by Ms Julia Maguire as part of a thesis in the Master of 
Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology degree at the Australian National University. 
This research is being conducted by study investigators located at Metro North Public Health 
Unit, Queensland Health and the National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance 
(NCIRS, Sydney). 
3 What does participation in this research involve? 
Participation in this study involves completing a 10 minute questionnaire, providing 
information regarding your child’s history of chickenpox, as well as relevant vaccination and 
medical history. You can complete this short questionnaire online via the link in the invitation 
email.  
We will ask for your consent to access your child’s immunisation records from the Australian 
Immunisation Register (AIR) to confirm their vaccination history. We will also ask for your 
consent to check the Queensland Notifiable Conditions System (NOCS) for any chickenpox test 
results for your child. You can provide this consent, or not, by ticking the appropriate box in 
the online questionnaire. 
There are no costs associated with participating in this research project, nor will you be paid 
for participating. 
4 What do I have to do? 
Along with this information sheet you have been sent an email with a link to the online survey 
for your completion. This questionnaire will require up to 10 minutes of your time. If you have 
any difficulties with the online questionnaire, one of our friendly research team is able to 
phone you at your convenience to complete the questionnaire. To complete the questionnaire 
by phone, please email Ms Julia Maguire at Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au with your 
contact details and preferred time of call, or phone Julia on (02)9845 0191 during business 
hours. 
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5 Other relevant information about the research project 
You are one of approximately 200 parents invited to participate in this study. The 
questionnaire will vary slightly for participants whose children we know have had chickenpox 
compared to those who haven’t. 
6 Do I have to take part in this research project?  
Participation is voluntary. If you do not wish to take part, you do not have to. If you commence 
the questionnaire, you are free to withdraw from the study at any stage by contacting Ms Julia 
Maguire at Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au.  
Your decision whether to take part or not, or to take part and then withdraw, will not affect 
your relationship with Wavell Heights Out of Hours School Care, NCIRS or Queensland Health.  
7 What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Your participation will help ensure the quality of this study, making its results as robust as 
possible. The results from this study will help inform the chickenpox vaccination schedule in 
Australia. This could potentially ultimately result in fewer cases of chickenpox in the 
community.  
8 What are the possible risks and disadvantages of taking part? 
There are no risks to you from participation in this study.  
9 What if I withdraw from this research project? 
There are no consequences to you from withdrawing from the study. 
 10 What happens when the research project ends? 
This study does not require follow-up with study participants unless clarification of 
questionnaire responses is required. Results of the study will be available to study participants 
as described in Section 11, below. 
Part 2  How is the research project being conducted? 
11 What will happen to information about me? 
Information provided by you about your child in the questionnaire will only be used for the 
purposes of this study. All information will remain confidential, with only the study 
investigators having access to this information. All information will be securely stored until its 
destruction 5 years after the study completing. No individual will be identified in any reports of 
the results of this study, including in any journal articles or conference presentations. 
If you agree to the study investigators accessing your child’s immunisation register and 
chickenpox test records, this access will be once only and only in connection to this study. 
At the completion of the questionnaire, interested participants can indicate that they would 
like a summary of the results of the study to be sent to them by providing their email address.  
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12 Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research project is being conducted by Ms Julia Maguire in her capacity as a Master of 
Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology student at the Australian National University, and her 
colleagues and supervisors at the National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance 
and Queensland Health. The study is not grant funded. 
13 Who has reviewed the research project?  
The ethical aspects of this research project have been approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of Queensland Health and the Australian National University. This project will be 
carried out according to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). 
This statement has been developed to protect the interests of people who agree to participate 
in human research studies. This project has also been authorised to be conducted at the 
National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance at The Children’s Hospital at 
Westmead.  If you have any concerns about the conduct of this study at this site please do not 
hesitate to contact the Research Governance Officer on (02) 9845 3011. 
14 Further information and who to contact 
If you want any further information concerning this project you can contact the chief 
investigator, Ms Julia Maguire, on (02) 9845 0191 or Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au. 
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Appendix 2. Participant questionnaire 
 
 
 
 Chickenpox  Parent Survey 
1. Chickenpox Vaccine Effectiveness in an Outbreak 
 
Chickenpox Vaccine Effectiveness in an Outbreak 
Cohort Study 
Questionnaire 
A study is being conducted through the Australian National University as part of a Master’s thesis, with 
support from Queensland Health, to assess vaccine effectiveness of the one dose chickenpox vaccine. As 
this disease is notifiable in Queensland, laboratories are required to notify the health department of all 
cases that are diagnosed. 
We would like to ask you some questions about your child's time at the Wavell Heights Out of 
Hours School Care Program during the period from 1st December 2016 to 28th February 2017 
when there were a number of children who were diagnosed with chickenpox, otherwise known as 
varicella. These questions should take up to 10 minutes to complete. Your participation is 
voluntary and all responses are confidential. 
We thank you very much for your time and cooperation. The information will help inform the 
vaccine schedule for chickenpox. 
If you would like assistance with this questionnaire please contact the Chief Investigator for this 
study 
Julia Maguire  
02 9845 0191 
Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au 
 
*1. Do you agree to participate in this study? 
 Yes  
No 
*2. Do you consent for us to access your child's medical and vaccination records from the QLD 
Notifiable Conditions System (NOCS) and the Australian Immunisation Register (AIR) for the 
purpose of this study as outlined in the Information sheet. 
 Yes 
No 
If yes, please write your child's full name here 
 
 
* 3. May we contact you for further information if required? 
 Yes 
No 
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2. Child details 
 
*4. What is your child's date of birth? 
 
DD MM YYYY 
 
Date / / 
 
*5. What is your child's sex? 
 
 Female 
Male 
 Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
*6. Is your child of Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Island descent? 
 
 Aboriginal 
 Torres Strait Islander 
  Both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
 Neither 
Unsure 
 
*7. Does your child have any problems with his/her immune system? 
 
 Yes 
No 
If yes, please specify the problems or condition 
 
 
* 8. Does your child have any other ongoing medical condition(s)? 
 
 Yes  
No 
If yes, please specify 
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3. Recent chickenpox infection 
Onset of symptoms between 1st December 2016 and 28th February 2017 
  
*9. Did your child have chickenpox with onset of symptoms between 1st December 2016 and 28th 
February 2017? 
 
 Yes  
 No 
 
  4. Recent chickenpox  infection 
Onset of symptoms between 1st December 2016 and 28th February 2017 
 
10. On what date did the symptoms start? 
Please provide your best estimation and indicate how confident you are with this date in the following 
question. 
DD MM YYYY 
 
Date / / 
 
11. How confident are you with the date you provided in the previous question? 
 
  Very confident 
  Somewhat confident  
  Guess 
 
12. How was the chickenpox diagnosed? 
 
 Clinical (GP, Emergency Department or in hospital) - By a doctor or nurse who examined your child 
but did not take a test for chickenpox 
  Laboratory - Positive results of a test that was taken for chickenpox by a doctor or nurse 
 Both clinical and laboratory 
  Self-diagnosed 
 Other - By a different health professional (please  specify) 
 
 
13. What symptoms did your child experience in this recent chickenpox infection? 
(Select all that apply) 
Fever 
Rash (typical chickenpox blisters) None 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
14. When did your child stop showing any symptoms of chickenpox? 
 
DD MM YYYY 
 
End of symptoms / / 
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15. Did you take your child to hospital during this chickenpox infection? 
 
 Yes - admitted to  hospital 
 Yes - attended a hospital Emergency Department but not admitted to hospital 
 No 
 
16. What is the highest number of chickenpox blisters you saw on 
your child's body during this infection? 
 Mild (<50 blisters) 
 Moderate (50–500 blisters) 
 Severe (500+ blisters) 
 Unsure 
 
 
5. Past chickenpox infection  
Before 1st December 2016 
*17. Has your child had chickenpox before 1st December 2016?? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
6. Past chickenpox infection  
Before 1st December 2016 
 
18. When did your child's chickenpox infection start in the period before 1st December 2016? 
Please provide your best estimation and indicate how confident you are with this date in the 
following question. 
DD MM YYYY 
 
Date / / 
 
 19. How confident are you with the date you provided in the previous question? 
 
 Very confident 
 Somewhat confident  
 Guess 
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 20. How was this chickenpox infection diagnosed? 
 
 Clinical (GP, Emergency Department or in hospital) - By a doctor or nurse who examined your child 
but did not take a test for chickenpox 
  Laboratory - Positive results of a test that was taken for chickenpox by a doctor or nurse 
 Both clinical and laboratory  
  Self-diagnosed 
  Other- By a different health professional (please specify) 
 
7. Past chickenpox infection  
Before 1st December 2016 
 
*21. Has your child had chickenpox after 28th February 2017? 
 Yes  
 No 
 
 
 
 
8. Past chickenpox infection  
After 28th February 2017 
 
22. When did your child's chickenpox infection start in the period after 28th February 2017? 
Please provide your best estimation and indicate how confident you are with this date in the 
following question. 
DD MM YYYY 
 
Date / / 
 
 23. How confident are you with the date you provided in the previous question? 
 
  Very confident 
  Somewhat confident  
  Guess 
 
 
 
 24. How was this chickenpox infection diagnosed? 
  Clinical (GP, Emergency Department or in hospital) - By a doctor or nurse who examined your child 
but did not take a test for chickenpox 
  Laboratory - Positive results of a test that was taken for chickenpox by a doctor or nurse 
  Both clinical and laboratory  
  Self-diagnosed 
  Other- By a different health professional (please specify) 
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9. Chickenpox vaccination history 
For the following questions it may help to refer to your child's health records (Red Book). 
*25. Has your child been vaccinated against chickenpox (usually given at 18 months of age, as 
varicella or MMRV vaccine)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Unsure 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Chickenpox vaccination history 
  *26. How many chickenpox vaccinations has your child received? 
 1 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Chickenpox vaccination history 
 
 
27. When did your child receive their first dose of chickenpox vaccine? 
DD MM YYYY 
 
End of symptoms / / 
 
28. When did your child receive their second dose of chickenpox vaccine? 
DD MM YYYY 
 
End of symptoms / / 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Chickenpox household contacts 
Onset of symptoms between 1st December 2016 and 28th February 2017 
  
*29. Has anyone else in your household had chickenpox with onset of symptoms between 1st 
December 2016 and 28th February 2017? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
30. What was the date of onset of illness of the household contact(s)? 
 
DD MM YYYY 
 
Person 1 / / 
 
Person 2 / / 
 
Person 3 / / 
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31. How was the chickenpox in the household contact(s) diagnosed? 
 
 Clinical (GP, Emergency Department or in hospital) - By a doctor or nurse who examined your child 
but did not take a test for chickenpox  
  Laboratory - Positive results of a test that was taken for chickenpox by a doctor or nurse 
 Both clinical and laboratory  
  Self-diagnosed 
 Other - By a different health professional (please specify) 
 
13. Thank you! 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
We appreciate your time and value your contribution to chickenpox vaccine knowledge. 
 
Please answer the question below and press 'Next' to submit your questionnaire. 
32. Would you like to receive a summary of the study results? 
 
 Yes 
No 
If yes, please provide a contact email  address 
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Appendix 3. Study summary for parents 
Study Outcome & Summary 
National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) 
Metro North Public Health Unit, Queensland Health 
Title Effectiveness of varicella vaccine during an outbreak of 
chickenpox in a school-based setting 
Principal Investigator Ms Julia Maguire 
Associate Investigators 
 
Dr Megan Young 
Associate Professor Stephen Lambert 
Ms Kim Langfeldt 
Associate Professor Kathryn Glass 
Dr Helen Quinn 
 
As you are aware, the recent outbreak of chickenpox among children attending Wavell Heights 
Out of School Hours Care (OSHC) facility between 1 December 2016 and 28 February 2017 
presented the opportunity to measure how well the vaccine protects children from developing 
chickenpox.  
Chickenpox is a highly contagious disease, it is usually mild and of short duration in healthy 
children. Breakthrough chickenpox occurs when a vaccinated person is diagnosed with 
chickenpox. This is what happened among the children at Wavell Heights OSHC. All parents 
who participated in this study reported their children to be vaccinated with at least one dose, 
if not two doses, of the chickenpox vaccine.  
A single dose of chickenpox vaccine was added to the Australian National Immunisation 
Program (NIP) in 2005. Since its introduction, there have been a limited number of Australian 
publications discussing the effectiveness of one dose of chickenpox vaccine. The current 
evidence shows that a one-dose vaccination schedule is not as effective at preventing 
chickenpox as a two-dose schedule. It was hoped that the results of this study would add to 
this limited knowledge and could help inform policy about a two-dose vaccine schedule in 
Australia. 
Unfortunately, there were not enough parents from the OSHC who participated in this study 
and we were unable to provide strong evidence of the benefits of adding a second dose of 
chickenpox vaccine to the NIP. However, we have collected further evidence of breakthrough 
chickenpox occurring in child care settings. This could be used to inform the vaccine schedule 
in the future. 
We appreciate your interest in and contribution to vaccine knowledge.  We also thank you for 
your time. If you would like any more information about this project you can contact the chief 
investigator, Ms Julia Maguire, on (02) 9845 0191 or Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au 
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Appendix 4. Sample size calculation 
Sample size for relative vaccine effectiveness comparing one dose to two doses of varicella 
vaccine, control to cases ratio of 5:1 
Two-sided confidence level 95% 
Power 80% 
Hypothetical percentage of controls with exposure  
(i.e. 2 doses of varicella vaccine)^ 
22% 
Hypothetical percentage of cases with exposure  
(i.e. 2 doses of varicella vaccine)* 
9.22% 
Odds ratio to be detected# 0.36 
Cases 92 
Controls 459 
Total sample size 551 
^Based on our study population 
*In our study sample the percentage of cases who received two doses of varicella vaccine was 29% 
#Based on literature 13 
Sample size for relative vaccine effectiveness comparing one dose to two doses of varicella 
vaccine, control to cases ratio of 1:1  
Two-sided confidence level 95% 
Power 80% 
Hypothetical percentage of controls with exposure  
(i.e. 2 doses of varicella vaccine)^ 
22% 
Hypothetical percentage of cases with exposure  
(i.e. 2 doses of varicella vaccine)* 
9.22% 
Odds ratio to be detected# 0.36 
Cases 127 
Controls 127 
Total sample size 254 
^Based on our study population 
*In our study sample the percentage of cases who received two doses of varicella vaccine was 29% 
#Based on literature 13 
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Prologue 
Study rationale 
This chapter evaluates the Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) system 
after ten years in operation. I used the United States Centres of Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems as the 
structure for this evaluation.1 Public health surveillance system such as PAEDS, coordinated by 
the National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS), are often 
government funded hence there is a responsibility for the system to be effectively achieving its 
aims and producing the contracted outputs for the benefit of the Australian public. The 
funding agreement for PAEDS between NCIRS and state and national health departments is 
currently under review for continued funding from July 2019 onwards. My evaluation of the 
PAEDS system is timely as a precursor and informer of an official government review. An 
independent external consultant will review the Australian Government’s public health 
surveillance needs, including of vaccine preventable diseases and adverse events following 
immunisation, and therefore the future need for the PAEDS system. My role 
I developed all of the study materials for this evaluation including documents required for the 
ethics application. I designed three different questionnaires for the three key groups of PAEDS 
stakeholders. These questionnaires were made using the online survey tool, Qualtrics. I 
managed the survey distribution process as well as the data collection and analysis of the 
qualitative survey response data and the quantitative PAEDS data.2 
I wrote this chapter and will present these recommendations to the PAEDS stakeholders. I will 
submit this evaluation for publication in a peer-reviewed journal.  Lessons learned 
This evaluation was a project of patience. I submitted the first ethics application in November 
2017 and received ethics approval in August 2018 under a National Mutual Acceptance and 
subsequent Site Specific Assessment from the PAEDS coordinating site in September 2018. 
This project presented another opportunity to develop questionnaires. I was required to 
produce three different questionnaires for the varying types of stakeholders: nurses, 
investigators and funders. I was also able to trial the use of another online survey tool, 
Qualtrics, which I enjoyed learning how to use. 
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I have gained an in-depth relationship with the CDC guidelines for evaluating a surveillance 
system along with gaining increased knowledge of the diseases and conditions under PAEDS 
network surveillance. 
The quantitative data analysis was challenging, even as someone who had substantial 
experience with data. The individual conditions and adverse events following immunisation 
(AEFI) had separate datasets, as did each patient’s vaccination history and demographic 
details, each with hundreds of variables. It took me a while to know where to start and even 
then, I found the process laborious. However, this problem had a silver lining of learning 
further skills in Stata. 
Analysing qualitative data was quite different. I was not particularly experienced in analysing 
questionnaires with many questions that collected free text responses. At this stage in the 
project, I was aware of the time running out before thesis submission which kept me working 
even though this process did not come naturally to me. After receiving the questionnaire 
responses, I learnt about effective questionnaires and questions I would and wouldn’t ask next 
time or questions I would ask in a differently way to obtain better responses.  
I was fortunate to attend the 2018 annual PAEDS face-to-face meeting in Brisbane. This 
provided an opportunity to gain additional informal feedback of the PAEDS network from a 
range of stakeholders. I was able to attend all sessions over the two day program where I 
observed and noted many useful opinions and ideas on PAEDS strengths and areas for 
improvement. Public health implications 
This evaluation will inform NCIRS, as the coordinating body, of the effectiveness of PAEDS as a 
public health surveillance system. I summarised the strengths and weaknesses of PAEDS and 
have provided recommendations to improve the system. NCIRS is encouraged to consider and 
implement these changes for the benefit of PAEDS as a surveillance system and for the benefit 
of the children it aims to serve. This evaluation will also assist in informing decisions about 
future Australian Department of Health funding of PAEDS from the 2019–2020 financial year 
onwards. Acknowledgements  
I would like to thank my primary supervisor at NCIRS, Dr Helen Quinn. As usual, Helen spent a 
lot of time with me developing this project and providing tips along the way. As a PAEDS 
epidemiologist, Helen also provided much needed insight into the system. 
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Abstract 
Introduction 
The Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) system is an active, hospital-
based, sentinel surveillance system that collects information on severe childhood diseases, 
particularly vaccine preventable diseases (VPDs), and adverse events following immunisation 
(AEFI). The National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) coordinates 
PAEDS which is currently funded by the state and Commonwealth Departments of Health and 
grants from the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC). This report is the first 
evaluation of PAEDS after ten years of operation since its initiation in 2007. 
Methods 
This evaluation follows the framework described in the United States Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance 
Systems.1 The attributes data quality, sensitivity and timeliness were assessed by analysing the 
PAEDS data collected in 2017 at all seven operating sites. The attributes simplicity, flexibility, 
acceptability, sensitivity, timeliness and stability were assessed via stakeholder questionnaires 
for six of the seven operating sites from PAEDS surveillance nurses, PAEDS investigators and 
PAEDS funding partners. Relevant internal and external documents were also reviewed to 
obtain further information of PAEDS protocols, operation and management. 
Results and discussion 
This evaluation assessed PAEDS usefulness, PAEDS ability to meet its own aims and objectives, 
and the level to which PAEDS has succeeded in the surveillance of selected conditions. PAEDS 
successfully fulfils its aims to actively collect detailed information that isn’t available from 
other surveillance systems regarding children hospitalised with VPDs and AEFI. We found that 
the system informs public health and vaccination policy and practice, including in relation to 
vaccine safety, and in a greater sense improves child health outcomes through research and 
knowledge advancement.  
PAEDS is less successful in accomplishing some of its stated objectives. The objective to 
provide high quality data on selected serious childhood conditions is achieved, although the 
timeliness of outputs is seldom ‘real-time’ due to the follow-up required for detailed 
surveillance. For some conditions, PAEDS aims to describe longer term clinical outcomes of 
children who attend hospital for that condition, however there is little evidence of these long-
term clinical outcomes being widely reported or disseminated. PAEDS has been able to identify 
and report detailed information on pathological agents and a limited number of key laboratory 
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and other markers that contribute to disease severity and vaccine effectiveness. In 2016, 
PAEDS increased its work to improve knowledge around the social determinants of childhood 
disease and vaccination utilising NHMRC grant funding. 
Despite the high level of data quality, sensitivity and demonstrated flexibility, this review 
identified areas where system attributes could be improved upon. For example, opportunities 
whereby some aspects of system operation could be simplified, subsequently becoming 
timelier and reducing data errors.  PAEDS has high acceptability among stakeholders but 
without secure funding is an unstable surveillance system. 
Conclusion and recommendations 
The lack of stable funding is a major barrier for continued PAEDS surveillance. If funding can be 
secured, PAEDS should be able to continue contributing to improving knowledge, policy and 
practices in relation to serious childhood diseases, particularly VPDs and AEFI. Improvements 
to the current functions of PAEDS discussed in this report should be considered and enacted, 
specifically regarding resources, coordination, data collection and management, and reporting. 
Upgrading PAEDS use of technology in data collection and entry would increase performance 
of several attributes of this surveillance system (E.g. changes to the PAEDS online data 
management system to allow better harmonisation with FluCAN). Some of the suggested 
recommendations aim to increase the reach of PAEDS outputs and awareness of PAEDS 
contributions to public health knowledge, policy and practice.  
The future of PAEDS is reliant on funding, primarily from state, territory and Commonwealth 
health departments. This partnership with government bodies is integral to PAEDS and should 
be specifically represented within PAEDS objectives. As long as PAEDS can continue to engage 
with these major stakeholders, determine key priorities in line with their and other key 
stakeholder objectives and deliver relevant outputs in an effective manner it can continue to 
play an important role in improving child health outcomes through research and surveillance 
that informs good policy and practice. 
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Introduction  
Globally, there is public concern about vaccine safety, and improving child health is a key 
priority, including via prevention of infectious diseases through immunisation programs.3 
However, our knowledge of serious childhood illness often relies heavily on clinician or 
parental reporting of limited information.4-8 The Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease 
Surveillance (PAEDS) system conducts active, hospital-based surveillance of serious childhood 
conditions, particularly vaccine preventable diseases (VPDs) and adverse events following 
immunisation (AEFI). PAEDS was initiated in 2007 as a partnership between NCIRS and the 
Australian Paediatric Surveillance Unit and has been coordinated solely by NCIRS since 2012.8 
The system is based on Canada’s Immunization Monitoring Program ACTive (IMPACT) which 
remains in operation after being piloted in 1991.9,10 
This evaluation assessed the ability of PAEDS in achieving its aims as a surveillance system and 
identified areas for improvement by following the United States Centres for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) guidelines for evaluating a public health surveillance system.1 A 
descriptive quantitative analysis using PAEDS surveillance data as well as using qualitative data 
collected in stakeholder questionnaires was conducted. The evaluation focused on the current 
state of PAEDS while acknowledging the evolution of PAEDS over its ten years of operation.  
After more than a decade in operation and numerous modifications, this evaluation aims to 
determine the success of PAEDS as a multi-jurisdictional public health active surveillance 
system of serious childhood conditions and to provide recommendations in preparation for the 
future operation and success of PAEDS. The PAEDS system 
PAEDS has grown substantially since conception. In 2007, PAEDS initially operated at four sites 
and provided active surveillance of three conditions, and as of 2018 PAEDS operated at seven 
sites across six states and territories of Australia and provided active surveillance of nine 
conditions (Figure 1).  There are many individuals and organisations involved in PAEDS, 
including clinicians, nurses and public health researchers, as well as associate investigators, 
collaborators and financial contributors.11 PAEDS collects information that is not available 
elsewhere regarding children hospitalised with serious illnesses, with a focus on VPDs and 
AEFI, in order to inform vaccine policy and practice, including vaccine safety, and control 
communicable disease.  
The PAEDS sites include Children’s Hospital at Westmead (CHW) in Sydney, Royal Children’s 
Hospital (RCH) and Monash Children’s Hospital (MCH) in Melbourne, Women’s & Children’s 
Hospital (WCH) in Adelaide, Perth Children’s Hospital (PCH) in Perth, Queensland Children’s 
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Hospital (QCH) in Brisbane and Royal Darwin Hospital (RDH) in Darwin. The PAEDS conditions 
(described in ‘Conditions under surveillance’) include acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), acute 
childhood encephalitis (ACE), intussusception, seasonal and pandemic influenza, pertussis, 
varicella zoster virus (VZV), invasive meningococcal disease (IMD), invasive group A 
streptococcal disease (IGAS) and Kawasaki disease (KD). The overarching aim of the system is 
to improve child health outcomes by actively monitoring severe childhood conditions of 
interest to inform public health action and policy, detection of outbreaks and monitoring of 
vaccine safety. 
The broad aims of PAEDS are displayed on their website as follows:12  
- to actively collect detailed information that is not available from other surveillance 
systems, about children hospitalised with vaccine preventable diseases and potential 
adverse events following vaccination; 
- to inform vaccination policy and practice, including vaccine safety; and 
- to improve child health outcomes.  
The objectives of PAEDS are reported in PAEDS protocols as follows. 
Primary objective for all conditions: 
- to provide high quality, real-time data on selected serious childhood conditions obtained 
through active surveillance, in particular on vaccine preventable diseases and serious 
adverse events following immunisation. 
Secondary objectives for specific conditions (listed): 
- to describe longer term clinical outcomes of children who present, or are admitted to 
hospital with any of the PAEDS conditions (for ACE, IMD, VZV and KD); 
- to identify pathological agents or other key laboratory markers that contribute to 
disease severity and vaccine effectiveness in the PAEDS conditions (for ACE and IGAS); 
and 
- to improve knowledge around the social determinants of childhood disease and 
vaccination (for pertussis and influenza). 
Overall objective: 
- to inform public health policy as well as clinical guidelines and vaccination policy within 
Australia. 
The operation of PAEDS is centred upon PAEDS nurses in the hospitals who actively search for 
children who have presented to the emergency department (ED) or are admitted suffering 
from one of the conditions of interest. The PAEDS nurses collect the required relevant 
information such as clinical admission summary, laboratory test results, vaccination history 
and medical history. This comprehensive information is input on the PAEDS online database. 
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Figure 1. The evolution of the PAEDS network 
Note. Figure information reproduced from PAEDS program protocol (INTERNAL), by PAEDS, 2018.13 
Italicisation denotes conditions temporarily included in PAEDS. Not all sites participate in surveillance 
for all PAEDS conditions. CHW – Children’s Hospital at Westmead (New South Wales), MCH – Monash 
Children’s Hospital (Victoria), NHMRC – National Health and Medical Research Council, PAEDS – 
Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance, PCH – Perth Children’s Hospital (Western Australia), 
QCH – Queensland Children’s Hospital (Queensland), RCH – Royal Children’s Hospital (Victoria), RDH – 
Royal Darwin Hospital (Northern Territory), WCH – Women’s and Children’s Hospital (South Australia). 
Conditions under surveillance have been supported by the Commonwealth Department of Health (DoH) 
or combination of DoH and State/Territory Departments of Health funding if not otherwise stated. 
August 2007 
PAEDS commenced 
CHW, RCH, WCH, PCH sites 
Acute flaccid paralysis, 
intussusception, varicella, infantile 
seizures (ceased October 2009) 
Consent for surveillance required June 2009 
Added pandemic influenza (ceased October 2009)  
[NHMRC funded] 
2012 
Added pertussis 
[NHMRC funded] 
2013 
Added QCH site 
Added acute childhood encephalitis [investigator 
funded, various sources]  
Added febrile seizures (ceased June 2014) 
[Commonwealth Department of Health funded] 
2014 
Added seasonal influenza 
[2 sites; funded via FluCAN] 
Waiver of consent for all surveillance 
 2016 
Added RDH site  
Added invasive meningococcal disease and 
invasive group A streptococcal disease, 
[NHMRC funded for additional influenza and 
pertussis activities, e.g. pertussis vaccine 
effectiveness, social research into uptake of 
pertussis and influenza vaccination] 2017 
Added MCH site 
2018 
PAEDS system evaluation 
2019 
 Added Kawasaki Disease 
 [NHMRC investigator funded] 
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At commencement, the system was based on a purely surveillance model. PAEDS has evolved 
into three streams of operation by adding research and evaluation to the overall PAEDS 
network (Figure 2) on a condition-specific basis, as part of or in addition to the government 
funding requirements. 
Figure 2. PAEDS system structure 
Note. Figure information reproduced from PAEDS program protocol (INTERNAL), by PAEDS, 2018.13 
ACE – acute childhood encephalitis, AFP – acute flaccid paralysis, IGAS –  invasive group A streptococcal 
disease, IMD – invasive meningococcal disease, KD – Kawasaki disease, PAEDS – Paediatric Active 
Enhanced Disease Surveillance, VZV – varicella zoster virus. 
The Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), as the national regulatory authority regarding 
the safety of vaccines, passively collects vaccine safety data from all state and territories.14 
Immunisation providers and consumers report adverse events to the TGA where the data are 
collated, assessed and presented in annual AEFI surveillance reports.15 This surveillance system 
relies heavily on voluntary reporting which results in marked underreporting of AEFI and 
unconfirmed causality, the system also collects limited clinical data and does not provide 
‘denominator’ data required for risk analyses.16 Active surveillance of these conditions allows 
for the acquisition of information that passive surveillance cannot collect. An NCIRS-led 
Long-term outcomes research 
(stream 2a) 
ACE, IMD, IGAS and KD 
 
Biological research  
(stream 2b) 
ACE and IGAS 
Social science 
(stream 2c) 
Influenza and pertussis 
Surveillance (stream 1) 
Daily screening of potential cases by PAEDS nurses 
Waiver of consent 
Enrolment of cases and data collection by PAEDS nurses 
Data extraction and analysis by PAEDS 
Notifications and reports to Public Health Units 
Commonwealth and State/Territory Departments of Health publications 
AFP, ACE, intussusception, influenza, pertussis, VZV, IMD, IGAS and KD  
Additional research (stream 2) 
Eligible cases from PAEDS surveillance study arms  
Opt-in consent 
Enrolment of cases by PAEDS nurses 
Data collection by PAEDS nurse or external investigator 
Data extraction and analysis by PAEDS or external investigator 
Publications and reports 
 
Evaluation (stream 3) 
Evaluation of PAEDS surveillance system or individual study arms 
Questionnaires to PAEDS stakeholders 
Opt-in consent where relevant 
PAEDS evaluation 
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initiative, AusVaxSafety, actively collects data on AEFI encounters of five vaccines in selected 
populations.17 AusVaxSafety produces vaccine safety analyses of common and expected AEFI 
of only these vaccines for which they are funded by the Commonwealth Department of Health 
(DoH). This system has a short follow-up period of three days and therefore does not capture 
any longer-term AEFI that may arise, however it does collect data required for self-controlled 
case series risk analyses. While important to public health knowledge, these AEFI surveillance 
systems capture only a fraction of cases and include limited fields, hence useful information 
about severe childhood illnesses and AEFI is lost and systems to fill these gaps are required.10 
The primary communicable disease surveillance system used in Australia is the National 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), established in 1991, which passively collects 
data on a select group of conditions across the country.18 The NNDSS, in itself, does not allow 
for the collection of detailed clinical and biological data, or detailed information on disease 
severity or outcomes which is compensated by other surveillance systems, including PAEDS. 
PAEDS collaborates with an existing active hospital-based system; the Influenza Complications 
Alert Network (FluCAN), which has similar aims to PAEDS but is limited to surveillance of 
laboratory confirmed influenza. PAEDS supplies influenza data to FluCAN from its sentinel 
paediatric sites which improves the overall representativeness of severe influenza data, 
particularly in the paediatric population, who experience the highest rates of hospitalisation 
from influenza of any age group. 
The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare collects hospitalisation data as a measure of 
severe morbidity.21 This is compiled from administrative inpatient statistics collected by each 
state and territory health department. As it is administrative data collected for resource 
allocation, it is lacking specific clinical detail about conditions which PAEDS collects, such as 
serotype or strains of disease, confirmation of organism, vaccination history and medical 
history. It is also de-identified for analyses and typically not available for analysis until 1–2 
years after national collection. Conditions under surveillance  
Specific serious childhood conditions have been chosen for PAEDS active surveillance, 
comprising several VPDs and AEFI. Some of these conditions are continually under surveillance 
while others were temporary inclusions and one was added at the beginning of 2019. This 
process of expanding surveillance is driven by PAEDS stakeholders or other new investigators 
suggesting conditions for inclusion that align with PAEDS objectives. They facilitate discussion, 
consideration and deliberation between the PAEDS paediatric health professionals until a 
decision on inclusion is reached. Surveillance of some conditions has also been piloted prior to 
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officially joining PAEDS. A condition may be included in PAEDS due to its prevalence, severity, 
sudden increase in incidence, potential for near-future vaccine introduction or potential 
vaccine side effects. In some circumstances, the condition is added to the PAEDS system but 
only at sites that choose to participate and/or for which funding is available, hence 
surveillance periods may differ by site for a condition (Figure 1). 
The current and past included conditions and the scope of their surveillance are briefly 
described below. Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) 
AFP is one of the three original PAEDS conditions under surveillance since 2007 and was 
introduced with the specific aim of improving Australia’s polio surveillance. AFP is a syndrome 
characterised by the acute onset of flaccid paralysis in one or more limbs or the acute onset of 
bulbar paralysis not explained by a fall, tumour or other such causes. The classification criteria 
for AFP, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), include poliomyelitis, non-polio 
AFP and polio-compatible AFP.22 
The surveillance of AFP aims to identify all cases of AFP at PAEDS sites, obtain stool samples of 
suspected AFP cases at all sites, document the diagnosis of AFP cases, and examine the clinical 
features and outcomes of AFP including non-polio AFP. 
Surveillance is vitally important for countries to be declared polio-free and to maintain polio-
free status according to the WHO criteria. AFP is the most common sign of acute polio and the 
best way to detect the presence or absence of polio and ensure a country maintains its polio-
free status. The WHO requires detection of at least one non-polio AFP case per 100,000 
children aged <15 years and subsequent investigation.23 Issues with meeting the WHO 
requirements surround the collection of multiple stool samples. Two stool specimens 24 to 48 
hours apart are to be collected within the first 14 days after onset of paralysis in at least 80% 
of detected AFP cases. These targets have been difficult to achieve in the past and PAEDS has 
made a very important contribution to improving and maintaining satisfactory levels of case 
finding and detailed reporting, as well as increasing the rates faecal testing.24  Intussusception 
Intussusception, which can present as an AEFI following rotavirus vaccination, is one of the 
three original PAEDS conditions under surveillance since 2007. Intussusception is the most 
common cause of bowel obstruction in infants and young children and may be fatal if 
untreated.25 Obstructions are caused when segments of the bowel become enfolded within 
each other.25  
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The two new rotavirus vaccines introduced in Australia in 2007 (both previously and one 
currently NIP-funded) were found by PAEDS (and a second expanded study that included 
PAEDS data) to be associated with a small but measurable increased risk of intussusception in 
young infants.25,26 Surveillance of intussusception is considered important to monitor this 
serious AEFI linked with rotavirus vaccines.  
The surveillance of intussusception in PAEDS currently aims to identify all cases of 
intussusception in infants aged <9 months at PAEDS sites and document intussusception 
frequency and severity using established Brighton criteria.27 In addition, intussusception 
surveillance aims to determine if or when the infant received a rotavirus vaccine and examine 
the temporal relationship between intussusception and rotavirus vaccines. Intussusception 
surveillance is funded by the DoH in the core funding provided for the original PAEDS 
conditions. Varicella zoster virus (VZV) 
Varicella is one of the three original PAEDS conditions under surveillance since 2007 while 
herpes zoster was formally added in 2012 (data on herpes zoster had been collected as a 
secondary outcome in the case report form [CRF] from 2007 to 2012). VZV is highly contagious 
and usually mild, however severe complications can occur, such as secondary bacterial 
infections, central nervous system manifestations, pneumonitis and death.28 Surveillance for 
VZV disease is not consistently conducted across all Australian states and territories; in some 
jurisdictions, laboratory positive test data (without clinical information) is collected, in others 
only syndromic ED surveillance is conducted and in others, parental reporting is accepted.29 
This wide variation in reporting has underpinned the need for detailed information on severe 
cases in the context of an NIP-funded program. The PAEDS case classification criteria include 
clinically or laboratory confirmed diagnosis of varicella or herpes zoster infection. 
The surveillance of VZV in PAEDS aims to document the incidence and demographic 
characteristics of hospitalised varicella or herpes zoster cases in children aged <15 years, 
describe the disease progression, characterise the virus genotypes associated with severe 
disease, and document vaccine related complications associated with varicella zoster infection. 
VZV surveillance is funded by the DoH in the core funding provided for the original PAEDS 
conditions. Infantile seizures 
Infantile seizures were temporarily added to PAEDS as an AEFI under surveillance from August 
2007 to October 2008.  Infantile seizure surveillance aimed to identify a temporal relationship 
between the seizure and recent vaccination, since seizures are recognised as a potential AEFI.30 
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However, surveillance was discontinued due to complexities of diagnosis and application of the 
case definition.30 
The classification criteria in PAEDS for an infantile seizure case were children aged 1–8 months, 
being their first seizure presentation, without any identified trauma and admission to hospital 
for at least four hours. 
The infantile seizure data collected in the period 2007–2008 were not assessed as part of this 
evaluation as they were not collected during the 2017 evaluation period. Pandemic influenza & neurological complications following pandemic influenza such as Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) 
Pandemic influenza was temporarily added as a PAEDS condition under surveillance from June 
to October 2009.30 The classification criteria for a case of pandemic influenza included 
laboratory confirmed influenza (H1N1/09) in children aged <15 years and admitted to hospital. 
Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) was the second AEFI to be added to PAEDS in order to add to 
global research regarding the causality of the pandemic influenza vaccines and subsequent 
GBS. Surveillance for GBS was facilitated via AFP surveillance and supplemented by the 
International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Edition, Australian Modification (ICD-10-AM)-
coded clinical case reviews. 
The pandemic influenza data collected in 2009 were not assessed as part of this evaluation as 
they were not collected during the 2017 evaluation period. Pertussis  
Pertussis was added as a PAEDS condition in 2012. Pertussis is a communicable disease and a 
respiratory illness that causes significant morbidity and mortality in Australia, despite being 
vaccine preventable.31 The classification criteria for a case of pertussis includes laboratory 
confirmed pertussis in children aged <15 years. 
The surveillance of pertussis aims to estimate the burden of disease caused by hospitalised 
pertussis, document the influence of comorbidities and vaccination history on disease, 
examine infection sources, describe diagnostic methodology, provide pertussis samples for 
genotyping allowing genotypic epidemiological analysis, and to calculate vaccine effectiveness 
(VE) for hospitalised pertussis. Pertussis surveillance is supported by a National Health and 
Medical Research Council (NHMRC) Partnership grant (2016–2019). 
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Acute childhood encephalitis (ACE) 
ACE was added as a PAEDS condition in 2013.  ACE is a poorly understood serious syndrome 
that has a high rate of long-term sequelae in affected children.32 The classification criteria for a 
case of ACE includes hospitalised ACE cases in children aged <15 years who meet the 
comprehensive inclusion and exclusion criteria. The children must be hospitalised with acute 
encephalopathy and have one or more of the following: fever, seizures, focal neurological 
findings, at least one abnormality of cerebrospinal fluid, or electroencephalography/ 
neuroimaging findings consistent with infection-related encephalitis. 
The surveillance of ACE aims to describe the incidence, clinical characteristics, causative 
pathogen, potential risk factors for admission and adverse outcomes post discharge, as well as 
produce a laboratory standardised diagnostic algorithm for ACE and describe the epidemiology 
of ACE in Australia. ACE surveillance has been funded by several NHMRC grants. Febrile seizures  
Febrile seizures, which can present as an AEFI following measles-containing and other 
vaccines, was included as a PAEDS condition from May 2013 to June 2014.30 Around that time, 
a study had found that the measles-mumps-rubella-varicella (MMRV) vaccine increased the 
risk of fever and febrile seizures in infants aged 12–23 months, hence this AEFI was 
temporarily added for PAEDS surveillance under a time-limited contract with the DoH, with 
supplementary funding from an NHMRC grant.33 
Febrile seizures can be triggered by viral infections and vaccination, although this association 
may not be causal.34 Febrile seizures were specifically were added to PAEDS in response to the 
addition of the new MMRV vaccine onto the National Immunisation Program (NIP) in mid-
2013. Other vaccines, such as for influenza, with or without the 13-valent pneumococcal 
conjugate vaccine, in 2011 have also been associated with febrile seizures and data on these 
potential associations were also considered of interest.34 
The surveillance of febrile seizures aims to describe febrile seizures clinically and 
epidemiologically in children aged ≤5 years, understand the influence of vaccination timing of 
measles and varicella containing vaccines, examine the long-term clinical outcomes, and 
determine risk factors of febrile seizures. 
The febrile seizure data collected in the period 2013–2014 were not assessed as part of this 
evaluation as they were not collected during the 2017 evaluation period. 
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Seasonal influenza  
Seasonal influenza has been a PAEDS condition since 2012. Surveillance of influenza in PAEDS 
is different to the other conditions in that it combines with the FluCAN surveillance study. 
Initial inclusion of seasonal influenza was only at two sites, funded via FluCAN. Expansion of 
the collaboration with FluCAN to include data collection at five additional sites occurred in 
2017–2018 in the context of an NHMRC funded Partnership grant, led by PAEDS/FluCAN 
investigators, with partner funding from state, territories and the Commonwealth 
Departments of Health. Both FluCAN and PAEDS upload data to the FluCAN data management 
system and conduct routine (weekly) reporting to the Department of Health via FluCAN. 
Detailed analysis of paediatric data is presented at regular National Influenza Surveillance 
Committee (NISC; a subcommittee of the Communicable Diseases Network Australia [CDNA]) 
meetings, and performed on cumulative data at the end of each season. Influenza surveillance 
is conducted seasonally, from April to October annually. All influenza data are stored on the 
Research Electronic Data Capture (REDCap) online data management system and only limited 
fields are stored on the primary PAEDS online data management system, WebSpirit.35 
The classification criteria for a PAEDS influenza case includes children aged <18 years 
presenting to hospital with suspected influenza and subsequently obtaining confirmed 
influenza with polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing.  
The surveillance of influenza aims to collect real-time data of influenza requiring 
hospitalisation and provide timely information to inform public policy and determine the 
burden of influenza requiring hospitalisation. The data are also used to assess VE against 
hospitalisation of the seasonal influenza vaccine. This system aims to rapidly report changes in 
the severity of influenza complications. Invasive group A streptococcal disease (IGAS) 
IGAS was added as a PAEDS condition in 2016. IGAS is a communicable disease that has a high 
mortality rate and long-term morbidity stemming from IGAS-associated bacteraemia, 
necrotising fasciitis and meningitis.36 The classification criteria for a case of IGAS includes 
hospitalised IGAS cases of children aged <18 years. IGAS surveillance is funded by the Shepard 
Foundation, the DoH and philanthropic donations. Candidate vaccines for GAS are under 
development. 
The surveillance of IGAS was implemented as a pilot study at RCH and was later added as a 
PAEDS condition. Like influenza, all IGAS data continue to be stored on REDCap, as it was 
originally, while minimal data fields are stored on WebSprit. The surveillance aims to count the 
incidence of IGAS hospitalisations, develop persistent IGAS hospital surveillance, and describe 
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IGAS clinically and genotypically. Data captured on cases can also inform public health 
responses, such as secondary (post-exposure) prophylaxis of the contacts of cases. Invasive meningococcal disease (IMD) 
IMD was added as a PAEDS condition in 2016. IMD is a rare but serious disease that 
disproportionately affects children.37 IMD can cause many severe sequelae following infection 
such as amputation, cerebral infarction, severe skin scarring and death.37 The classification 
criteria for a case of IMD includes hospitalised IMD in children aged <18 years. Australia 
experienced the emergence of serogroup W meningococcal disease in 2016, which, together 
with an increase in serogroup Y, has led to the introduction of nation-wide Men ACWY 
vaccination programs for adolescents and infants, as well as other children and young adults as 
an outbreak response.  
The surveillance of IMD aims to describe IMD epidemiologically and genotypically, the 
association between disease severity and type, sequelae following IMD, and also to calculate 
VE of vaccines against IMD caused by all serogroups. IMD surveillance has been funded by 
NHMRC grants and Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) scholarships. Kawasaki disease (KD) 
Kawasaki disease (KD) is the newest addition to the PAEDS network, included from January 
2019 on a cost-recovery basis under an NHMRC-funded investigator-led grant supported by 
the National Blood Authority. KD is a childhood vasculitis of unknown aetiology. KD has also 
raised concern as a potential causally associated AEFI, such as in clinical trials of the 
meningococcal B vaccine, Bexsero, although to date, based on limited data, no causal 
relationship has been proven. The sequelae of KD can include coronary artery aneurysms, 
myocarditis, myocardial infraction and arrhythmia which can extend into adulthood causing 
premature death.38,39 Treatment in the acute phase is based on intravenous immunoglobulin 
infusion.39 
The classification criteria for a case of KD includes hospitalised KD in children aged <18 years. 
The surveillance data of this condition were not evaluated since they were not a part of the 
PAEDS system in 2017. Public health importance 
The conditions included in PAEDS were chosen and continued for surveillance, in consultation 
with PAEDS investigators and funders, due to their importance for child health in Australia. The 
data that PAEDS collects combines vaccination history and detailed clinical history, and 
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sometimes additional collection and testing of select biological samples. These comprehensive 
data were not readily available for these select AEFI or serious childhood illnesses prior to the 
introduction of PAEDS.9 
PAEDS specific contributions to public health knowledge are detailed further in the ‘Utility of 
PAEDS’ section. Objectives of evaluation 
This evaluation focused on surveillance system attributes that are relevant to PAEDS and used 
specific PAEDS conditions to assess the attributes. 
After ten years in operation, PAEDS was evaluated to: 
• assess the usefulness of PAEDS outputs; 
• assess the operation of the system to meet its aims and objectives; 
• assess the surveillance system performance via selected attributes; and 
• provide recommendations to improve the system. Methods 
This evaluation follows the framework described in the CDC’s Updated Guidelines for 
Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems.1 This guide provides a detailed structure for an 
evaluation of a public health surveillance system by assessing how the system meets its aims, 
and how successful the system is in terms of several key attributes. The quantitative attributes 
(data quality, sensitivity and timeliness) were assessed by analysing the PAEDS collected data 
at all seven operating sites. The qualitative attributes (simplicity, flexibility, acceptability, 
sensitivity, timeliness and stability) were assessed via stakeholder questionnaires for six of the 
seven operating sites. Relevant internal and external documents were also reviewed to obtain 
further information of PAEDS protocols, operation and management. Remaining attributes 
(positive predictive value [PPV] and representativeness) were not included in this evaluation 
(Table 1).  
The findings and recommendations resulting from this evaluation will be disseminated to 
stakeholders. 
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Table 1. Summary of public health surveillance system attributes assessed in this report 
using different modalities of data and select group surveys 
 STAKEHOLDER EVALUATION 
SURVEILLANCE 
DATA System feature PAEDS nurses 
PAEDS 
investigators 
PAEDS 
collaborators 
PAEDS aims     
Usefulness     
System attributes:     
Simplicity     
Flexibility     
Data quality     
Acceptability     
Sensitivity     
Timeliness     
Stability     
PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance. 
This evaluation of PAEDS had several limitations. Firstly, acceptability of the system to families, 
parents, guardians and children participating was not measured, nor was the opinions of the 
laboratory staff and data users beyond PAEDS stakeholders. Secondly, detailed influenza and 
IGAS data housed in REDCap were not analysed for data quality as only WebSpirit data were 
included. More so, data quality issues may have been undetected due to quality being 
manually assessed. Opinions of stakeholders based in the Northern Territory could not be 
included in this evaluation due to time constraints in gaining additional ethics approvals. Stakeholder evaluation 
Three questionnaires were developed for the three groups of stakeholders: PAEDS specialist 
surveillance nurses (Appendix 1), PAEDS investigators (Appendix 2) and PAEDS collaborators 
and funding partners (Appendix 3). Questionnaires were administered using the online survey 
tool Qualtrics.2 The anonymous survey link to the 15 minute questionnaire was distributed via 
email along with a participant information sheet. This method was chosen to preserve the 
identity of the study cohort from the study investigators. Participants were given the option to 
complete the questionnaire over the phone or face-to-face, if preferred. Reminder emails 
were sent to participants two weeks and three weeks post initial invitation. The questionnaire 
comprised of ranking-style questions such as ‘extremely important’ to ‘not at all important’ as 
well as incorporating open-ended questions to gather further explanations. The questionnaire 
responses were analysed for frequency of response such as percentage responded ‘extremely 
well’ and ‘very well’ for PAEDS performance. Free text responses were analysed for key 
themes. Discussions at the 2018 annual PAEDS face-to-face meeting provided further 
opportunity to gain informal stakeholder feedback which was also included in this evaluation. 
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The participant information sheet described the evaluation, participant involvement and 
reinforced the voluntary nature of the study (Appendix 4). Consent was obtained via a tick box 
at the beginning of the questionnaire. Prior to beginning this study, all PAEDS affiliates were 
informed of this evaluation and of their anticipated involvement. Data evaluation 
PAEDS de-identified hospital surveillance data were used for descriptive analyses of 
participants admitted or presenting to hospital between 1 January 2017 and 31 December 
2017. Data were captured on WebSpirit which the PAEDS nurses compile from the patient’s 
clinical data, case report, discharge summary, pathology results and vaccination records from 
the Australian Immunisation Register (AIR).40 The data analysed were de-identified, line listed 
and did not require involvement from the participants. The data were extracted on 12 
February 2018. Variables included time stamps during hospital stay, basic demographic 
characteristics, details of diagnosis and treatment, tests performed and test results. 
PAEDS data were recorded by patient, with a unique patient identification number, and were 
extracted in separate datasets for each PAEDS condition as well as additional datasets for 
patient details and patient vaccination history. Consequently, the quality of the data was 
assessed separately for each condition, patient details and vaccination history.  
The data were limited to patients admitted or presenting to hospital in 2017 and only patients 
who were reported as ‘eligible’ for inclusion in PAEDS. For measures of timeliness, patients 
who were identified retrospectively via a code audit of the ICD-10-AM and ‘other’ methods 
were excluded, in order to reduce nonsensical results. To examine the impact of the severe 
2017 influenza season, pre-flu season (January-June), peak-flu season (July-October) and post-
flu season (November-December) variations in timeliness were compared. The influenza 
dataset had limited variables as it was not primarily collected by PAEDS, rather by FluCAN, 
therefore measures of timeliness could not be calculated with the data provided. The included 
influenza data from WebSpirit were limited to admissions from 1 January 2017 to 31 October 
2017. Usefulness 
The usefulness of PAEDS was assessed by examining the ability of PAEDS to achieve its aims of 
detecting serious childhood illnesses such as VPDs and AEFI and monitoring disease trends and 
outbreaks. The added value of PAEDS to the field of knowledge and to child health was 
described, as was the need of this system to address these aims in the presence of similar 
systems within Australia; i.e. do other existing systems already achieve these goals and acquire 
this information? Usefulness of PAEDS was assessed by the extent to which PAEDS information 
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was disseminated and the impact it had on policy decisions, vaccination programs and clinical 
practice. The various roles of PAEDS in previously assisting policy decisions and the availability 
of PAEDS data to policy makers were examined. PAEDS ability to meet its objectives was 
examined via identifying PAEDS outputs and considering stakeholder opinions. System attributes 
The attributes evaluated included simplicity, flexibility, data quality, acceptability, sensitivity, 
timeliness and stability. Positive predictive value (PPV) and representativeness were not 
assessed in this evaluation. PPV in the PAEDS system is the percentage of patients captured by 
PAEDS who were true cases of the condition of interest.1 All recorded cases in PAEDS were 
already verified to be true cases of the conditions or disease as a part of the PAEDS 
recruitment process, hence evaluation of PPV was deemed unnecessary. Additional 
verification of these cases would be redundant.  
In regards to representativeness, there are seven hospitals within Australia that participate in 
PAEDS. Each of these sites is a large tertiary, referral public hospital in a state capital city and 
together were estimated to account for >75% of all admissions to hospitals providing specialist 
paediatric services in Australia.30 For cases to be included in PAEDS, they must have presented 
to the ED or been admitted as an inpatient into one of these hospitals. Given these 
characteristics of the surveillance system, the representativeness is limited to children who are 
geographically located in proximity of one of the sites and who require medical care to the 
extent of hospital presentation or referral to one of the sites for a higher level of care. The fact 
that PAEDS is not in operation in hospitals in Tasmania, northern Queensland, northern 
Western Australia and central Australia is potentially a current constraint of the system. The 
limitations of population representativeness are understood and, as a result, this attribute was 
not assessed further. Simplicity 
This attribute was evaluated by examining the ease of operation and the flow of information 
within the PAEDS network as well as through attitudes of stakeholders collected from 
questionnaires. An efficient surveillance system should achieve its aims while being as simple 
as possible without redundancies and duplications. The structure of the system influences 
other attributes such as data quality, timeliness and acceptability.  Flexibility 
The ability of PAEDS to evolve in terms of adding and removing conditions for surveillance as 
well as adding sites for operation was evaluated to demonstrate the flexibility of the system 
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(Appendix 5). Stakeholder questionnaires gathered this information in addition to the evidence 
of the ten years in which PAEDS has evolved. The flexibility of PAEDS is reliant on the funding 
and resource allocation agreements within the system and may be site specific. The high 
intensity of the 2017 influenza season enabled the evaluation of PAEDS flexibility during times 
of high demand and system stress. Data quality 
The completeness and validity of the data collected in the system was evaluated by 
quantitative analysis of PAEDS collected surveillance data as well as the processes in place to 
monitor or correct any data errors. Data quality is site and condition dependent as site-specific 
procedures are in place and some conditions require additional information. The analysis 
described the variations in data quality and completeness by condition and by site, when 
appropriate.  Acceptability 
Acceptability was initially assessed by the response rate to the evaluation questionnaire and 
subsequently by stakeholder interaction within the PAEDS network, the use of its reports and 
the stakeholder opinion of the importance of the system. Evaluating acceptability is subjective 
and is likely to vary by stakeholder type within the organisation; as a result tailored 
questionnaires were distributed to nurses, investigators and collaborators. Sensitivity 
Sensitivity was assessed quantitatively using audits of the proportion of the cases within the 
hospital with ICD-10-AM coding for a PAEDS condition that are captured by the PAEDS 
network. This method has variable utility, but is particularly appropriate when an ICD code has 
high sensitivity and specificity in relation to the condition of interest. For example, there is no 
ICD code for the syndrome of AFP, however, codes for GBS, transverse myelitis and other 
select conditions that can result in AFP are explored to audit and augment active case capture. 
For selected PAEDS conditions, audits are performed at least quarterly by PAEDS staff at each 
site as a quality measure of completeness of active surveillance case ascertainment and as a 
method of retrospective case recruitment. To allow for a delay in hospital coding and patients 
who had extended hospital stays, the audits were performed three months after the quarter 
was complete, e.g. the audit for quarter one, 1 January 2017 to 31 March 2017, was requested 
on 1 July 2017 and was aimed to be completed in one month, by 1 August 2017. These audits 
request the information of patients aged <15 years (<18 years for IGAS and IMD patients, and 
influenza patients from April 2018) admitted to the hospital within the relevant quarter with 
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the ICD codes of the PAEDS condition, either as primary or a secondary code (Appendix 6). 
Note that ICD code audits are not performed for influenza. Stakeholder attitudes of the ability 
of PAEDS to detect changing disease trends and predict disease outbreak was also assessed.  
Comparison of ICD-coded cases with clinically confirmed cases, detected via active surveillance 
of admission records and/or laboratory test confirmation, also allow for an assessment of the 
validity of the utility of ICD coding (an administrative code) to match clinically verifiable cases. 
This in turn, helps better understand the validity of using such ICD codes in analysis of large 
health-care databases, when case confirmation cannot be undertaken. Examples of this 
include work done by PAEDS on validating the ICD code for intussusception.41 
As described in Table 2, sensitivity was calculated as the number of true positives (i.e. A, the 
cases captured by PAEDS that were also captured by ICD coding) divided by the actual number 
of positives (i.e. A+C, all ICD coded cases). 
Table 2. Calculation of sensitivity for the PAEDS network 
Condition detected 
by PAEDS 
Condition detected by hospital 
ICD-10-AM coding 
Yes No  
Yes True positive A 
False positive 
B A+B 
No False negative C 
True negative 
D C+D 
 
 A+C B+D Total 
ICD-10-AM – International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Edition, Australian Modification Timeliness 
Quantitative and qualitative data analyses were used to assess the timeliness of the PAEDS 
system. Timeliness was reflected in the time between stages of the PAEDS system. This was 
assessed by calculating times from patient hospital admission to time the patient was 
recruited, as well as a number of other measurements such as timeliness of vaccination history 
check on AIR and record completion. Note that RDH data was excluded when assessing 
timeliness due to the retrospective recruitment of many cases in 2017. Qualitative feedback 
from stakeholders was used to evaluate the time between each step of the PAEDS process and 
in terms of dissemination of information such as monthly and annual reports. 
Timeliness is important for communicable diseases. The strength of PAEDS to identify and 
recruit an eligible child can rapidly inform communicable disease outbreak knowledge or a 
previously unrecognised AEFI; both of these scenarios are time-sensitive and require rapid 
response to reduce further harm. 
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Stability 
The reliability of PAEDS to fulfil its surveillance obligations was determined from stakeholder 
questionnaire responses regarding system outages, the impact of times of high stress, staff 
requirements, online system capabilities and the ability to add further surveillance conditions. 
Stakeholder acceptability as well as evidential and perceived usefulness of PAEDS was used to 
evaluate stability. Importantly, the funding status of PAEDS was examined to evaluate the 
current and future financial stability of the system which underpins the stability of the entire 
system. Ethics approval 
Ethics approval was obtained via National Mutual Acceptance (HREC/18/SCHN/72), Site 
Specific Assessment at the PAEDS coordinating centre (SSA/18/SCHN/190) and from the 
Australian National University Human Research Ethics Committee (2017/909). Results & discussion 
Stakeholder response to the questionnaire varied by stakeholder group: 93% (14/15) PAEDS 
nurses, 42% (8/19) PAEDS investigators and 83% (5/6) PAEDS state, territory and 
Commonwealth health departments responded. Each state and territory of Australia was 
represented in the nurse responses. There were no responses from PAEDS investigators or 
funders in South Australia. Stakeholders based in Northern Territory could not be included in 
the stakeholder evaluation questionnaire analysis. Importantly, the majority of PAEDS 
stakeholders were able to contribute valuable responses through presentation and discussions 
at the 2018 annual PAEDS face-to-face meeting that informed this evaluation.  
Responses to the stakeholder questionnaire, discussions at the 2018 PAEDS annual 
stakeholder face-to-face meeting, published PAEDS data and reports of PAEDS contributions 
from various resources were used to assess the usefulness of the system. The usefulness of the 
system was evaluated against the four objectives of PAEDS. Objectives and usefulness 
The objectives of PAEDS are identified in PAEDS protocols. These objectives were guided by 
those of the IMPACT system upon which PAEDS is based.9 To be further discussed, PAEDS has 
performed well against two of its objectives, underperformed against one of its objectives, 
while one objective is relatively new and its performance cannot be thoroughly assessed. 
Throughout this evaluation it became clear that PAEDS investigators were unaware of, or 
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confused about, these objectives which could explain the varied achievement of the 
objectives. 
Objective 1: Provide high quality, real-time data on selected serious childhood conditions 
obtained through active surveillance, in particular on vaccine preventable diseases and serious 
adverse events following immunisation 
PAEDS is an active surveillance system that provides timely and comprehensive data to 
increase knowledge of childhood illnesses and AEFI across Australia. PAEDS produces rich, 
detailed data that are used for research outputs as well as for direct public health outputs. The 
system is built to be a “comprehensive, integrated, validated data collection” which fills 
knowledge gaps, allows cross-jurisdictional collaboration and informs immunisation programs. 
Seventeen of the 22 participating stakeholders (77%) agreed that PAEDS is achieving this 
objective extremely or very well (Table 3). 
Seven NIP-relevant conditions and two AEFI are under PAEDS surveillance which supports the 
DoH in monitoring disease trends and the safety of their vaccines. Some of the PAEDS 
conditions (such as IGAS) are state and territory notifiable conditions rather than nationally 
notifiable under the NNDSS. Therefore PAEDS collects substantial data on conditions that are 
not otherwise (or yet) available and contributes to the evidence to inform evaluation of their 
potential addition to the NNDSS, as well as the baseline data in preparation for addition to the 
NNDSS. These baseline data will also be useful once (a) vaccines become available for diseases 
that were not previously vaccine preventable, such as the IGAS (or respiratory syncytial virus 
[RSV]) vaccines currently in development, (b) when new generation vaccines are developed for 
current VPDs, such as the change from meningococcal C vaccine to meningococcal ACWY 
conjugate vaccine, or (c) following changes to the NIP schedule, such as the addition of 
maternal pertussis vaccination to the NIP in 2018 in order to better protect young infants 
against pertussis.  
PAEDS identifies cases of important conditions and collects samples for testing that add to the 
biological knowledge of the disease, such as stool samples of AFP cases tested for enteric virus 
identification by the National Enterovirus Reference Laboratory. Essential to reach the WHO 
reporting targets, PAEDS contributes to the national AFP surveillance and collected the 
majority of AFP cases nationally in 2017, representing approximately 77% of all AFP cases 
captured annually in Australia.42 Prior to the establishment of AFP surveillance through PAEDS, 
Australia had difficulty meeting the reporting targets, especially the faecal testing 
requirements. This testing requires two faecal specimens within 14 days of onset of paralysis 
and was only obtained for 31% of cases in 2008–2009.24 With a target of 80%, PAEDS 
surveillance contributes to the WHO requirements for Australia to maintain polio-free status 
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as part of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative; having fulfilled the case target for incidence 
detection (97% in 2017), however the stool testing target remains unsatisfactory (37% in 
2017).43 A government stakeholder praised PAEDS for its “critical contribution to AFP 
surveillance” and a PAEDS investigator reported that “no other system can fill this gap, PAEDS 
is very important for AFP surveillance.” 
PAEDS has reported many public health contributions in its annual reports. A major 
contribution of PAEDS was its role in identifying the risk of intussusception post-rotavirus 
vaccination among young infants.25,44 Using PAEDS data, the two new rotavirus vaccines 
introduced to Australia in 2007, RotaTeq and Rotarix, were reported in a world-first 
publication to be associated with a small but measurable increased risk of intussusception in 
young infants following the first two doses of rotavirus vaccine but not following subsequent 
vaccine doses.25,26 The finding prompted changes to product information and safety updates 
from the TGA. Due to the absence of vaccination history captured in hospital inpatient 
datasets, other databases alone would not have been sufficient to identify this AEFI 
connection. Therefore without PAEDS the associated vaccine risk may not have been 
recognised, or at least would have taken considerably longer to be detected and confirmed. 
The contributions of PAEDS to vaccine safety knowledge also include assessing the risk of 
febrile seizures post-MMR vaccination.45-47 
It was acknowledged among government stakeholder feedback that PAEDS collects data that 
are difficult to capture through other mechanisms. PAEDS collects data on conditions or 
syndromes that don’t have a laboratory test or for which laboratory testing is inconclusive or 
inefficient. The AEFI surveillance of ACE, AFP, severe acute neurological events (SANE) and 
acute disseminated encephalomyelitis (ADEM) demonstrates the use of infectious disease 
surveillance in conditions that are “agnostic to cause” due to their syndromic nature. These 
conditions can be difficult to track since they may not be caused by a singularly-defined 
infectious agent, nor do they have a standardised reporting process in any jurisdiction. 
Therefore other existing surveillance systems such as the NNDSS cannot detect these 
conditions.  
The expansion of PAEDS has increased the diversity of data with increasing representation of 
culturally and linguistically diverse populations, as well as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples, particularly in recent years with the addition of PAEDS sites in Darwin (2016) and 
south-west Melbourne (2018). Expanding the system enables the capture of information from 
otherwise hard to reach groups such as those critically ill, lost to follow up, non-English 
speaking background, and thereby obtaining more complete data from the broader 
population. This has been particularly facilitated by the waiver of consent for inclusion of 
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surveillance data for various conditions, ensuring detailed data from potentially vulnerable 
children is relatively complete. The expansion of PAEDS has also included the addition of more 
conditions under surveillance. 
The growth of the system has allowed PAEDS to capture trends in poorly studied conditions, 
including identifying Mycoplasma pneumonia, parechovirus and enterovirus 71-related 
outbreaks.42 When referring to the outbreak cases of parechovirus, a PAEDS investigator 
commented that this “would not have been picked up by alternate mechanisms”. These 
epidemics reported by PAEDS have resulted in publications, factsheets, clinical guidelines, and 
direct policy in practice implications by changing surveillance practices in jurisdictions.  
Influenza surveillance is a major contribution of PAEDS that was reported by many 
stakeholders to fill knowledge gaps and provide crucial timely data. Weekly influenza reports 
by CHW have been noted as particularly useful by stakeholders, who suggest this reporting 
should be emulated by the remaining sites. The contribution of PAEDS to ensuring paediatric 
representation within FluCAN is substantial, with 70% of FluCAN paediatric data coming from 
PAEDS sites in 2017. This data provides rapid vaccine coverage data estimates using test 
negative controls (particularly discriminating between children with and without underlying 
medical conditions for whom funding of vaccination varies nationally and is not available via 
the AIR), VE and severity estimates which are promptly disseminated. These data are needed 
continually during the year and inform the vaccine program for the following influenza season. 
Stakeholders described this influenza surveillance as essential, however they were not 
convinced that the surveillance must continue to be within the PAEDS system, especially 
considering the impact of the influenza season on resources needed to ensure timely reporting 
of the remaining PAEDS conditions. 
An incidental positive contribution of PAEDS is its capacity to inform the specificity and 
sensitivity of ICD codes for PAEDS conditions which are validated in each jurisdiction. The 
breadth of the system spanning across Australia allows for data sharing between states and 
territories regarding increased incidence of a condition, changes to the presentation of a 
condition, or AEFI increases, which help the early identification of outbreaks and issues of 
vaccine safety. Consensus of data supports that PAEDS has successfully achieved this objective. 
Objective 2: Describe longer term clinical outcomes of children who present, or are admitted 
to hospital with any of the PAEDS conditions (for ACE, IMD, VZV and KD) 
An aim of PAEDS IMD surveillance is to increase knowledge and understanding of long-term 
outcomes however very little relevant data have been captured. Eleven of the 22 stakeholders 
(50%) agreed that PAEDS is achieving this objective only moderately or slightly well (Table 3). 
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PAEDS collects data on severity and long-term effects which are lacking in the NNDSS national 
system. PAEDS data have contributed to the knowledge of severe disease and risk factors, and 
could be useful in evaluating the changes in meningococcal vaccines programs in Australia or 
understanding the infectious sequelae of VZV later in life.48 The flux in IMD strain dominance 
provides support for the continued IMD surveillance through PAEDS, despite the current lack 
of outputs regarding long-term clinical outcomes of IMD or any of the PAEDS conditions. It was 
reported by a stakeholder that surveillance of long-term outcomes for IMD does not receive 
any funding and would explain the lack of outputs. In addition, time to accrue and analyse 
longer term outcomes is required. Surveillance of VZV long-term outcomes was not considered 
a high priority, nor was it thought to have adequate funding for it to be undertaken. 
This objective was effectively achieved in the case of febrile seizure surveillance post MMRV 
vaccine. PAEDS investigators used a self-controlled case series methodology to calculate the 
attributable risk of febrile seizures up to 30 days post vaccination, which resulted in 
publications.45 
A PAEDS investigator who rated this objective to be only ‘slightly well achieved’ noted that 
PAEDS had not done much investigation of long-term outcomes which is problematic due to 
the additional work and challenges it raises for the surveillance nurses. Another investigator 
suggested the lack of a systematic and consistent follow-up process for each condition could 
be responsible for underachievement of this objective, while also considering the achievability 
of this objective within resource constraints. As a result, this objective to describe longer term 
outcomes for IMD, ACE, IGAS and KD has not been effectively achieved by PAEDS (Figure 2). 
However, of note, IGAS and KD only commenced surveillance in 2016 and 2019, respectively, 
and funding and conduct of long-term follow-up for ACE is being undertaken separately by the 
lead investigators for that study, Prof Cheryl Jones and Dr Phil Britton. 
Objective 3: Identify pathological agents or other key laboratory markers that contribute to 
disease severity and vaccine effectiveness in the PAEDS conditions (for ACE and IGAS) 
Eighteen of the 22 stakeholders (82%) agreed that PAEDS is achieving this objective extremely 
or very well (Table 3). PAEDS has successfully achieved this objective to date. 
Annually, PAEDS data contribute to child and maternal influenza VE calculations, via FluCAN, 
which have reinforced the importance of vaccination and demonstrated the high levels of 
influenza activity in the past several years in Australia. In 2016, specifically, PAEDS data were 
able to provide evidence of no increased risk of post-vaccination severe acute neurological 
events following administration of the 2016 influenza vaccine. 
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PAEDS role in generating vaccine safety knowledge and building confidence in vaccines also 
occurs in relation to non-influenza VPDs within the PAEDS system. PAEDS data have 
contributed to VE estimates for maternal pertussis vaccine protection of early infants as well 
as varicella VE against hospitalised VZV.50-52 PAEDS has demonstrated the one-dose varicella 
vaccine protection against hospitalised varicella as well as identified genotypic diversity.50 T 
The monitoring of VZV and the moderate one-dose VE seen in children provided evidence to 
inform a review of the recommendation for second dose of varicella vaccine to be NIP-funded, 
as is the case in the United States of America where breakthrough cases, including school-
based varicella outbreaks, were frequently documented despite high one-dose coverage.53-55 
These various VZV-related findings have resulted in high profile publications and awards such 
as the NHMRC ‘10 of the best’ awarded to a PAEDS investigator, Professor Helen Marshall.51 
PAEDS provides the only nationally consistent verified source of data on severe varicella and 
herpes zoster, both of which assist with the evaluation of the nationally funded varicella 
vaccine program.49  
PAEDS data led to ground breaking research into the aetiology, management and outcomes for 
ACE. ACE surveillance has shown childhood encephalitis to be associated with epidemics of 
important emerging pathogens amongst children in Australia including enterovirus 71 and 
human parechovirus type 3 and determined the magnitude of the contribution of influenza to 
childhood encephalitis.56-62 Furthermore, PAEDS surveillance also identified a cluster of 
Mycoplasma pneumoniae-associated encephalitis in Western Sydney, a probable marker of the 
epidemic activity of this common, yet inadequately understood, pathogen.63 Contemporary 
causes and consequences of all-cause childhood encephalitis data were presented at the 
Infectious Diseases Society of America Infectious Disease week in 2016 and the European 
Congress of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases in 2017.63,64 
PAEDS data have been used in the world’s biggest study of intussusception and rotavirus 
including clinical data, vaccine history and outcome data. The research demonstrated that 
vaccine associated intussusception is not more severe than naturally-acquired intussusception 
(manuscript in preparation). Overall, the clinical and healthcare utilisation aspects of 
intussusception (irrespective of whether vaccine-associated) have also been well described 
using PAEDS data, including the effect of age on poorer clinical outcomes (increased bowel 
resection and intensive care unit admission rates), but not increase in surgery occurrence.  
PAEDS specifically identified ACE and IGAS to be addressed within this objective yet IGAS has 
seemingly been neglected and replaced by other conditions such as intussusception and VZV. 
IGAS was only added to the system in 2016 which may contribute to the lack of IGAS outputs 
relating to this objective. 
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Objective 4: Improve knowledge around the social determinants of childhood disease and 
vaccination (for pertussis and influenza) 
A relatively new application of PAEDS is the introduction of the social research stream, funded 
via the PAEDS NHMRC Partnership Grant on influenza and pertussis (CIA Macartney), with the 
aim of understanding more comprehensively the vaccine-related knowledge, attitudes and 
behaviours of families of children hospitalised with these diseases. Twelve of the 22 
stakeholders (55%) agreed that PAEDS is achieving this objective extremely or very well, 
however half of funders rated this objective as only moderately important (Table 3).  
This research aims to gain knowledge and attitudes of families of the children hospitalised with 
influenza and pertussis with the objective of developing improved strategies to protect young 
infants.49 Aims of this research include to identify barriers and facilitators to maternal and child 
vaccination in unvaccinated participants and those who have experienced vaccine failure or 
AEFI.  
Government stakeholder opinion was conflicting. Some commented that the inclusion of social 
research in PAEDS is “incredibly useful” and that its outputs “add a lot to our understanding”, 
while others believe this research to be not at all important: “There is a lot of social research 
happening in other areas…I am not sure that the social research being done through PAEDS 
adds anything to that work. I believe PAEDS should focus on the important clinical/public 
health aspects of the identified cases”. 
General usefulness 
In addition to these specific aims and objectives, PAEDS has academic outputs and 
contributions with PAEDS data published and presented nationally and internationally. PAEDS 
has provided several students with research opportunities largely based at NCIRS and CHW. 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) and Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology scholars have 
completed and are currently working on projects based on PAEDS data or using the PAEDS 
platform.  
Overall stakeholder feedback of PAEDS found that each objective was considered either 
extremely or very important by 91% of nurses, 85% investigators and 75% of funders. Seven of 
the eight (88%) PAEDS investigators rated the PAEDS system as extremely or very useful while 
one rated it to be only moderately useful. PAEDS investigators praised the system: “PAEDS fills 
a gap between notification data and hospitalisation data, as it provides very detailed clinical 
data that are especially important for the severe end of the diseases…and informs vaccine 
effectiveness by performing case-control studies” and “PAEDS is a unique opportunity to 
complement existing public health surveillance networks. To do this, it needs to be agile and 
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real-time. Although we are becoming increasingly so, we in the past have not had the systems 
that facilitate these timely responses”. An investigator suggested that PAEDS data could be 
“better integrated with other sources of disease data, rather than just providing a 
supplemental source of data”. 
All nurses and investigators rated the overall PAEDS system as extremely or very important 
while no funder rated it as extremely important. Half of the nurses remarked that PAEDS fills a 
gap for which there is not another system that is able to provide timely, high quality, 
nationwide data on serious paediatric conditions and promote a timely public health message. 
A number of stakeholders commented on the partnership with the various health departments 
and the role of PAEDS in informing policy and practice and providing strategic advice on 
surveillance of important diseases. This partnership is integral to PAEDS yet is not specifically 
represented in the PAEDS objectives and could be proposed as an additional objective. 
Funding stakeholders who agree that PAEDS is useful commented: 
- PAEDS provides “rich information about severe paediatric infections or AEFIs. 
Opportunity to investigate risk factors in depth. Opportunity to estimate VE. 
Opportunity to gather more information, such as genetic susceptibility or organism 
mutations”. 
- PAEDS collects information regarding “long-term sequelae” and provides “improved 
surveillance of conditions not laboratory notifiable”. 
- PAEDS collects “details of severe disease, VE values for severe disease, molecular 
epidemiology for severe disease that are not available through other surveillance 
mechanisms”. 
- “Most other surveillance systems do not obtain detailed clinical information.” 
Several common issues were raised by the PAEDS nurses that are possibly responsible for the 
sub-optimal achievement of objective one. Inefficiencies such as duplication of data entry into 
two separate databases, WebSpirit and REDCap, and lack of an electronic data collection tool, 
such as a portable tablet, were identified as common themes throughout the evaluation as 
barriers to providing real-time data collection and entry.  
While only one funder responded that they were unsure of the usefulness of PAEDS, a number 
of funding stakeholders proposed ideas to increase usefulness: 
- “The usefulness of PAEDS in AEFI is not as clear for policy and program design and 
could be better articulated.” 
- “Regular engagement with policy and program officers to ensure the system aligns 
with broader objectives.” 
- “Ensure efforts are focused on conditions where this surveillance is most appropriate.” 
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- “It would be useful to understand the rationale and process for selecting diseases 
monitored through PAEDS. As a funder, it would be useful to be involved in the 
selection of diseases for surveillance.” 
Table 3. Responses of PAEDS nurses and PAEDS investigators on achievement of objectives 
 How well PAEDS is achieving each of its objectives 
Objective Extremely 
well 
Very 
well 
Moderately 
well 
Slightly 
well 
Not well 
at all 
(1) Provide high quality, real-
time data on selected serious 
childhood conditions obtained 
through active surveillance, in 
particular on VPDs and serious 
AEFI 
7 
32% 
10 
45% 
5 
23% - - 
(2) Describe longer term clinical 
outcomes of children who 
present, or are admitted to 
hospital with any of the PAEDS 
conditions 
3 
14% 
8 
36% 
9 
41% 
2 
9% - 
(3) Identify pathological agents 
or other key laboratory markers 
that contribute to disease 
severity and VE in the PAEDS 
conditions 
5 
23% 
13 
59% 
4 
18% - - 
(4) Improve knowledge around 
the social determinants of 
childhood disease and 
vaccination 
4 
18% 
8 
36% 
9 
41% 
1 
5% - 
Respondents (N=22) include 14 surveillance nurses and 8 investigators. 
AEFI – adverse events following immunisation, PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance, 
VPD – vaccine preventable disease, VE – vaccine effectiveness. Operation of PAEDS Data collection and management 
PAEDS nurses provided feedback regarding data collection and management as the primary 
stakeholder with experience of the daily processes. The process of data collection is described 
in Figure 3 where data are collected on paper-based forms which are later transferred to the 
online system, WebSpirit, used by PAEDS. This method is used for all conditions; however 
minimal data fields for influenza and IGAS are kept in WebSpirit as these data are primarily 
stored in REDCap. WebSpirit is an electronic data capture and clinical trial management system 
managed by the Paediatric Trials Network Australia. It allows for users to customise their own 
electronic case report forms and stores data on an Australian server. REDCap, created by 
Vanderbilt University, is a similar online data collection and management tool that is 
specifically made for research studies rather than clinical trials for which WebSpirit is intended.  
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The use of two separate data management systems was a commonly reported limitation of 
PAEDS. Stakeholders unanimously decided that the future of PAEDS would involve the use of 
one sole data management system to streamline data processes. Originally WebSpirit was the 
chosen PAEDS data management system due to its ability to capture unique patients allowing 
for linkage of patients who are enrolled in PAEDS for several conditions at different 
admissions. In addition, REDCap was not readily available at the time when a switch from the 
previous Access database was necessary. However the frequency of patient return for PAEDS 
conditions is low and is not a critical database function necessary going forward, obviating the 
need to continue with WebSpirit. 
REDCap was proposed as the sole PAEDS data management system due to its capabilities and 
relevance to the requirements of PAEDS. Using one data management system would abolish 
the extra time currently taken in repetition of data entry into the two data management 
systems thus speeding up data entry as a whole. Moving to REDCap could take up to one year 
and, with the lack of committed ongoing funding, this decision has been postponed until 
further funding is secured. Another time saving suggestion was for PAEDS influenza 
surveillance to be merged with FluCAN, especially considering each system involves its own 
CRF.  
The existing paper-based data collection and subsequent electronic data entry methodology 
was repeatedly criticised. Nurses suggested the use of a tablet (i.e. an iPad) which would be 
logged into the database (i.e. WebSpirit) and the relevant CRF would be completed and 
directly uploaded during patient consultation, and progressively updated electronically when 
more information becomes available.  
The current data entry process fortunately allows for the patient eligibility in PAEDS to be 
revised. For example, patient records of AFP cases are discussed at the Polio Expert Panel (PEP) 
and if the PEP decides that the patient is not a true AFP case then the record is updated to 
ineligible and is excluded from PAEDS AFP case numbers. In other cases, the treating physician 
may be consulted and report that the case did not meet the eligibility criteria.  
The amount of data collected for PAEDS ranges by condition with 174 data fields in the 
intussusception dataset compared to 450 data fields in the IMD dataset, however not all data 
fields are mandatory. These data fields include hospital admission information, laboratory 
results, vaccination history and CRF responses. As presented at the 2018 annual PAEDS face-
to-face meeting, all conditions have gone through a process to reduce unnecessary data 
capture and thus reduce the length of the CRFs. Such changes include removing questions 
asking for irrelevant vaccination history, country of birth of patient’s parents, language spoken 
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at home, intensive care unit (ICU) information, treatment information and irrelevant travel 
information. More so, many of these fields were not being used in data analysis. 
 
Figure 3. Steps in PAEDS surveillance, recruitment and data entry, 2017 
IGAS – invasive group A streptococcal disease, PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance, 
CRF – case report form. 
ADMITTED 
PAEDS surveillance nurses trawl hospital emergency department, inpatient, laboratory, 
and Intensive Care Unit hospital databases (i.e. Powerchart, formerly Health-e-Care) for 
potential PAEDS-eligible patients  who were admitted or presented the previous day. 
Potential PAEDS patients can also be notified to PAEDS surveillance nurses by laboratory 
staff or the treating clinician. The nurses use the 'PAEDS Case Screening and Recruitment 
Guide' to determine preliminary eligibility. 
IDENTIFIED 
Daily, potential patients are manually recorded in a hard-copy log book in which PAEDS 
nurses record a short summary of patient details and for which PAEDS condition the 
patient may be recruited. The record remains in this log book until the patient is 
eventually deemed PAEDS eligible or ineligible (doesn't meet criteria) usually based on 
laboratory results, which can cause delays. The time in this step can vary widely by 
condition and laboratory requirements for eligibility confirmation. 
ELIGIBLE  
Once deemed eligible, the patient record is transferred to a computer-based password-
protected Excel spreasheet. This step allows for the nurse to check if the patient has a 
previous WebSpirit entry so the patient will not have a duplicate account on WebSpirit. If 
a patient already exists on WebSpirit, the WebSpirit unique identifier is recorded on the 
Excel log and a new entry is made on WebSpirit for that admission. If the patient does 
not already exist on WebSpirit, a new WebSprit unique identifier is created for the 
patient. 
RECRUITED  
The surveillance nurse completes a hard-copy condition-specific case report form (CRF) 
with patient information from the various databases as well as acquire additional 
required information gathered from consulting with the patient's parent or guardian.  
COMPLETED 
The surveillance nurse then manually enters all information from the hard-copy CRF on 
the online CRF in WebSpirit, including: admission data, vaccination history, laboratory 
results, treament received, family information, travel history, etc. Some conditions 
require a lot of data and therefor completion of WebSpirit data entry for a single patient 
can take several hours to several days. An additional step is required for influenza and 
IGAS patients whose data are also entered onto REDCap. Records on WebSpirit aim to 
be completed in two months of initial data entry, this allows for most laboratory results 
and additional data to be collected and entered.  
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Data analysis and interpretation 
WebSpirit data are exported as comma separated values (i.e. CSV) files for analysis in Excel and 
Stata by the PAEDS network coordinators based at CHW who perform the bulk of the data 
analysis for routine reporting. Additional analyses are performed by investigators for various 
projects or other affiliated research staff. 
Collection of data can differ by site due to jurisdictional differences in testing or reporting, for 
example the process for recruiting controls in the case-control pertussis study. All Australian 
states except Queensland perform a Multiplex-PCR test (i.e. a broad test for respiratory 
illnesses) which is able to test for multiple diseases in the one test.65 However, stakeholders in 
Queensland are required to request a specific pertussis test since the Multiplex-PCR test is not 
used. This requirement results in fewer negative pertussis test results and therefore fewer 
controls recruited in Queensland, which subsequently reduces the power and 
representativeness of the case-control study results. Reporting processes and data dissemination 
Depending on the requirements of the specific condition, each individual PAEDS case may be 
required to be reported to another body such as the local public health authority or laboratory 
(e.g. the Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory for AFP cases). In some scenarios 
the hospital, the laboratory and PAEDS may all report the same case to the same or different 
reporting bodies. There is duplication of reporting due to a lack of communication between 
various stakeholders. 
Many reports have been published in peer-reviewed journals based on PAEDS data. 
Publications of general PAEDS work as well as condition-specific work have occurred since 
2007 (number of publications as of mid-2017 reported in PAEDS protocol); regarding general 
PAEDS (4), AFP (5), ACE (16), GBS (2), febrile seizures (2), influenza (14), intussusception (3) 
and varicella (4). These articles are primarily written by PAEDS investigators along with various 
non-PAEDS affiliated co-authors. In addition there are many articles currently being drafted 
and many conference presentations using PAEDS data. 
PAEDS data and reports are disseminated through several channels (Figure 4) which are used 
for various applications (Figure 5). The majority of PAEDS investigators reported using PAEDS 
annual reports and PAEDS monthly reports, much fewer reported using the PAEDS newsletter, 
only one reported using the PAEDS website, and several commented that the PAEDS website 
could be better utilised. The latest PAEDS newsletter available was published in December 
2016 and the most recent news reported in the ‘News & Events’ page is from August 2018 (as 
of February 2019).12 Three quarters (11/14) of investigators and funders reported that there 
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were not any barriers in accessing PAEDS data and reports, while two were unaware of the 
resources available and one reported the unavailability of timely reports as the major barrier 
to using PAEDS outputs.  
PAEDS is expanding its reach in data dissemination with the aim of increasing PAEDS 
awareness and value. PAEDS collects substantial amounts of data which can be used to 
address a multitude of research areas. PAEDS coordinators want to get the most out of the 
information that is being collected and inform more public health research and action. 
 
Figure 4. Stakeholder reported use of PAEDS data and reports 
Respondents (N=15) include 8 investigators and 7 funders. 
PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance. 
 
Figure 5. Stakeholder reported uses for PAEDS data and reports  
Respondents (N=15) include 8 investigators and 7 funders. 
PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance, ATAGI – Australian Technical Advisory Group 
on Immunisation. 
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A substantial portion of the general feedback from stakeholders focused on timely data 
analysis and reporting; “real-time analysis remains one of our challenges”. As of mid-2018, the 
most current PAEDS annual report was regarding 2015 PAEDS operations. One investigator felt 
that other existing public health systems already provide case counts of diseases but PAEDS 
needs to, and has the capability to, provide real-time comprehensive data. Stakeholders want 
the PAEDS outputs to be available sooner, employing improved dissemination pathways, and 
for the data to be publically available.  
Suggestions for improved use of PAEDS data involved increasing awareness of PAEDS and 
becoming available to a wider audience. PAEDS could include other health organisations in 
dissemination groups such as the Royal Australasian College of Physicians and their monthly 
newsletter. A government stakeholder criticised PAEDS data and reports saying that they 
“appear to be shared in an ad hoc or limited way, and sometimes go to jurisdictional 
individuals but not others who need to know or have an interest”. An additional suggestion for 
increasing awareness of PAEDS was integrating with other health data sources such as 
notifications, hospitalisation and the AIR to allow for more comprehensive reports on VPDs.  
Other issues raised by one government stakeholder in regards to data dissemination were the 
lack of relevancy of the data to PAEDS stakeholders: 
- “Aside from AFP cases, which are collated and analysed by the National Enteroviruses 
Reference Laboratory, and influenza hospitalisations as part of FluCAN, the data 
collated by PAEDS is not relevant to the routine surveillance work of the 
Department…Other VPDs under surveillance by PAEDS are collected nationally and 
analysed by the Department through the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System, which is a sufficient mechanism for routine surveillance.” 
- “In terms of AEFI reports, the data do not align with policy and program deliberations. 
Further, the reports are not presented in a format that is able to be used for policy or 
program design or implementation.” 
Public health action impact 
Six of the eight PAEDS investigators who participated in the questionnaire reported that their 
use of PAEDS data and reports had led to public health action. These actions include the 
submission of IGAS to be considered as a nationally notifiable disease, highlighting severe 
manifestations of influenza in children and ongoing burden of influenza, contributing to 
decisions regarding vaccine programs, describing the emergence of human parechovirus, 
contributing to improved enterovirus surveillance, supporting clinical advice through public 
health factsheets, advising the TGA regarding the risk of intussusception following rotavirus 
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vaccine, and informing safety of the second dose of MMRV vaccine in relation to febrile 
seizures. One investigator commented that although they had not caused change with their 
use of PAEDS data, the data led to discussion of important issues. 
Three of the seven PAEDS funders who participated in the questionnaire reported that their 
use of PAEDS data and reports had led to public health action. These actions included 
recommendations for influenza vaccination, and improved surveillance and follow-up of AFP 
cases. A government stakeholder reported that, to their knowledge or involvement, PAEDS has 
not led to any public health action at a national level due to a lack of national alert processes. 
Public health policy impact 
Four of the eight PAEDS investigators who participated in the questionnaire reported that their 
use of PAEDS data and reports had led to public health policy changes. These changes focused 
on influenza. PAEDS data have influenced the state, territory and national based influenza 
immunisation programs. One investigator reported a possible contribution of PAEDS data in 
the introduction of maternal diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine on the vaccine schedule. 
Three of the seven PAEDS funders who participated in the questionnaire reported that their 
use of PAEDS data and reports had led to public health policy changes. These policy changes 
included initiating discussions regarding the addition of parechovirus onto the NNDSS and 
influenza vaccination policy changes in children aged <5 years. However one government 
stakeholder reported that “the reports do not provide data or information in a format that 
enables use for policy….engagement with policy makers through the PAEDS design and 
development phase would have supported alignment with key issues of interest to policy and 
program development”. Flow of data within PAEDS 
The flow of data within PAEDS is described in Figure 6. Updates to the data can occur at any 
time when new information is available such as laboratory test results or vaccination history. 
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Figure 6. Flow chart of data within the PAEDS network  
Note. Figure reproduced from Paediatrics Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) annual report 
2015: Prospective hospital-based surveillance for serious paediatric conditions, by McRae JE et al., 
2017.42  System attributes 
Simplicity 
The concept of PAEDS is quite simple in the sense that PAEDS nurses collect data that they 
then enter into an online database for analysis, but the reality of the process is more complex. 
The steps of surveillance, recruitment and data entry are described in Figure 3. The number of 
steps from initial data collection to online database data entry is an indication of the 
complexity of the system. This lack of simplicity can impact other attributes such as data 
quality, data completeness and timeliness. Each time the data are copied from one location to 
another provides another opportunity for error and also increases the time until the patient 
record is complete on the online database. There is added complexity as the network currently 
covers six jurisdictions in Australia and nine conditions for surveillance that require varied data 
collection and follow-up procedures. The flow of information is described generally in Figure 6 
and specifically for ACE cases in Figure 7 as an example. 
Each condition requires different data to be collected such as additional laboratory test results 
or additional medical history information. The surveillance nurses are highly trained and 
sufficiently experienced that the differences in recruitment for each condition are almost 
Results 
Sample 
Data entry 
Incomplete date: Contact the 
treating clinician (if still an 
inpatient) or parent/guardian (if 
patient discharged). Data extraction and analysis 
Daily search for potential cases: Review of emergency 
department and inpatient databases, laboratory logs 
and contact with key clinicians. 
Data collection: History, 
immunisation status 
presentation, treatment and 
outcomes from clinical notes. 
De-identified data entered into a 
web-based data management 
system, WebSpirit. 
Biological sample collection for 
further pathogen analysis: 
Dispatch to relevant laboratory 
(e.g. Victorian Infectious Diseases 
Reference Laboratory) and follow-
up of results. 
Reports and publications 
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memorised. On the occasions when the nurses require clarification, a simple Excel spread 
sheet was developed to assist with the data collection specifications for each condition. 
System changes to WebSpirit can be difficult and time-consuming. These requests are sent to 
the WebSpirit office base in Germany for implementation. However, smaller changes to the 
CRF are simple and performed by one of the PAEDS network managers. Data extraction from 
WebSpirit is a simple one-click process into a CSV file. 
To increase system simplicity, standardised protocols and case definitions are used for each 
condition at the participating sites, which allows for consistency in reporting across sites. The 
requirement to obtain consent from parents or guardians in the surveillance stream was 
removed in 2014.42 
Stakeholders agree that PAEDS processes are simple (Table 4). Those who disagreed noted 
that the process for obtaining laboratory results is difficult when the laboratory is not co-
located with the hospital. Again, the multiple databases, duplication of data collection and 
data entry, and reliance on paper-based forms emerged as a barrier to achieving system 
simplicity. Stakeholders would like simple and efficient protocols for the process of data 
extraction and cleaning. The network managers were praised for their overseeing abilities and 
management which enhance the flow of PAEDS data. 
Table 4. Responses of stakeholders on PAEDS 
 Agreement with each statement 
Objective Strongly 
agree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
The flow of data in the 
PAEDS system is sufficient  
3 
14% 
12 
55% 
5 
23% 
1 
5% 
1 
5% 
The flow of data in the 
PAEDS system is simple  
2 
9% 
11 
50% 
6 
27% 
3 
14% 0 
PAEDS processes are 
simple 
2 
9% 
10 
45% 
7 
32% 
3 
14% 0 
Respondents (N=22) include 14 surveillance nurses and 8 investigators. 
PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance. 
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Figure 7. Flowchart of PAEDS acute childhood encephalitis surveillance 
Note. Figure reproduced from PAEDS ACE surveillance study flowchart (NSW) (INTERNAL), by PAEDS, 
2013.66  
ACE – acute childhood encephalitis, ACIR – Australian Childhood Immunisation Register, CNS – central 
nervous system, CSF – cerebrospinal fluid, CT – computed tomography, DICE – Discovering the Infectious 
Causes of Encephalitis, EEG – electroencephalography, MRI – magnetic resonance imaging, SOP – 
standard operating procedure, NSW – New South Wales, PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease 
Surveillance. 
Completion PAEDS ACE requirements: 
• At time of discharge PAEDS Research Nurse 
to obtain discharge summary, assign 
Glascow coma outcome scale  
• Obtain final ICD-10-AM coding data when 
available 
• Review PowerChart record at six weeks post 
presentation, finalise record of 
investigations and assign final diagnosis in 
consultation with NSW investigation team 
PAEDS Research Nurse to: 
• Complete questionnaire with family 
and from clinical notes and 
PowerChart investigation results 
• Report cases to the coordinating 
centre and NSW investigation team 
• Obtain copies of medical reports (MRI, 
CT, EEG, Microbiology) 
• Confirm child’s immunisation status 
through ACIR 
• Enter results into PAEDS database 
Case screening: 
Keywords in the child’s presentation or 
provisional diagnosis: 
• Encephalopathy/encephalitis 
• Personality change 
• Behavioural change 
• Altered conscious state 
• Seizures 
• Abnormal head imaging- MRI 
consistent with encephalitis  
• Acute disseminated encephalomyelitis 
• Focal neurological signs 
 
Case Identified  
• Review current clinical notes 
• If inpatient: Contact clinical team then 
approach family to consent 
• If discharged: Contact family at home, 
and post consent + information form 
with return postage 
Case did not meet recruitment criteria or case 
did meet criteria but exclusion criteria apply or 
consent not given 
A paper questionnaire is not required, but record 
the case on the PAEDS database (as per SOP). 
Case did meet recruitment criteria and 
exclusion criteria do not apply and 
consent given 
A paper questionnaire is to be completed 
and record the case on the PAEDS 
database (as per SOP). 
 
Inclusion criteria: 
‘Suspected acute encephalitis’ is defined as: 
1. A child aged 0–14 years; 
2. Hospitalised with encephalopathy (defined by 
altered level of consciousness lasting ≥24 hours, 
lethargy or personality change); and 
3. With ≥1 of the following: fever, seizures, focal 
neurological findings, at least one abnormality of 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF; age determined 
pleocytosis, or elevated protein ≥ 40mg/dl), or 
EEG/ neuroimaging findings consistent with 
infection-related encephalitis. 
Exclusion criteria: 
1. Patients with viral aseptic meningitis without 
encephalopathy; 
2. Patients with acute bacterial meningitis 
without cerebral involvement; 
3. Patients with non-infectious CNS disorders 
due to hypoxic, ischaemic, vascular, toxic and 
metabolic cause; 
4. Patients with CNS disorders lasting <24 hour; 
or 
5. Patients with chronic encephalopathies. 
NSW investigation team: 
• Oversee completion questionnaire 
• Obtain copies of medical reports (MRI, CT, EEG, Microbiology) 
• Provide clinical team with evidence based ‘standard of care’ diagnostic algorithm 
• (Optional) Arrange consent of patient for ‘ACE DICE study’ and consent for follow up 
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Flexibility 
PAEDS stakeholders pride the system on its flexibility. The growth of PAEDS since 2007, Figure 
1, demonstrates the flexibility of PAEDS in adding and removing conditions, adding surveillance 
sites, and adjusting to the public health needs of the time such as investigating the risk of 
complications post-pandemic influenza vaccination. PAEDS has proven its ability to incorporate 
research studies into PAEDS such as the case-control pertussis study investigating VE in 
children hospitalised with pertussis following maternal vaccination. An NHMRC grant also 
allowed for PAEDS to include hospitalised influenza to be temporarily under surveillance 
during the 2009 pandemic year.30 
PAEDS conducts surveillance on specific areas of concern which can be added when deemed 
relevant and later removed when no longer pertinent. For instance, febrile seizures were 
briefly included in PAEDS in 2013–2014, as part of the Australian Government Department of 
Health vaccine safety plan following the introduction of the MMRV vaccine on the NIP, due to 
the potential increased risk of febrile seizures.  
The process for the addition of a condition to PAEDS varies. Using ACE as an example, this 
condition was suggested by one of the PAEDS investigators and brought forward for discussion 
amongst stakeholders. The investigator was undertaking their PhD and hence had grant 
funding for an ACE-related study. As a PhD candidate and practicing paediatrician, this 
investigator was able to commit the time required for ACE to successfully be included in 
PAEDS. Therefore, ACE surveillance was approved. PAEDS have not developed defined criteria 
or a protocol to determine whether a condition is worthwhile, and viable, to be added to 
PAEDS. Despite a proven history of general flexibility within the system, the prolonged and 
unguided process for change demonstrates a level of inflexibility for rapid change.  
Adding a new condition involves many decisions beyond the suitability of the condition for 
PAEDS surveillance, including ethics, staffing and funding which take time to be resolved. 
There should also be consideration of what conditions the funders believe are important and 
would be willing to financially support. Nurse responses in the questionnaire indicated that 
there is little thought of the impact on nurses when considering the addition of a new 
condition or research study, such as the additional time commitments expected and the 
possibility of monetary compensation for the additional nurse duties. Similarly complex is the 
addition of a new surveillance site for which a guided process would also be useful.  
Conditions have been removed from PAEDS when deemed no longer important or sustainable; 
however, like the addition of conditions, there is no a defined criterion or protocol to assess 
conditions for removal. Stakeholders have suggested pertussis as a candidate for removal 
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based on the breadth of knowledge already gained on pertussis epidemiology, the availability 
of notification data through NNDSS, the sustainable level of vaccine coverage and the 
complete achievement of its original surveillance aims. PAEDS investigators have also 
discussed removing intussusception and IMD since the surveillance aims have been addressed 
and there may be no more knowledge to gain from their inclusion in PAEDS. Yet as discussions 
regarding condition removal occur, along with reasonable rationale, there is a general 
reluctance among stakeholders to cease surveillance of conditions. 
Table 5. Responses of stakeholders on PAEDS flexibility 
 Rating of the flexibility of PAEDS in response to system changes 
 Excellent Good Average Poor Very 
poor 
Unsure 
Adding new PAEDS conditions 3 14% 
13 
59% 
5 
23% 0 
1 
5% 0 
Removing PAEDS conditions 4 18% 
7 
32% 
5 
23% 
3 
14% 
1 
5% 
2 
9% 
Staff changes 1 5% 
13 
59% 
6 
27% 
1 
5% 0 
1 
5% 
Changes to PAEDS case 
definitions 
1 
5% 
17 
77% 
2 
9% 0 0 
2 
9% 
Adding new PAEDS sites  2 9% 
10 
45% 
5 
23% 0 0 
5 
23% 
Respondents (N=22) include 14 surveillance nurses and 8 investigators. 
PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance. 
The majority of stakeholders rated the flexibility of PAEDS to be either excellent or good (Table 
5). Changing a PAEDS case definition rated the most favourably while removing a condition 
from PAEDS rated poorly. Stakeholders suggested that a protocol with a number of criteria to 
advise removal would be beneficial and increase system flexibility. The criteria could include: 
have the condition-specific aims/objectives been achieved? Is there a sustainable level of 
vaccine coverage? Do alternative reliable data sources currently exist? What more can PAEDS 
surveillance add to the knowledge base? The answers to these questions imply that pertussis 
could be suitable for removal. To aid condition removal, a stakeholder suggested the inclusion 
of a ‘sunset clause’ where surveillance for conditions would cease after a specified time unless 
agreed criteria for continuation are met. In the future, the speed at which the removal of 
pertussis, intussusception or IMD is discussed and resolved would tangibly demonstrate the 
flexibility of the PAEDS system. The value of removing a condition when appropriate seems to 
be well understood by stakeholders yet the realities of the process are not. 
The flexibility of changes in staff, such as staff joining or leaving PAEDS, and its effects on 
performance was rated poorly by PAEDS nurses with 36% responding average or poor. A 
framework around staff hiring, training and workload would assist these transitions for the 
nursing staff as well as from a site budget perspective. 
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Overall the flexibility of the system is “very much dependent on effective guidance and 
leadership from the coordinating centre, except for staff changes which is a local issue”. A 
number of issues were raised as local site issues since hospital processes and budgets vary 
greatly by site and would be difficult to manage at a network level. Data quality 
There are a number of determinants that can affect data quality in the PAEDS system, namely 
the accuracy of data collection and data entry, the intelligence of the online database to flag 
errors, and the comparability of data between sites. The latter is aided by the use of 
standardised protocols, case definitions and case report forms across all sites with the 
availability of up-to-date data dictionaries for reference. An advantage of PAEDS is that the 
quality of PAEDS data is not dependent on the quality of the contributing databases such as 
ICD coding. All participating nurses were either very satisfied or satisfied with the reliability of 
the data reported by PAEDS, as were seven of the eight PAEDS investigators. 
Some of the current CRFs are long and collect a substantial amount of information. For 
example, the ACE CRF had 59 questions, many of which had several sub-questions. Most of 
these questions were important, such as patient personal details, laboratory results, treatment 
and ICD codes, however some questions were either no longer deemed appropriate or were 
not relevant to the condition. Stakeholders suggested that the CRF should only collect relevant 
vaccination histories rather than the patient’s lifetime vaccination history, such as previous 
rotavirus vaccination for intussusception patients or previous poliomyelitis vaccination for AFP 
patients. Stakeholders also reported that several questions from the patient details section 
were due to be removed in the near future, including mother’s and father’s country of birth, 
which are currently mandatory fields; these fields are less complete (90%) than most other 
fields. Surveillance nurses reported feeling uneasy about asking these personal questions that 
don’t appear relevant to the child’s condition. These imminent changes will reduce data 
collection, data entry and time needed in verification of vaccination records, which could 
improve data quality, data completeness and overall system timeliness. Ideally PAEDS would 
only collect data relevant to the patient’s condition and data that are being used in analyses. 
All data collected by PAEDS should add value to surveillance analyses, research study analyses 
or public health knowledge.  
Prior to WebSpirit, PAEDS data were stored on a Microsoft Access database. Per stakeholder 
discussions, this system had frequent issues including data mix-ups and technical glitches, until 
PAEDS began using WebSpirit in May 2013. WebSpirit does not allow data imports and as a 
result all previous PAEDS data are housed in both the Access database and various CSV files. 
However, WebSpirit was not designed to house the data that PAEDS collects as it is primarily 
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intended for clinical trial data. As a result, via the questionnaire and the face-to-face meeting, 
stakeholders voiced their preference to move to another online database, REDCap, which is 
used by other surveillance systems, despite its limited capability to house the large number of 
data fields that PAEDS collects. 
Miscoding of dates was identified as a major issue in all of the PAEDS condition datasets. There 
was a clear pattern of miscoding predominantly at the end and beginning of the year when a 
patient may have been admitted in one year yet recruited in the next year. For example, a 
patient was admitted on 27 December 2017, yet the PAEDS recruitment date was recorded as 
10 January 2017, almost one year prior to admission; it can be deduced that the recruitment 
year was miscoded and should be 2018. This common error could be limited by adding in-built 
logic to the online CRF. For example, recruitment date must be after admission date, if within 
the capabilities of the database. It is difficult to determine the extent of data errors that 
remain undetected within the data. 
The completeness of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status is often a problem among 
public health datasets, however this mandatory field had high completeness with only 2.7% of 
patient records with incomplete Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status in 2017 (Table 6).  
Table 6. Completeness of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status in the patient dataset, 
2017 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status 2017 PAEDS patients n % 
Aboriginal only 140 6.3% 
Torres Strait Islander only 0 0.0% 
Both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander  8 0.4% 
Neither Aboriginal nor Torres Strait Islander 2,012 90.6% 
Not stated 61 2.7% 
Total 2,221 100.0% 
PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance. 
Data quality would instantly increase with the introduction of dropdown menus in place of 
free text entry when there are a finite number of possible responses. For example in the 2017 
patient dataset, the field requiring mother’s country of birth included six different responses 
corresponding to Australia with iterations such as ‘Australa’, ‘Australian’, Australlia’ and 
‘AUS5TRALIA’ simply as a result of human error in data entry. In saying that, this error example 
had minimal impact as it was only identified in 1.4% of patients. 
Of the 11,737 recorded vaccinations (of the 1,831 unique patients) in the 2017 vaccination 
dataset, 119 (1.7%) did not have a date associated with the corresponding vaccination. The 
completeness of the vaccine data field varied by site with PCH having the highest proportion of 
incomplete records (3.7%) and RDH having zero incomplete records for this field. One hundred 
and ten of the 11,737 records (0.9%) did not report a vaccine type and six (0.1%) reported 
‘other vaccine’, however there was no field present in which to identify the other vaccine.  
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Similarly, language spoken at home was recorded as ‘other’ for 6.6% (146/2221) of patients 
and only three remained unknown in the subsequent question which required clarification of 
the ‘other’ language. It is noted that some ‘other’ languages recorded by the surveillance nurse 
were included in the original list of languages and should have been recorded in the initial 
language question. In the cases that a patient has multiple primarily languages, many nurses 
recorded these as ‘other’ in the initial question and as free text in the subsequent language 
question, even if both languages were an option in the original list; i.e. recording multiple 
languages is not an option hence the nurses are required to list them as ‘other’ language and 
subsequently describe them. The ‘other’ language description is prone to errors due to the 
free text nature of the field which allows for spelling errors and for non-languages to be 
entered.  
Table 7. Completeness of the case report form mandatory fields, patient dataset, 2017 
Field Completeness n/2221 (%) 
First name 2218 (99.9) 
Last name 2218 (99.9) 
Date of birth 2215 (99.7) 
Sex 2215 (99.7) 
Postcode 2196 (98.9) 
Country of birth* 2033 (91.5) 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status* 2160 (97.3) 
Language† 1954 (88.0) 
Gestational age or term birth‡ 1087 (48.9) 
Respiratory disease* 2131 (95.9) 
Cardiac disease* 2136 (96.1) 
Neurological disease* 2132 (96.0) 
Immunodeficiency* 2132 (96.0) 
* missing or don’t know 
† including ‘other’ language that was not defined in the follow-up question 
‡ missing, ‘not applicable’, ‘don’t know’ in gestational age or, if empty, term birth fields 
The completeness of the patient dataset was generally high (Table 7); of the 2,221 patient 
records in 2017, 56.5% had completed all mandatory fields while 11.4% had one missing field, 
15.6% had two missing fields and 16.5% had three or more missing fields. The majority of the 
missing fields were in the medical history section of the CRF requiring information on 
respiratory, cardiac and neurological disease or immunodeficiency. In addition, this section 
includes two mandatory questions asking about the presence of ‘other’ medical conditions; 
despite being mandatory these questions are poorly completed  since this answer will most 
likely be ‘no’; however nurses tended to not tick this box and opted to leave the question 
blank.  
In the condition-specific datasets, the completeness was assessed for a sample of variables 
and was found to be generally high, but completeness varied by condition (Table 8). The 
apparent lower completeness in the ACE dataset may be due to the length of the CRF and the 
large number of data fields.  
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Table 8. Completeness, %, of case report form mandatory fields from each condition dataset, 
2017 
Field ACE (N=178) 
AFP 
(N=51) 
IMD 
(N=38) 
ISS 
(N=53) 
PSS 
(N=159) 
VZV 
(N=37) 
Identification method 99 100 100 100 100 100 
Admitted or ED presentation  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Transferred from other facility 89 100 100 100 97 100 
Discharge status 74 94 84 96 98 100 
Require ICU admission 72 100 95 100 95 97 
Cerebrospinal fluid testing  82 - - - - - 
Date of paralysis onset - 100 - - - - 
Serogroup confirmation method - - 79 - - - 
Stool sample collected - - - 100 - - 
Specimen collection date - - - - 100 - 
Sample collected - - - - - 100 
ACE – acute childhood encephalitis, AFP – acute flaccid paralysis, ED – emergency department, ICU – 
intensive care unit, IMD – invasive meningococcal disease, ISS – intussusception, PSS – pertussis, VZV – 
varicella zoster virus. Blank when not applicable. Acceptability 
The acceptability of PAEDS reflects the willingness of stakeholder participation in PAEDS. 
Acceptability can be influenced by the perceived importance of the conditions under 
surveillance, the quality and quantity of meaningful output, and general satisfaction that 
participation in PAEDS is worthwhile. All nurses believed that PAEDS is definitely a good use of 
their time, as did seven of the eight investigators (one probably yes), and four of the six 
funders (one probably yes and one probably no). The funder who did not believe PAEDS to be 
a good use of their time explained that the “outputs of PAEDS do not contribute to our work”. 
Of the current conditions under PAEDS surveillance, the conditions that were rated the least 
important by stakeholders were intussusception, KD, VZV and pertussis (Table 9). IGAS was 
generally rated as an important condition to include in PAEDS however since IGAS is currently 
under consideration for inclusion on the NNDSS, the need for continued inclusion in PAEDS 
requires questioning and the additional benefits of PAEDS surveillance requires assessment.   
From the nurse perspective, shorter CRFs are preferred and would likely be preferred by 
participating parents and guardians. It is important to only collect information that is pertinent 
to the patient’s condition and current hospital admission, and that will be used in some 
capacity in the future. The length and complexity of the CRFs have recently been reduced and 
it was suggested that a further abridged CRF could be prepared, particularly for the lengthy 
social science CRF, to encourage more responses from time-poor parents. Upgrading to an 
electronic data collection tool and to one universal database would improve the nurses’ 
acceptability of the data processes.  
It was indicated that the PAEDS CRFs and the notifiable disease CRFs have very similar data 
fields but are currently reported by different people which encourages duplication in public 
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health reporting. Neither of these forms can be eliminated as they serve different purposes 
but permitting PAEDS nurses to complete the notifiable disease form would promote 
consistency in reporting. This is the case for all sites except for in the Northern Territory where 
the PAEDS nurse has approval to complete the notifiable disease CRF in addition to the PAEDS 
CRF. 
Table 9. Responses of stakeholders on the importance of PAEDS surveillance by condition 
 Importance of each condition’s inclusion in PAEDS surveillance 
Objective Extremely 
important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important 
Unsure 
AFP 24 86% 
4 
14% 0 0 0 0 
VZV 8 29% 
7 
25% 
10 
36% 
3 
11% 0 0 
Pertussis 11 39% 
7 
25% 
6 
21% 
4 
14% 0 0 
Pandemic flu 20 71% 
7 
25% 0 
1 
4% 0 0 
Seasonal flu 17 61% 
10 
36% 
1 
4% 0 0 0 
IMD 14 50% 
7 
25% 
6 
21% 
1 
4% 0 0 
Intussusception 8 29% 
4 
14% 
11 
39% 
4 
14% 
1 
4% 0 
Febrile seizures 5 18% 
9 
32% 
12 
43% 
1 
4% 
1 
4% 0 
SANE, GBS, 
ADEM 
18 
64% 
7 
25% 
2 
7% 
1 
4% 0 0 
ACE 15 54% 
6 
21% 
5 
18% 
1 
4% 0 
1 
4% 
IGAS 15 54% 
8 
29% 
5 
18% 0 0 0 
Kawasaki 
disease 
4 
14% 
7 
25% 
14 
50% 
3 
11% 0 0 
Respondents (N=22) include 14 surveillance nurses, 8 investigators and 6 funders. ACE – acute childhood 
encephalitis, ADEM – Acute Disseminated Encephalomyelitis, AFP – acute flaccid paralysis, GBS – 
Guillane-Barré syndrome, IGAS – invasive group A streptococcal disease, IMD – invasive meningococcal 
disease, SANE – severe acute neurological events, VZV – varicella zoster virus. 
The lack of feedback throughout the system was a common thread in stakeholder discussions 
and questionnaire responses. PAEDS nurses would appreciate the addition of an agenda item 
of the regular PAEDS meetings be devoted to feedback of the findings, outputs and 
contributions of PAEDS data, including confirmation that the data they collected are being 
analysed. This feedback would allow nurses to understand the usefulness and importance of 
their work and motivate them going forward. PAEDS investigators would appreciate feedback 
regarding the use of PAEDS data and reports from local, state and national health 
departments. 
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States and territories have different ethical concerns based on the priorities and policies of 
their local Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs). The newly approved Program of 
Research ethics application via the National Mutual Acceptance has overcome many of the 
issues that arose due to the local HRECs. However there remain differences of opinion 
regarding the waiver of consent with concerns of privacy of health records and data sharing, 
with the Western Australian HREC particularly unsupportive of this method of consent (despite 
granting approval). 
The impact of influenza season affects the acceptability of the PAEDS system especially in the 
wake of an unexpectedly large and severe influenza season in 2017. The nurses and 
investigators would like to consider methods to deal with such an event, if it were to reoccur. 
Suggestions included investigate the capacity for scalability in the work force, determine 
priorities, engage medical students to assist (while satisfying their own research 
requirements), and adjust reporting and auditing to outside of influenza season. Considering 
that several PAEDS conditions also peak in winter, like influenza, adjusting the reporting 
periods would not substantially lessen the workload. Nurse acceptability of PAEDS would also 
be improved if they had more time to spend on administrative tasks in addition to the 
surveillance tasks. One nurse responded that nursing hours do not get considered when a new 
condition is added, especially in terms of the additional administrative work involved, 
irrespective of the additional surveillance work. 
In terms of acceptability outside of PAEDS stakeholders, this is unknown. Parents, guardians, 
laboratory staff and other users of PAEDS data and reports were not included in this 
evaluation. PAEDS could be valued more if the wider community were aware of its existence. It 
is worth noting that a consumer representative sits on the NCIRS Advisory Board and the 
NCIRS Scientific Advisory Board, who has reportedly deemed the work of PAEDS to be highly 
acceptable. Regardless, more publicity for PAEDS among groups who would benefit from its 
outputs would “take advantage of this existing platform for the greater public health good”. Sensitivity 
Sensitivity of a public health surveillance system is desired when the aim of the system is to 
detect outbreaks, as is the case for PAEDS. System sensitivity is particularly important for rare 
and serious diseases such as IMD. PAEDS is expected to have high case ascertainment and, 
likewise, sensitivity due to the active surveillance practice characteristic of the PAEDS system.  
Since 2011, PAEDS has performed quarterly audits to calculate the sensitivity of the system. A 
PAEDS surveillance nurse at each site performs this audit which involves ascertaining the total 
number of cases per condition captured by PAEDS (numerator) and retrospectively searching 
for additional missed cases from an audit of the relevant ICD codes. This calculates the sum of 
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cases captured through PAEDS plus missed cases identified via ICD coding (denominator). In 
addition to this sensitivity calculation, the audit includes the identification of cases that are 
captured by PAEDS but are not captured in ICD coding. A PAEDS research surveillance nurse 
based at CHW centrally collates the sensitivity data from all sites and creates a final audit in 
the middle of the following year. The 2017 data audit was available in July 2018.  
In 2017, the ICD code audit identified a total of 532 cases of all PAEDS conditions of which 504 
(95%) were captured by PAEDS (Table 10). Sensitivity varies by site with a high of 100% at RCH 
and WCH compared to a low of 82% at RDH. Overall in 2017, sensitivity ranged from 89% to 
100% by condition. Using ACE as an example, there were 189 cases of ACE identified in the 
audit from the participating sites, of which 177 (94%) were identified by PAEDS. Pertussis and 
IMD have the highest sensitivities with 100% of cases captured in the ICD code audit being 
recruited by PAEDS. This includes two IMD cases and nine pertussis cases that were captured 
by PAEDS only and were not ICD coded for the respective condition. PAEDS active surveillance 
captured many cases that were not ICD coded; 32% of ACE cases, 22% of IGAS cases, 16% of 
VZV cases, 12% of pertussis cases, 9% of AFP cases, 5% of IMD cases and 2% of intussusception 
cases (Table 11). Some cases identified by PAEDS but not identified by ICD coding could be due 
to the patients presenting to ED and subsequently being solely managed within the ED; these 
patients are not eligible for ICD coding. 
A surveillance system that does not capture every intended case can still be very useful in 
monitoring trends and detecting changes, and therefore informing public health action. 
Despite the slightly lower sensitivity for some conditions and sites, each condition and site of 
PAEDS demonstrated high sensitivity.  
Table 10. Sensitivity, % (total number), of PAEDS recruitment by site and condition, 2017 
Condition CHW PCH RCH WCH QCH RDH Total (N) 
ACE 100 81 100 100 89 - 94 (189) 
AFP 100 78 100 100 93 - 94 (50) 
IGAS 100 92 100 100 83 100 95 (94) 
IMD 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 (38) 
Intussusception 75 93 100 100 88 33 89 (57) 
Pertussis 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 (64) 
VZV 83 88 86 100 100 100 95 (40) 
Total (N) 98 (97) 89 (101) 100 (113) 100 (77) 90 (133) 82 (11) 95 (532) 
Monash Children’s Hospital (Victoria) did not participate in surveillance during this period. ACE – acute 
childhood encephalitis, AFP – acute flaccid paralysis, CHW – Children’s Hospital at Westmead (New 
South Wales), IGAS – invasive group A streptococcal disease, IMD – invasive meningococcal disease, PCH 
– Perth Children’s Hospital (Western Australia), QCH – Queensland Children’s Hospital (Queensland), 
RCH – Royal Children’s Hospital (Victoria), RDH – Royal Darwin Hospital (Northern Territory), VZV – 
varicella zoster virus, WCH – Women’s and Children’s Hospital (South Australia). 
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Table 11. Case ascertainment, n, by condition and method, 2017 
 Case identification method  
Condition Total cases 
captured by 
PAEDS active 
surveillance 
Number 
captured by 
PAEDS only and 
not ICD-coded 
Number captured 
retrospectively 
following ICD-10-
AM audit 
Total captured 
cases (surveillance 
and ICD-10-AM 
audit combined) 
ACE 177 84 12 189 
AFP 47 20 3 50 
IGAS 89 25 5 94 
IMD 38 2 0 38 
Intussusception 51 1 6 57 
Pertussis 64 9 0 64 
VZV 38 7 2 40 
Total (%) 504 (95%) 148 (28%) 28 (5%) 532 (100%) 
ACE – acute childhood encephalitis, AFP – acute flaccid paralysis, IGAS – invasive group A streptococcal 
disease, IMD – invasive meningococcal disease, PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease 
Surveillance, VZV – varicella zoster virus. 
PAEDS investigators agreed that PAEDS can effectively detect outbreaks of PAEDS conditions 
(6/6) and changes in PAEDS condition trends (5/6). Investigators provided evidence of the 
parechovirus outbreak and the changes to pertussis and VZV hospitalisation trends to support 
their responses. Although some stakeholders had contradictory explanations: “each condition 
is closely monitored so any change is picked up” compared to “PAEDS could probably detect an 
epidemic of a non-endemic disease, but I doubt it would confidently detect a change in an 
endemic disease”. Another stakeholder pointed out the lack of ‘denominator’ data which 
would be useful in trend analyses to “develop baseline activity across the network”. Timeliness 
To assess timeliness, the time between patient hospital admission or ED presentation, 
identification, recruitment and checking vaccination status on the AIR were examined (Figure 
8). Time between stages of the PAEDS recruitment process vary substantially by condition and 
by site. Timeliness is an important attribute of PAEDS as it is the cornerstone of the first 
objective to provide real-time data; hence if timeliness is poor then PAEDS is not effectively 
achieving a key aim. 
PAEDS surveillance nurses and investigators act as powerful ‘ears to the ground’ at the clinical 
interface with respect to rapidly alerting state, territory and Commonwealth health 
departments of serious conditions or cases of critical importance to public health programs or 
health security. For example, there is reportedly rapid communication regarding 
hospitalisation of infants diagnosed with intussusception in close proximity to rotavirus vaccine 
to state and territory health departments, rapid communication of deaths due to influenza or 
pertussis to state and territory health departments including assistance in investigation and 
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data gathering under sensitive conditions, and this also occurs for ICU admitted cases of 
various conditions. 
There is not a prescribed timeframe for surveillance nurses to progress the patient to the next 
stage. New inpatients are checked daily and patients identified on the previous day are 
checked daily to progress recruitment. The nurses aim to complete a patient’s case file in 
WebSpirit in two months from admission, however evidently this is not strictly followed. The 
median time from admission to case record completion ranged by condition from 1.3 months 
to 3.0 months (Figure 8). In some cases the two month goal is not feasible; such as ACE cases 
that can take six weeks from identification to recruitment due to lags in test results or AFP 
cases that require two stool samples collected for enteric virus identification, without 
considering the time needed for the details to be updated on WebSpirit.42 However, influenza 
cases can be recruited almost immediately after identification as this occurs post-test positive 
result, which allows for rapid record completion. Conditions requiring PCR confirmation tend 
to be quicker while syndromic conditions are more complex and cause delays in reporting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Range of median time delays, days, in PAEDS processes by condition, 2017 
Included conditions are acute childhood encephalitis, acute flaccid paralysis, invasive meningococcal 
disease, intussusception, pertussis and varicella zoster virus. Included sites are Children’s Hospital at 
Westmead (New South Wales), Royal Children’s Hospital (Victoria), Women’s and Children’s Hospital 
(South Australia), Perth Children’s Hospital (Western Australia), Queensland Children’s Hospital 
(Queensland) and Royal Darwin Hospital (Northern Territory), where applicable. Note that in 2017, 
Royal Darwin Hospital did not capture data for acute childhood encephalitis and acute flaccid paralysis, 
and Monash Children’s Hospital (Victoria) only captured data for influenza and invasive group A 
streptococcal disease. AIR – Australian Immunisation Register, PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced 
Disease Surveillance. 
2–9.5 days 
0–2 days 
31–37.5 days 
Patient admitted 
Patient identified by PAEDS 
Patient recruited into PAEDS 
Vaccination status checked and updated on AIR  
(Aim to be completed 30 days post admission) 
Patient record complete on WebSpirit 
(Aim to be completed two months post admission) 
 
35–45 days 
39–92 days 
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The exception to the lack of timeliness protocols is the patient AIR check for which the PAEDS 
nurses aim to complete this check at 30 days post admission. However, there is no alert 
system, rather nurses set personal calendar alerts. There is some confusion regarding site 
protocols with nurses at the same site providing contradictory responses in which some report 
there are protocols for timeliness while others disagree. Nurses have monthly meetings and 
end-of-month reporting which act as pseudo deadlines to make sure data collection and entry 
is up to date. Tasks to be completed are communicated between nurses via daily collaboration 
and emails ensuring all staff are aware of their workload and timeliness obligations. Also, the 
nurses have competing time commitments such as administrative duties additional to their 
primary surveillance duties which are bound to affect system timeliness. This issue will 
continue to grow as PAEDS grows unless staffing is appropriately increased. 
Increased timeliness within the system can be unavoidably affected by nurse availability such 
as sick leave, annual leave, public holidays, weekends and the Christmas shut down period. 
The number of surveillance nurses varies across sites with RDH only having one nurse in 2017 
therefore these periods of absence can greatly impact timeliness. With this in mind, timeliness 
was particular poor in January due to the Christmas holiday period. It is worth noting that 2017 
was a particularly large influenza season which most likely had an impact on the timeliness of 
other PAEDS conditions in 2017.  
Table 12. Responses of stakeholders on PAEDS timeliness regarding contributing factors 
when data collection and reporting takes longer than expected 
Contributing factor Number of responses 
High patient load in influenza season 9 
Lack of staff 7 
High volume of PAEDS-appropriate patients 5 
Delays in patient testing 2 
Delays in laboratory testing 2 
Insufficiently trained staff 1 
Non-PAEDS-related work taking priority 1 
No electronic medical records at site 1 
Unclear on PAEDS priorities in times of high work load 1 
Respondents (N=22) include 14 surveillance nurses and 8 investigators. Multiple responses per 
stakeholder. PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance. 
Stakeholders generally agreed that PAEDS provided timely information that is not otherwise 
available. The main reasons for delays in the data collection were high patient load during the 
influenza season and lack of staff (Table 12). 
Influenza data are reported on a weekly basis to the DoH to inform national influenza 
surveillance. The timeliness of influenza reporting appears to be the unspoken yet understood 
priority for PAEDS and in times of high stress it is accepted that all influenza surveillance 
should remain while data entry for other conditions can fall behind.  
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Government stakeholders agreed that while data analysis and publications are timely, the 
annual reporting is slow. However, this is also largely influenced by peer reviewed 
(Communicable Diseases Intelligence) publication timelines. One stakeholder remarked that 
the annual reports are more helpful than the monthly reports. Timely reporting is required for 
some situations such as providing case counts for influenza and AFP, which later require 
detailed case data provided to key select committees upon follow-up. 
Admission date to identification date 
Time from admission to identification had a median of 2–9.5 days which varied by condition. 
Pertussis had the longest median time from admission to identification of 9.5 days which was 
shortest at RCH (4 days) and longest at PMH (19 days). All remaining conditions had a median 
time of two days.  
Identification date to recruitment date 
Time from identification to recruitment had a median of 0–2 days which varied by condition. 
IMD, intussusception, pertussis and VZV had the shortest median time from identification to 
recruitment with a median of zero days. ACE had the longest median time from identification 
to recruitment with a median of two days which was shortest at WCH and PCH (0 days) and 
longest at CHW (3 days). 
Admission date to recruitment date 
Time from admission to recruitment had a median of 2–11 days which varied by condition. 
Intussusception had the shortest median time from admission to recruitment of two days 
which was shortest at CHW (1 day) and longest at WCH (3 days). Pertussis had the longest 
median time from admission to recruitment of 11 days which was shortest at RCH (5 days) and 
longest at PMH (24 days).  
Admission date to AIR 30 day check date 
Time from admission to completion of the AIR 30-day check had a median of 35–45 days over 
all sites ranging by condition (excluding influenza) with pertussis having the lowest and ACE 
having the highest median stage time (Table 13). These median times were longer than the 
goal for the AIR check which is aimed to be completed at 30 days post hospital attendance.  
For influenza, admission date to AIR 30 day check date was calculated to have a median of 96 
days ranging from the shortest time at PCH (39.5 days) and the longest time at QCH (120 days).  
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Table 13. Percentage of cases checked in the Australian Immunisation Register at various 
time points, 2017 
 30 days 40 days 50 days 70 days 100 days Range 
ACE 5% 37% 52% 75% 94% 23–157 
AFP 11% 50% 66% 92% 100% 29–100 
IMD 0% 57% 81% 91% 100% 31–79 
Influenza 3% 14% 20% 31% 52% 1–303 
Intussusception 14% 49% 68% 89% 100% 26–88 
Pertussis 16% 51% 58% 72% 93% 22–205 
VZV 9% 54% 64% 82% 100% 26–100 
Note. The aim is 30 days from hospital admission to updated data in AIR. 
ACE – acute childhood encephalitis, AFP – acute flaccid paralysis, IMD – invasive meningococcal disease, 
VZV – varicella zoster virus. 
Admission date to WebSpirit case completion date 
Time from admission to record completion had a median of 56–92 days which varied by 
condition, noting that the aim was to complete each record within two months (approximately 
60 days) of admission or presentation (Table 14). VZV had the shortest median time from 
admission to record completion of 39 days while, unsurprisingly, ACE had the longest median 
time from admission to record completion of 92 days, which is influenced by the required 
follow-up times. 
Table 14. Timeliness (in days) by condition, median (25th, 75th percentile), n, 2017 
 Admission to 
recruitment 
Recruitment to  
AIR check 
Admission to 
completion 
ACE 5 (2, 9), n=167 37 (28, 64), n=111 92 (71, 121), n=105 
AFP 4 (2, 11), n=50 35 (28.5, 50), n=44 65.5 (37.5, 85.5), n=40 
IMD 4 (1, 7), n=29 31 (28, 43), n=21 78 (44, 112), n=22 
Intussusception 2 (1, 4), n=46 36 (32, 51), n=37 41 (35, 53), n=37 
Pertussis 11 (3, 26), n=129 34 (24, 60), n=90 40 (32, 73), n=90 
VZV 3 (1, 5), n=34 37.5 (29, 51), n=22 39 (34, 61), n=22 
ACE – acute childhood encephalitis, AFP – acute flaccid paralysis, AIR – Australian Immunisation 
Register, IMD – invasive meningococcal disease, VZV – varicella zoster virus. 
Impact of the influenza season 
Timeliness of each stage (admission, identification, recruitment, AIR 30 day check and record 
completion) were assessed for the impact of the 2017 influenza season (determined as 7 July 
2017 to 10 October 2017) which experienced an unexpectedly high number of cases. It was 
hypothesised that this high burden of disease could have impacted on the timeliness of PAEDS 
as the limited PAEDS nurses’ time was stretched following up influenza cases hence causing 
other conditions to be neglected. Influenza surveillance requires weekly reporting to FluCAN 
with accurate influenza cases numbers; therefore influenza surveillance during influenza 
season takes preference over the surveillance of other PAEDS conditions. The impact of 
influenza season was assessed by comparing the mean stage time for PAEDS conditions during 
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three time periods: 2017 influenza pre-season (January-June), influenza peak season (July-
October) and influenza post-season (November-December). 
Generally, admission to recruitment time mirrored the case load for that condition, with 
greater case numbers causing greater time to recruitment. None of the conditions appeared to 
have substantially longer times from admission to recruitment during peak influenza season. 
Surprisingly, timeliness of ACE case recruitment shortened during peak influenza season while 
timeliness of IMD case recruitment decreased in peak influenza season despite it coinciding 
with peak IMD case load.  
It should be noted that delays in timeliness are counterbalanced by the high level of detail and 
quality of information sought, which is greater than performed in basic surveillance systems. Stability 
PAEDS is a stable system in terms of functioning to a high level on a daily basis for over ten 
years. The stability of PAEDS is dependent on the perceived usefulness and reliability of the 
system in order to secure the funding required to keep PAEDS in operation. Several outputs of 
academic and public health importance have been produced based on PAEDS information, and 
outputs have continually been produced from the commencement of PAEDS until the time of 
this evaluation.  
PAEDS operates on a mixed-funding model and receives funding from various avenues, 
including the DoH, state and territory health departments and NHMRC grants. There is also 
considerable input from PAEDS investigators who volunteer their time to provide valuable 
expert knowledge without compensation. The funding from the Immunisation Branch at the 
DoH is set to cease at the end of the 2018–2019 financial year. If any of these stakeholders 
were to withdraw funding, the functionality of PAEDS would undoubtedly reduce. As a result 
of insecure funding, PAEDS as a system is relatively unstable.  
Funding would increase the long-term stability of PAEDS however the source of funding may 
impact system outputs. Funding bodies provide money for surveillance to fulfil their own 
priorities, hence the money bestowed to PAEDS may come with caveats of surveillance of 
specific areas of investor interest. If these areas of interest do not align with the aims and 
objectives of PAEDS then the focus of PAEDS would shift. 
PAEDS receives funding from the Australian Government Department of Health and each state 
and territory health departments also supports their participating sites for the three original 
PAEDS conditions; acute flaccid paralysis, varicella zoster virus and intussusception. An 
anomaly of PAEDS, as compared with other surveillance systems, is that DoH funding comes 
via the Office of Health Protection’s Immunisation Branch, rather than the seemingly better 
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suited Communicable Disease Epidemiology and Surveillance Branch. The current funding with 
the health departments will cease in June 2019 and is subject to renewal. In addition to this 
core funding, conditions receive further funding from other avenues; as follows: 
- ACE funding has come from the PAEDS investigators (with some input from the 
Surveillance Branch of the Commonwealth Department of Health) and several NHMRC 
grants. However, this is not an option going forward and therefore state and/or 
Commonwealth funding is required if deemed suitable to continue. 
- Pertussis and influenza surveillance is supported by an NHMRC partnership grant 
(2016–2019). 
- IMD has been funded by NHMRC grants and PhD scholarships. 
- IGAS surveillance has been primarily supported by the Shepherd Foundation as well as 
the DoH and philanthropic donations.  
- New PAEDS condition, Kawasaki disease, is supported by the National Blood Authority 
and an NHMRC grant; resourcing via PAEDS is based on a cost-recovery model. 
- A proposed PAEDS condition, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) disease, for which a 
maternal vaccine to protect infants is in phase III studies, would be suitable to seek 
health department(s) funding. 
- Proposed PAEDS condition, gram-negative bloodstream infections, have secured 
funding from The University of Queensland and the Children’s Hospital Foundation for 
18 months on a cost-recovery basis and does not require any additional funding. 
Adding new conditions to the system requires additional funding, particularly for the extra 
nursing resources required. Thus, when a new condition is suggested for PAEDS inclusion, not 
all sites may be able to participate in its surveillance. It was suggested that only conditions that 
have adequate funding should be added. This may include conditions funded through NHMRC 
grants and with support from PhD candidates. Strategies for important paediatric conditions 
that are considered for funding can also leverage off the existing infrastructure/core-funded 
functions but this would require some commitment to core funding by DoH and potentially 
state/territory health departments; this model was the case for ACE surveillance. It was 
suggested that other funding avenues should be investigated, such as the potential addition of 
respiratory syncytial virus disease surveillance supported by funding from the pharmaceutical 
company/ies that are in the later stages of vaccine development. Such undertakings would 
have to consider the potential benefits and risks that such funding may offer. 
Funding for PAEDS is reliant on the funding bodies acknowledging the many uses of PAEDS 
outputs and realising its potential and capacity for growth. PAEDS is no longer a surveillance 
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system exclusive to VPDs, hence could be used in a broader health context by building upon 
the existing platform.  
The nurses agreed that the system is stable in times of usual workload, however two nurses 
rated PAEDS as unstable based on periods of high workload, the reported lack of staff, and the 
challenges in remaining up-to-date in data collection and entry. The time constraints also 
impact accuracy of data collection and data entry. One investigator rated PAEDS as unstable 
due to the uncertainty of continued government funding despite the stability implied by the 
ten year presence of PAEDS. Two funding stakeholders rated PAEDS as very stable, two as 
stable and no funder rated PAEDS as unstable. This is surprising as the main impact on PAEDS 
stability is funding and there is a lack of funding commitment from the health departments. 
Yet, funders agree that inconsistent funding is not evidence for a financially stable system and 
believe PAEDS would benefit from long-term funding security: “Relying on state contributions 
committed for several years at a time is not the epitome of stable adequate resourcing for a 
national system”. 
The nurses agreed that the system is stable in times of usual workload, however two nurses 
rated PAEDS as unstable based on periods of high workload (such as during the 2017 record 
influenza season), the reported lack of staff, and the challenges in remaining up-to-date in data 
collection and entry. The time constraints also impact accuracy of data collection and data 
entry. One investigator rated PAEDS as unstable due to the uncertainty of continued 
government funding despite the stability implied by the ten year presence of PAEDS. Two 
funding stakeholders rated PAEDS as very stable, two as stable and no funder rated PAEDS as 
unstable. This is somewhat surprising as the main impact on PAEDS stability is funding and 
there is uncertainty of funding commitment from the health departments due to 
review/funding renewals being explored in early 2019. Yet, funders agree that inconsistent 
funding is not evidence for a financially stable system and believe PAEDS would benefit from 
long-term funding security: “Relying on state contributions committed for several years at a 
time is not the epitome of stable adequate resourcing for a national system”. 
Two nurses rated PAEDS as currently inadequately resourced. The main issue concerned the 
additional administrative duties requested of the PAEDS nurses despite not hiring additional 
administrative support for these tasks. Nurse retention may also be an issue as some nurses 
felt that the budget does not allow for their own professional development which they could 
gain in other clinical positions; this issue would need discussion at each specific site as it 
concerns the salary awards. In reference to the 2017 influenza season in which nurses felt 
overwhelmed with influenza surveillance, stakeholders provided suggestions for allowing 
PAEDS to continue in these times of high stress without the system being detrimentally 
Chapter 5  Evaluation of a Surveillance System 
252 
affected. One idea was that surveillance for the other PAEDS conditions could be paused 
during influenza season or when the number of influenza cases surpasses a pre-defined 
threshold. These suggestions allow for surveillance of all PAEDS conditions while addressing 
the priority of influenza surveillance. 
Three investigators believed that PAEDS is not adequately staffed and others believed that 
PAEDS is on the verge of being understaffed, resulting in limited system flexibility in the 
current state of operation. Another investigator believed that stability fluctuated by seasonal 
demands and staffing is the major resource that is impacted. Efficiency in generating data, 
limiting duplication, would reduce nurse tasks and increase staffing stability without requiring 
extra funding.  
Resources would become available if conditions that are no longer suitable for PAEDS 
surveillance were removed, thus making PAEDS more flexible, acceptable and stable. PAEDS 
conditions could also be prioritised and resources allocated accordingly in times of high stress.  Summary 
Strengths 
PAEDS surveillance gathers otherwise uncaptured information that contributes to a broader 
national understanding of serious childhood conditions. This knowledge, obtained via active 
hospital-based sentinel surveillance, allows for informed and appropriate responses to issues 
of public health importance including new and emerging diseases. Several additional benefits 
occur as by-products of PAEDS nurse consultation with families, such as using the consultation 
to offer opportunistic vaccination of at-risk children and families. As PAEDS includes several 
VPDs, the system provides NIP-relevant outputs such as VE and vaccine coverage estimates. 
Surveillance in PAEDS is relatively inexpensive to run and produces detailed, enhanced, timely 
clinical, demographical and laboratory data for a large cohort of serious illnesses that has 
broad national representativeness and is internationally recognised as being of value, by virtue 
of a range of publications. Non-notifiable conditions, that are either AEFI, or new or related 
infectious disease syndromes, are also included in PAEDS and contribute to the surveillance of 
conditions where there is a limited knowledge base and alternative available data. The active 
surveillance of AEFI adds confidence that vaccine safety is being closely monitored by a system 
tailored to detect potentially serious outcomes.67 
PAEDS encourages collaboration between staff, researchers and clinicians between states and 
territories through regular meetings and communication. PAEDS has created a community of 
dedicated surveillance nurses and investigators that share local information and prepare other 
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sites for potential impending AEFI and disease trends present at their site. This community, 
and indeed the established nationally operable PAEDS ethical approvals (recently upgraded to 
a “Program”), is a model for similar cross-jurisdictional systems that fall outside of legislated or 
emergency enacted surveillance to operate. This has been noted, for example, in a review by 
the NHMRC funded Centres for Research Excellence, APPRISE (Australian Partnership for 
Preparedness Research on Infectious Disease Emergencies). 
The flexibility of the PAEDS system is touted as a strength, particularly the ability to add 
conditions and sites for surveillance as well as its responsiveness to changes in disease trends: 
“It is the balance between real-time patient data which enable the system to be both 
responsive but comprehensive that is its real strength”. Aiming for system flexibility has not 
been to the detriment of consistency as case definitions and collection processes are the same 
across all sites. The PAEDS network managers at the coordinating centre are largely 
responsible for these successes and have also been able to provide continual support to the 
sentinel sites. 
Policy changes and public health action have resulted from the work of PAEDS, from 
recognising outbreaks, analysing disease trends and informing vaccine schedules: “Pertussis 
and intussusception have previously been extremely important diseases for PAEDS surveillance 
and the outcomes have been successfully translated into practice”. A stakeholder responded 
that since “the immunisation program in Australia is comprehensive, and costly. We need to 
continue to gather evidence about the impact of vaccination on VPDs, undertake research to 
inform our understanding of AEFI and vaccine safety generally”. Weaknesses 
As a sentinel surveillance network, PAEDS is limited to the participating hospitals and the 
children who attend these hospitals. This somewhat reduces the breadth of the outputs by 
population demographics and not capturing all severe cases occurring nationally. Pre-specified 
case definitions also may exclude potential participants such as out-of-hospital deaths or 
children who die while being treated in the hospital ED. This can also be true of PCR testing 
which has high sensitivity and specificity but may not necessarily be uniformly or consistently 
used for diagnosis, thus potentially limiting the capture of cases. 
The lack of stable long-term funding is the biggest immediate issue for the continuation of 
PAEDS surveillance. The current funding model of PAEDS relies heavily on in-kind contributions 
of PAEDS investigators, laboratories and hospitals which is potentially unsustainable. 
Alternative support through grant funding and associated PhD scholarships are only short term 
and do not provide longevity of funding for the system. PAEDS requirement to operate under 
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multi-jurisdictional/state-based ethical approvals involves time-consuming amendments of 
ethics applications to make system changes. 
One major identified weakness was that PAEDS does not have a strategic plan. This could 
underpin some of the confusion evident among stakeholders regarding the current objectives 
of PAEDS. Throughout the evaluation the specific wording of the objectives was questioned, 
even the existence of these objectives was questioned. Clarity regarding the aims and 
objectives of this system should increase its effectiveness and utility. 
In line with the limited funding is the generally limited supply of resources, primarily staff, in 
the system. Nurse satisfaction is reduced due to high case load, reported unrealistic 
expectations of time frames and lack of feedback regarding outputs and affirmation of work 
value. There is limited feedback between PAEDS sites and nurses, as well as between the sites 
and the local, state, territory and national government health departments. This lack of 
communication can reduce public health actions and meaningful engagement to address 
governmental priorities of public health policy and practice. 
The current regular reports produced by PAEDS could be timelier and aim to provide 
information that is not already available in other reports and that emphasise the particular 
information that is unique to PAEDS. Improvements  
The improvements suggested are subject to funding.  
The methods for reporting, in terms of content, audience and timeliness would benefit from 
refinement to ensure stakeholder engagement and achievement of PAEDS aims. Developing 
closer ties with the broader public health community would increase awareness of PAEDS 
outputs, increasing usefulness and potentially generating additional funding avenues. To 
increase usefulness, PAEDS could integrate with pre-existing datasets and produce an 
increasingly diverse range of outputs. PAEDS outputs, such as regular reports and publications, 
could be better disseminated to subscribed individuals or communities allowing for greater 
awareness of PAEDS.  
Data collection should be regularly reviewed to limit the collection of unnecessary data fields. 
Improvements in the technology used by PAEDS would assist in several aspects of the system 
including data quality, timeliness, simplicity and acceptability. Employment of small changes 
such as electronic data collection via tablets and moving to one universal data management 
system could have significant positive consequences. 
Chapter 5  Evaluation of a Surveillance System 
255 
Likewise, hiring a study coordinator and/or data entry staff at each site would reduce the 
administrative duties of the surveillance nurses while increasing staff satisfaction, data 
accuracy and timeliness of reporting. These additional staff could also assist in the site-specific 
ethics applications and administrative requirements. 
Continual periodic reviews of PAEDS conditions would allow PAEDS to stay relevant in 
capturing new and emerging disease, and would effectively use the limited resources available 
for the surveillance of important and current conditions. The objectives of PAEDS should also 
be periodically reassessed to ensure they are being met and addressing stakeholder priorities. Recommendations  
In order to improve PAEDS for future surveillance of important childhood conditions the 
following recommendations have been proposed and grouped into one of four categories: Resources 
1. Secure longer term sustainable funding for PAEDS. 
2. Assess the duties of PAEDS nurses in addition to their primary role as a surveillance nurse 
to determine the necessity of these duties and the feasibility of hiring additional staff.  
3. Consider an alternative to WebSpirit, such as REDCap, as the sole online data management 
system for PAEDS. Coordination 
4. Develop a strategic plan, with clear objectives for PAEDS that all stakeholders have 
contributed to and agreed upon. In addition, periodically assess the adherence to the plan 
and the achievement of these objectives. 
5. Amend objectives to include the partnership with the various health departments and the 
aim of PAEDS to inform policy and practice as well as to provide strategic advice on 
surveillance of important diseases. This could be included in the existing objective 1 or be 
an additional objective. 
6. Reconsider the use of the term ‘real-time’ in objective 1. Completion of extensive patient 
record data takes between two to three months which is not evidence of ‘real-time’ data 
reporting but rather ‘real-time’ data collection. The term ‘timely’ would be a more 
accurate description of the system. 
7. Reconsider removal of objective 2 due to lack of outputs to date, or implement a plan to 
address this objective. 
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8. Implement consistent use of the (currently) in-draft criteria to determine whether a 
condition should be added to PAEDS, i.e. considering feasibility, outbreak potential, 
severity, vaccine availability, public concern, political concern, international concern and 
the priorities of funding bodies.  
9. Create defined criteria for the removal of a PAEDS condition, i.e. considering whether 
there are any unachieved aims, feasibility of continuation, public health interest, and the 
priorities of funding bodies. Data collection and management 
10. Implement electronic portable data collection tools (e.g. a tablet) which allow for an 
electronic case report form to collect data that are directly input into the online PAEDS 
data management system. 
11. Improve implementation of strict data field controls in the online case report form by 
enforcing a defined format of data (i.e. date, number, specified choices, etc.) and allow for 
defined logic such as date 1 must be prior to date 2.  
12. Periodically reassess data to determine if frequent responses in free text ‘other’ 
questionnaire responses should be included as an additional option in the primary 
question. 
13. Ensure rigorous periodic review of each condition CRF and assess the completeness of 
mandatory fields and identify fields that are very rarely used and consider their removal. 
Also, consider the use of each data field, if data are not being used then consider its 
removal from the CRF or investigate potential uses for the data. 
14. Annually check the ICD website for coding changes such as additions, amendments or 
deletions of condition codes, for relevant conditions.  
15. Investigate methods to reduce paper usage in surveillance and recruitment steps thus 
making the physical log book, admission paperwork for each patient and CRF irrelevant. If 
hard-copy CRFs remain, due to local site or other ethical requirements (E.g. including 
around the lack of established electronic medical records at each site), clearly identify 
which fields are mandatory. 
16. Implement automatic alerts, linked to the online data management system, to remind 
surveillance nurses to complete various steps in the data collection and data entry process 
such as completing patients’ CRF and the AIR 30-day check. 
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Reporting 
17. Increase PAEDS profile nationally and internationally by broadening the availability and 
dissemination of PAEDS outputs beyond PAEDS stakeholders (i.e. general public, 
laboratories, participating parents and health professional group). 
18. Increase the timeliness of annual report publications, notwithstanding inherent delays 
notes in publishing via peer review in Communicable Diseases Intelligence. PAEDS could 
provide their reports directly to the state, territory and Commonwealth health 
departments prior to publication. Conclusion 
This evaluation assessed PAEDS usefulness, PAEDS ability to meet its own aims and objectives 
and the level of PAEDS success in surveillance of conditions. PAEDS successfully fulfils its aims 
of actively collecting detailed information that isn’t available from other surveillance systems 
regarding children hospitalised with serious illnesses and AEFI. PAEDS informs vaccination 
policy and practice, including vaccine safety, and in the greater sense improves child health 
outcomes through research, knowledge advancement and changing public health policy and 
practice.  
PAEDS is less successful in accomplishing some of its objectives. The objective to provide high 
quality data on selected serious childhood conditions is achieved although the timeliness of 
outputs is seldom ‘real-time’; noting that surveillance for some conditions is rapid while this is 
not possible for other conditions. This is a symptom of the type of surveillance that PAEDS 
performs in gathering detailed data rather than a criticism of PAEDS surveillance lacking in 
real-time outputs. It would be more suitable for PAEDS to aim for real-time data collection and 
timely reporting, since real-time reporting is almost impossible with the exception of influenza 
surveillance. 
PAEDS intends to describe longer term clinical outcomes of children who present, or are 
admitted, to hospital with a selected PAEDS condition however there is little evidence of these 
long-term clinical outcomes being widely reported or disseminated. PAEDS has somewhat 
successfully been able to identify pathological agents and a limited number of other key 
laboratory markers that contribute to disease severity and VE. Recently, PAEDS increased its 
work to improve knowledge around the social determinants of childhood disease and 
vaccination, as a grant-funded output, but the stakeholder reaction regarding necessity of this 
was mixed. In light of the findings in the review, PAEDS needs to ensure that the objectives of 
the system align with those of greatest importance to policy and practice of VPDs and AEFI. 
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PAEDS has contributed to the public health knowledge of several important VPDs and AEFI. 
This surveillance and accompanying research outcomes have justified support by numerous 
funding bodies particular as PAEDS provides enhanced data on the safety and effectiveness of 
NIP-funded vaccines. The outputs from PAEDS increase the reliability and reputation of the NIP 
within Australian health professionals and the public.  
PAEDS provides effective AEFI surveillance and independent assessment contributing to public 
confidence in vaccines. PAEDS fulfils three of the four requirements to continue to achieve this 
commitment in the future, as described by researchers at the Institute for Vaccine Safety, 
Johns Hopkins University: ‘bring together experts from government, industry and academia to 
inform and determine associations between vaccines and adverse events’, ‘make 
recommendations to improve vaccine safety’, and ‘disseminate finding to the public’.67 
However, the absent requirement is ‘funding to conduct the vaccine safety investigations’. To 
date, PAEDS has made crucial contributions to AEFI knowledge resulting in policy changes of 
which may not have been possible without dedicated funding for PAEDS. 
Each system attribute could be improved, despite the high level of data quality, sensitivity and 
demonstrated flexibility. The system could be simplified and subsequently become timelier 
and reduce data errors. PAEDS has high acceptability among stakeholders but without secure 
funding is an unstable surveillance system. 
The future of PAEDS is reliant on funding, primarily from state, territory and Commonwealth 
health departments. As long as PAEDS can continue to engage with these major stakeholders, 
determine priorities and deliver relevant outputs, the funding bodies should find value in the 
continuation of PAEDS. 
Chapter 5  Evaluation of a Surveillance System 
259 
References 
1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Updated guidelines for evaluating public 
health surveillance systems: recommendations from the Guidelines Working Group. MMWR 
Recomm Rep. 2001;50(RR-13):1-35; quiz CE1-7. 
2. Qualtrics. Qualtrics. United States. 2017. 
3. World Health Organization. Ten threats to global health in 2019. [cited 12 February 
2019]. Available from: https://www.who.int/emergencies/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-
2019. 
4. Varricchio F, Iskander J, Destefano F, Ball R, Pless R, Braun MM, et al. Understanding 
vaccine safety information from the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System. Pediatr Infect 
Dis J. 2004;23(4):287-94. 
5. Freed GL, Clark SJ, Butchart AT, Singer DC, Davis MM. Parental vaccine safety concerns 
in 2009. Pediatrics. 2010;125(4):654-9. 
6. Gust DA, Strine TW, Maurice E, Smith P, Yusuf H, Wilkinson M, et al. 
Underimmunization among children: effects of vaccine safety concerns on immunization 
status. Pediatrics. 2004;114(1):e16-22. 
7. Davis RL, Kolczak M, Lewis E, Nordin J, Goodman M, Shay DK, et al. Active surveillance 
of vaccine safety: a system to detect early signs of adverse events. Epidemiology. 
2005;16(3):336-41. 
8. Hinrichsen VL, Kruskal B, O'Brien MA, Lieu TA, Platt R. Using electronic medical records 
to enhance detection and reporting of vaccine adverse events. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 
2007;14(6):731-5. 
9. Zurynski Y, McIntyre P, Booy R, Elliott EJ, PAEDS Investigators Group. Paediatric Active 
Enhanced Disease Surveillance: a new surveillance system for Australia. Paediatr Child Health. 
2013;49(7):588-94. 
10. Infectious Diseases and Immunization Committee, Canadian Paediatric Society. 
IMPACT after 17 years: Lessons learned about successful networking. Paediatr Child Health. 
2009;14(1):40-3. 
Chapter 5  Evaluation of a Surveillance System 
260 
11. National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance. PAEDS: Paediatric Active 
Enhanced Disease Surveillance. 2017. [cited 2 July 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.paeds.edu.au/. 
12. National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance. PAEDS - Paediatric Active 
Enhanced Disease Surveillance. 2018. [cited 2 July 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.paeds.edu.au/. 
13. Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance. PAEDS program protocol (INTERNAL). 
2018. 
14. Australian Government Department of Health: Therapeutic Goods Administration. 
2019. [cited 12 February 2019]. Available from: https://www.tga.gov.au/. 
15. Dey A, Wang H, Quinn H, Cook J, Macartney K. Surveillance of adverse events following 
immunisation in Australia, 2015. Commun Dis Intell Q Rep. 2017;41(3):E264-E78. 
16. Australian Government Department of Health: Therapeutic Goods Administration. 
About the Database of Adverse Event Notifications (DAEN) – medicines. 2019. [cited 12 
February 2019]. Available from: https://www.tga.gov.au/about-daen-medicines. 
17. AusVaxSafety. Vaccine safety in Australia: AusVaxSafety summary report 2016–17. In: 
National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance, editor. 2019. 
18. Miller M, Roche P, Spencer J, Deeble M. Evaluation of Australia's National Notifiable 
Disease Surveillance System. Commun Dis Intell Q Rep. 2004;28(3):311-23. 
19. Toms C, de Kluyver R, Enhanced Invasive Pneumococcal Disease Surveillance Working 
Group for the Communicable Diseases Network Australia. Invasive pneumococcal disease in 
Australia, 2011 and 2012. Commun Dis Intell Q Rep. 2016;40(2):E267-84. 
20. Polkinghorne B, OzFoodNet Working G. OzFoodNet quarterly report, 1 July to 30 
September 2015. Commun Dis Intell Q Rep. 2017;41(4):E506-E14. 
21. Australian Government: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. 2019. [cited 12 
February 2019]. Available from: https://www.aihw.gov.au/. 
22. WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific. Report of the interim meeting of the 
Technical Advisory Group on the Expanded Programme on Immunisation and Poliomyelitis 
Eradication. Beijing, China October/November 1994. 
Chapter 5  Evaluation of a Surveillance System 
261 
23. World Health Organization. WHO–recommended standards for surveillance of selected 
vaccine-preventable diseases. 2003. 
24. Zurynski Y, Davey E, Elliott EJ. Australian Paediatric Surveillance Unit annual report, 
2008 and 2009. Commun Dis Intell Q Rep. 2010;34(3):285-90. 
25. Carlin JB, Macartney KK, Lee KJ, Quinn HE, Buttery J, Lopert R, et al. Intussusception 
risk and disease prevention associated with rotavirus vaccines in Australia's National 
Immunization Program. Clin Infect Dis. 2013;57(10):1427-34. 
26. Buttery JP, Danchin MH, Lee KJ, Carlin JB, McIntyre PB, Elliott EJ, et al. Intussusception 
following rotavirus vaccine administration: post-marketing surveillance in the National 
Immunization Program in Australia. Vaccine. 2011;29(16):3061-6. 
27. Tapiainen T, Bär G, Bonhoeffer J, Heininger U. Evaluation of the Brighton Collaboration 
case definition of acute intussusception during active surveillance. Vaccine. 2006;24(9):1483-7. 
28. Choo PW, Donahue JG, Manson JE, Platt R. The epidemiology of varicella and its 
complications. J Infect Dis. 1995;172(3):706-12. 
29. Sheel M, Beard F, Quinn H, Dey A, Kirk M, Koehler A, et al. Australian vaccine 
preventable disease epidemiological review series: varicella-zoster virus infections, 1998–
2015. Communicable Diseases Intelligence. 2018;42(S2209-6051(18)00002-7). 
30. Zurynski YA, McRae JE, Quinn HE, Wood NJ, Macartney KK. Paediatric Active Enhanced 
Disease Surveillance inaugural annual report, 2014. Commun Dis Intell Q Rep. 2016;40(3):E391-
E400. 
31. Quinn HE. Pertussis control in Australia--the current state of play. Commun Dis Intell Q 
Rep. 2014;38(3):E177-8. 
32. Fowler A, Stodberg T, Eriksson M, Wickstrom R. Long-term outcomes of acute 
encephalitis in childhood. Pediatrics. 2010;126(4):e828-35. 
33. Klein NP, Fireman B, Yih WK, Lewis E, Kulldorff M, Ray P, et al. Measles-mumps-
rubella-varicella combination vaccine and the risk of febrile seizures. Pediatrics. 
2010;126(1):e1-8. 
34. Li X, Lin Y, Yao G, Wang Y. The Influence of Vaccine on Febrile Seizure. Curr 
Neuropharmacol. 2018;16(1):59-65. 
Chapter 5  Evaluation of a Surveillance System 
262 
35. Research Electronic Data Capture (REDCap) [Internet]. 2004. [cited 28 June 2018]. 
Available from: https://www.project-redcap.org. 
36. Stevens DL, Bryant AE. Severe Group A Streptococcal Infections. Streptococcus 
pyogenes: Basic Biology to Clinical Manifestations. Oklahoma City, OK. 2016. 
37. Jafri RZ, Ali A, Messonnier NE, Tevi-Benissan C, Durrheim D, Eskola J, et al. Global 
epidemiology of invasive meningococcal disease. Popul Health Metr. 2013;11(1):17. 
38. Gordon JB, Kahn AM, Burns JC. When children with Kawasaki disease grow up: 
myocardial and vascular complications in adulthood. J Am Coll Cardiol. 2009;54(21):1911-20. 
39. Newburger JW, Takahashi M, Gerber MA, Gewitz MH, Tani LY, Burns JC, et al. 
Diagnosis, treatment, and long-term management of Kawasaki disease: a statement for health 
professionals from the Committee on Rheumatic Fever, Endocarditis and Kawasaki Disease, 
Council on Cardiovascular Disease in the Young, American Heart Association. Circulation. 
2004;110(17):2747-71. 
40. WebSpirit [Internet]. 2013. [cited 27 June 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.ptna.com.au/index.php/webspirit. 
41. Quinn HE, Wood NJ, Cannings KL, Dey A, Wang H, Menzies RI, et al. Intussusception 
after monovalent human rotavirus vaccine in Australia: severity and comparison of using 
healthcare database records versus case confirmation to assess risk. Pediatr Infect Dis J. 
2014;33(9):959-65. 
42. McRae JE, Quinn HE, Macartney K. Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance 
(PAEDS) annual report 2015: prospective hospital-based surveillance for serious paediatric 
conditions. Commun Dis Intell Q Rep. 2017;41(3):E264-E78. 
43. World Health Organization Western Pacific Region. Polio Bulletin. 2018. 
44. Australian Government Department of Health. Rotavirus vaccination and the risk of 
intussusception. Therapeutic Goods Administration, editor. Canberra, ACT. 2013. 
45. Macartney KK, Gidding HF, Trinh L, Wang H, McRae J, Crawford N, et al. Febrile 
seizures following measles and varicella vaccines in young children in Australia. Vaccine. 
2015;33(11):1412-7. 
Chapter 5  Evaluation of a Surveillance System 
263 
46. Deng L, Gidding H, Macartney K, Crawford N, Buttery J, Gold M, et al. Post vaccination 
febrile seizure severity and outcome Pediatrics. 2019;143(5):e20182120. 
47. Macartney K, Gidding HF, Trinh L, Wang H, Dey A, Hull B, et al. Evaluation of 
Combination Measles-Mumps-Rubella-Varicella Vaccine Introduction in Australia. JAMA 
Pediatr. 2017;171(10):992-8. 
48. Thomas AS, Perez JA, Jr. Complications of varicella zoster infection of the central 
nervous system. Methodist Debakey Cardiovasc J. 2017;13(2):76-7. 
49. McRae J, Quinn H, Saravanos G, McMinn A, Britton P, Wood N, et al. Paediatric Active 
Enhanced Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) annual report 2016: prospective hospital-based 
surveillance for serious paediatric conditions. Commun Dis Intell. 2018;2019 Feb 1(43). 
50. Marshall HS, Clarke M, Heath C, Quinn H, Richmond PC, Crawford N, et al. Severe and 
complicated varicella and associated genotypes 10 years after introduction of a one dose 
varicella vaccine program. J Infect Dis. 2018. 
51. Marshall HS, McIntyre P, Richmond P, Buttery JP, Royle JA, Gold MS, et al. Changes in 
patterns of hospitalized children with varicella and of associated varicella genotypes after 
introduction of varicella vaccine in Australia. Pediatr Infect Dis J. 2013;32(5):530-7. 
52. Quinn H, Comeau J, Marshall H, Elliot E, Crawford N, Blyth C, et al., editors. 
Effectiveness of maternal vaccination among infants aged <6 months hospitalised with 
pertussis. Public Health Association of Australia's National Immunisation Conference; 2018; 
Adelaide, Australia. 
53. Fu J, Wang J, Jiang C, Shi R, Ma T. Outbreak of varicella in a highly vaccinated preschool 
population. Int J Infect Dis. 2015;37:14-8. 
54. Lopez AS, Guris D, Zimmerman L, Gladden L, Moore T, Haselow DT, et al. One dose of 
varicella vaccine does not prevent school outbreaks: is it time for a second dose? Pediatrics. 
2006;117(6):e1070-7. 
55. Parker AA, Reynolds MA, Leung J, Anderson M, Rey A, Ortega-Sanchez IR, et al. 
Challenges to implementing second-dose varicella vaccination during an outbreak in the 
absence of a routine 2-dose vaccination requirement - Maine, 2006. J Infect Dis. 2008;197 
Suppl 2:S101-7. 
Chapter 5  Evaluation of a Surveillance System 
264 
56. Britton P, Dale R, Booy R, Blyth C, Crawford N, Marshall H, et al. Influenza-Associated 
Neurological disease: Cases Identified by the Australian Childhood Encephalitis (ACE) Study ID 
Week; San Diego, CA2015. 
57. Britton PN, Blyth CC, Macartney K, Dale RC, Li-Kim-Moy J, Khandaker G, et al. The 
Spectrum and Burden of Influenza-Associated Neurological Disease in Children: Combined 
Encephalitis and Influenza Sentinel Site Surveillance From Australia, 2013–2015. Clin Infect Dis. 
2017;65(4):653-60. 
58. Britton PN, Dale RC, Blyth CC, Macartney K, Crawford NW, Marshall H, et al. Influenza-
associated Encephalitis/Encephalopathy Identified by the Australian Childhood Encephalitis 
Study 2013–2015. Pediatr Infect Dis J. 2017;36(11):1021-6. 
59. Britton PN, Dale RC, Nissen MD, Crawford N, Elliott E, Macartney K, et al. Parechovirus 
Encephalitis and Neurodevelopmental Outcomes. Pediatrics. 2016;137(2):e20152848. 
60. Britton PN, Jones CA, Macartney K, Cheng AC. Parechovirus: an important emerging 
infection in young infants. Med J Aust. 2018;208(8):365-9. 
61. Teoh HL, Mohammad SS, Britton PN, Kandula T, Lorentzos MS, Booy R, et al. Clinical 
Characteristics and Functional Motor Outcomes of Enterovirus 71 Neurological Disease in 
Children. JAMA Neurol. 2016;73(3):300-7. 
62. Zander A, Britton PN, Navin T, Horsley E, Tobin S, McAnulty JM. An outbreak of 
enterovirus 71 in metropolitan Sydney: enhanced surveillance and lessons learnt. Med J Aust. 
2014;201(11):663-6. 
63. Britton P, Dale R, Blyth C, Clark J, Crawford N, Marshall H. The causes and clinical 
features of childhood encephalitis in Australia: a multicentre prospective cohort study.  Open 
Forum Infectious Diseases. 2015. 
64. Britton P, Dale R, Clark J, Crawford N, Marshall H, Elliott E, editors. Emerging epidemic 
viruses are an important cause of encephalitis in infants and children: findings from Australian 
cohort (ACE) study (2013–2016). European Congress of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious 
Diseases (ECCMID); 2017. 
65. Krause JC, Panning M, Hengel H, Henneke P. The role of multiplex PCR in respiratory 
tract infections in children. Dtsch Arztebl Int. 2014;111(38):639-45. 
Chapter 5  Evaluation of a Surveillance System 
265 
66. Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance. PAEDS ACE surveillance study 
flowchart (NSW). (INTERNAL). 2013. 
67. Salmon DA, Moulton LH, Halsey NA. Enhancing public confidence in vaccines through 
independent oversight of postlicensure vaccine safety. Am J Public Health. 2004;94(6):947-50. 
Chapter 5  Evaluation of a Surveillance System 
266 
Appendices Appendix 1. Participant questionnaire for PAEDS surveillance nurses 
Welcome to the PAEDS Stakeholder Evaluation survey for PAEDS surveillance nurses! 
As you are aware, the Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) system allows 
for the rapid collection of timely detailed clinical, vaccination and laboratory data of severe 
childhood conditions (listed below). 
PAEDS aims: 
- to actively collect detailed information that isn’t available from other surveillance 
systems, about children hospitalised with vaccine preventable diseases and potential 
adverse events following vaccination;  
- to inform vaccination policy and practice, including vaccine safety; and 
- to improve child health outcomes. 
PAEDS operates using dedicated surveillance nurses at each participating site who search 
through hospital admissions to identify cases for recruitment. 
PAEDS conditions under surveillance:  
Vaccine preventable disease (VPD) 
Adverse event 
following immunisation 
(AEFI) 
Other Condition 
Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) Intussusception Acute childhood encephalitis 
(ACE) 
Varicella zoster virus (VZV) Severe acute neurological 
events (SANE) 
Invasive group A streptococcal 
(IGAS) disease 
Pertussis Febrile seizures Kawasaki disease 
Pandemic influenza   
Seasonal influenza   
Invasive meningococcal disease (IMD)   
PAEDS currently operates at 7 sites in 6 states and territories which account for >75% of all 
admissions to hospitals providing specialist paediatric services in Australia; these sites are 
Children’s Hospital at Westmead in New South Wales, Royal Children’s Hospital and Monash 
Children’s Hospital in Victoria, Women’s & Children’s Hospital in South Australia, Princess 
Margaret Hospital for Children in Western Australia, Lady Cilento Children’s Hospital in 
Queensland and Royal Darwin Hospital in the Northern Territory. 
PAEDS contributes to academic research as well as public health policy and practice. Such 
activities include influenza reporting with FluCAN, AFP reporting as part of the national 
surveillance requirements for WHO's Global Polio Eradication Initiative, and identifying the risk 
of intussusception following rotavirus immunisation with RotaShield, amongst many other 
contributions. 
If you would like more information prior to completing the questionnaire, please visit the 
PAEDS website or search for the PAEDS annual reports published online in the Communicable 
Diseases Intelligence journal. 
We appreciate your honest input as we hope to make accurate conclusions and helpful 
recommendations for the benefit of PAEDS. Please allow 10-15 minutes to complete this 
questionnaire.  
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If you have any questions please contact the Chief Investigator, Julia Maguire, at 
Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au or 02 9845 0191. 
Do you agree to participate?  
o Yes 
o No 
The following questions are regarding GENERAL aspects of PAEDS: 
Q1.1 In which jurisdiction are you based? 
o Australian Capital Territory   
o New South Wales 
o Northern Territory   
o Queensland  
o South Australia 
o Tasmania  
o Victoria 
o Western Australia   
 
Q1.2 How would you rate the importance of each aim/objective of PAEDS? 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important Unsure 
Provide high quality, 
real-time data on 
selected serious 
childhood 
conditions obtained 
through active 
surveillance, in 
particular on VPDs 
and serious AEFI  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Describe longer 
term clinical 
outcomes of 
children who 
present, or are 
admitted to hospital 
with any of the 
PAEDS conditions  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Identify pathological 
agents or other key 
laboratory markers 
that contribute to 
disease severity and 
vaccine effectiveness 
in the PAEDS 
conditions 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Improve knowledge 
around the social 
determinants of 
childhood disease 
and vaccination  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Q1.3 If you answered 'Not at all important' or 'Slightly important' please explain your 
response. 
 
Q1.4 Please rate how well you believe PAEDS is achieving each of its aims/objectives. 
 Extremely well 
Very 
well 
Moderately 
well 
Slightly 
well 
Not well 
at all Unsure 
Provide high quality, real-
time data on selected 
serious childhood 
conditions obtained 
through active surveillance, 
in particular on VPDs and 
serious AEFI 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Describe longer term 
clinical outcomes of 
children who present, or 
are admitted to hospital 
with any of the PAEDS 
conditions  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Identify pathological 
agents or other key 
laboratory markers that 
contribute to disease 
severity and vaccine 
effectiveness in the PAEDS 
conditions 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Improve knowledge around 
the social determinants of 
childhood disease and 
vaccination 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q1.5 If you answered 'Not well at all' or 'Slightly well' please explain your response. 
 
Q1.6 Do you think there are any other aims/objectives that PAEDS could or should be trying 
to achieve? 
o Yes  
o No  
o Unsure  
 
Q1.7 Please list these additional aims/objectives and provide reasoning. 
 
The following questions are regarding the ACCEPTABILITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q2.1 Please rate your view on the importance of the PAEDS system as a whole. 
o Extremely important  
o Very important  
o Moderately important  
o Slightly important  
o Not at all important   
o Unsure 
 
Q2.2 Please explain your response. 
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Q2.3 Please rate your view on the importance of the vaccine preventable diseases (VPDs) 
included in PAEDS. 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important  Unsure 
Acute flaccid 
paralysis (AFP) o  o  o  o  o  o  
Varicella zoster 
virus  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Pertussis  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Pandemic influenza  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Seasonal influenza o  o  o  o  o  o  
Invasive 
meningococcal 
disease (IMD) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
Q2.4 Please rate your view on the importance of the adverse events following immunisation 
(AEFI) included in PAEDS. 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important  Unsure 
Intussusception o  o  o  o  o  o  
Febrile seizures o  o  o  o  o  o  
Severe acute 
neurological 
events (SANE) e.g. 
Guillain-Barré 
Syndrome (GBS), 
Transverse Myelitis 
and Acute 
Disseminated 
Encephalomyelitis 
(ADEM) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
2.5 Please rate your view on the importance of the other conditions included in PAEDS. 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important  Unsure 
Acute childhood 
encephalitis (ACE) o  o  o  o  o  o  
Invasive group A 
streptococcal 
(IGAS) disease 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Kawasaki disease o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Q2.6 Do you think participating in PAEDS is a good use of your time? 
o Definitely yes   
o Probably yes   
o Might or might not   
o Probably not   
o Definitely not   
 
Q2.7 If you answered 'Definitely not' or 'Probably not' please explain your response. 
 
The following questions are regarding the SIMPLICITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q3.1 Please rate how much you agree with the following statements: 
 Strongly agree  
Somewhat 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree  
Somewhat 
disagree  
Strongly 
disagree  Unsure 
The flow of data in 
the PAEDS system is 
sufficient  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The flow of data in 
the PAEDS system is 
simple  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
PAEDS processes are 
simple  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q3.2 If you answered 'Strongly disagree' or 'Disagree' please explain your response. 
 
Q3.3 What do you suggest to improve the ease, efficiency or flow of information in the 
PAEDS system? 
The following questions are regarding the FLEXIBILITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q4.1 Please rate the flexibility of PAEDS in response to various system changes: 
 Excellent  Good  Average Poor  Very poor Unsure 
Adding new PAEDS 
conditions o  o  o  o  o  o  
Removing PAEDS 
conditions  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Staff changes  o  o  o  o  o  o  
PAEDS case definition  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Adding new PAEDS sites o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q4.2 Please explain your responses. 
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The following questions are regarding the STABILITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q5.1 In your opinion, how would you rate the stability of the PAEDS system as a whole? 
Thinking about data collection and reporting in times of both low and high stress. 
o Very stable  
o Stable  
o Neither stable nor unstable  
o Unstable  
o Very unstable  
o Unsure   
 
Q5.2 If you answered 'Very unstable' or 'Unstable' please explain your response. 
 
Q5.3 Do you believe that PAEDS is currently adequately resourced, in terms of staff, training 
and other resources? 
o Yes  
o No  
o Unsure  
 
Q5.4 Please explain your response. 
 
The following questions are regarding the SENSITIVITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q6.1 Do you think that PAEDS is capturing all true cases of the PAEDS conditions who 
present to your PAEDS site? 
o Yes   
o No  
o Unsure   
 
The following questions are regarding the TIMELINESS of PAEDS: 
 
Q7.1 In your opinion, does PAEDS provide timely information regarding PAEDS conditions 
that is not otherwise available? 
o Yes  
o No   
o Unsure   
 
Q7.2 Please explain your response. 
 
Q7.3 Does your site have defined protocols for the timeliness of data collection and 
reporting? 
o Yes  
o No   
o Unsure   
 
Q7.4 If yes, please describe the protocols in place. For example, is there an alert system in 
place to check ACIR records 30 days after case enrolment? 
 
Q7.5 How does the timeliness of data collection and reporting differ for PAEDS conditions? 
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Q7.6 On the occasions when data collection and reporting takes longer than expected, what 
factors contribute to this? 
o Lack of staff   
o Insufficiently trained staff  
o Delays in patient testing  
o Delays in laboratory tests  
o High volume of PAEDS-appropriate patients  
o High patient load in flu season  
o Unsure 
o Other, please specify  
 
The following questions are regarding the DATA QUALITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q8.1 How satisfied are you with the reliability of data reported by PAEDS? 
o Very satisfied   
o Satisfied   
o Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
o Dissatisfied  
o Very dissatisfied   
o Unsure   
 
Q8.2 If you answered 'Very dissatisfied' or 'Dissatisfied' please explain your response. 
 
Additional comments: 
 
Q9.1 In your opinion, what are the strengths of PAEDS? 
 
Q9.2 In your opinion, what are the limitations of PAEDS? 
 
Q9.3 In your opinion, how could PAEDS be improved? 
 
Q9.4 Further comments? 
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Appendix 2. Participant questionnaire for PAEDS investigators 
Welcome to the PAEDS Stakeholder Evaluation survey for PAEDS surveillance investigators! 
As you are aware, the Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) system allows 
for the rapid collection of timely detailed clinical, vaccination and laboratory data of severe 
childhood conditions (listed below). 
PAEDS aims: 
- to actively collect detailed information that isn’t available from other surveillance 
systems, about children hospitalised with vaccine preventable diseases and potential 
adverse events following vaccination;  
- to inform vaccination policy and practice, including vaccine safety; and 
- to improve child health outcomes. 
PAEDS operates using dedicated surveillance nurses at each participating site who search 
through hospital admissions to identify cases for recruitment. 
PAEDS conditions under surveillance:  
Vaccine preventable disease 
(VPD) 
Adverse event following 
immunisation (AEFI) Other Condition 
Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) Intussusception Acute childhood encephalitis (ACE) 
Varicella zoster virus (VZV) Febrile seizures Invasive group A streptococcal (IGAS) disease 
Pertussis Severe acute neurological events (SANE) Kawasaki disease 
Pandemic influenza   Seasonal influenza   Invasive meningococcal disease 
(IMD)   
PAEDS currently operates at 7 sites in 6 states and territories which account for >75% of all 
admissions to hospitals providing specialist paediatric services in Australia; these sites are 
Children’s Hospital at Westmead in New South Wales, Royal Children’s Hospital and Monash 
Children’s Hospital in Victoria, Women’s & Children’s Hospital in South Australia, Princess 
Margaret Hospital for Children in Western Australia, Lady Cilento Children’s Hospital in 
Queensland and Royal Darwin Hospital in the Northern Territory. 
PAEDS contributes to academic research as well as public health policy and practice. Such 
activities include influenza reporting with FluCAN, AFP reporting as part of the national 
surveillance requirements for WHO's Global Polio Eradication Initiative, and identifying the risk 
of intussusception following rotavirus immunisation with RotaShield, amongst many other 
contributions. 
If you would like more information prior to completing the questionnaire, please visit the 
PAEDS website or search for the PAEDS annual reports published online in the Communicable 
Diseases Intelligence journal. 
We appreciate your honest input as we hope to make accurate conclusions and helpful 
recommendations for the benefit of PAEDS. Please allow 10-15 minutes to complete this 
questionnaire.  
If you have any questions please contact the Chief Investigator, Julia Maguire, at 
Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au or 02 9845 0191. 
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Do you agree to participate?  
o Yes 
o No 
The following questions are regarding GENERAL aspects of PAEDS: 
 
Q1.1 In which jurisdiction are you based? 
o Australian Capital Territory   
o New South Wales 
o Northern Territory   
o Queensland  
o South Australia 
o Tasmania  
o Victoria 
o Western Australia   
 
Q1.2 How would you rate the importance of each aim/objective of PAEDS? 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important Unsure 
Provide high quality, 
real-time data on 
selected serious 
childhood 
conditions obtained 
through active 
surveillance, in 
particular on VPDs 
and serious AEFI  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Describe longer 
term clinical 
outcomes of 
children who 
present, or are 
admitted to hospital 
with any of the 
PAEDS conditions  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Identify pathological 
agents or other key 
laboratory markers 
that contribute to 
disease severity and 
vaccine effectiveness 
in the PAEDS 
conditions 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Improve knowledge 
around the social 
determinants of 
childhood disease 
and vaccination  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
Q1.3 If you answered 'Not at all important' or 'Slightly important' please explain your 
response. 
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Q1.4 Please rate how well you believe PAEDS is achieving each of its aims/objectives. 
 Extremely well 
Very 
well 
Moderately 
well 
Slightly 
well 
Not well 
at all Unsure 
Provide high quality, real-time 
data on selected serious 
childhood conditions obtained 
through active surveillance, in 
particular on VPDs and serious 
AEFI 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Describe longer term clinical 
outcomes of children who 
present, or are admitted to 
hospital with any of the PAEDS 
conditions  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Identify pathological agents or 
other key laboratory markers 
that contribute to disease 
severity and vaccine 
effectiveness in the PAEDS 
conditions 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Improve knowledge around 
the social determinants of 
childhood disease and 
vaccination 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q1.5 If you answered 'Not well at all' or 'Slightly well' please explain your response. 
 
Q1.6 Do you think there are any other aims/objectives that PAEDS could or should be trying 
to achieve? 
o Yes  
o No  
o Unsure  
 
Q1.7 Please list these additional aims/objectives and provide reasoning. 
The following questions are regarding the USEFULNESS of PAEDS: 
Q2.1 How would you rate the overall usefulness of the PAEDS system? 
o Extremely useful   
o Very useful  
o Moderately useful  
o Slightly useful  
o Not at all useful  
o Unsure 
 
Q2.2 Please explain your response. 
 
Q2.3 What gaps does PAEDS fill that are not filled by any other surveillance systems in 
Australia? Please explain your response 
 
Q2.4 Do you use the PAEDS data and/or reports? 
o Yes  
o No   
o Unsure   
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Q2.5 Which PAEDS data and/or reports do you use? Please select all that apply. 
▢ PAEDS Annual Report   
▢ PAEDS monthly reports  
▢ PAEDS newsletters   
▢ PAEDS conference presentations   
▢ Journal articles relating to PAEDS   
▢ Ad hoc data requests  
▢ PAEDS website  
▢ Other, please specify  
▢ I do not use PAEDS data or reports  
 
Q2.6 What do you use these data and/or reports for? Please select all that apply. 
▢ PAEDS related research   
▢ Non-PAEDS-related research  
▢ Conference presentations  
▢ To respond to media inquiries  
▢ Develop briefings  
▢ General interest   
▢ Other, please specify   
▢ I do not use PAEDS data or reports 
 
Q2.7 Has your use of PAEDS data or reports led to any public health action? 
o Yes   
o No  
o Unsure  
 
Q2.8 If yes, why and if no, why not? Please provide details. 
 
Q2.9 Has your use of PAEDS data or reports led to any public health policy changes? 
o Yes   
o No  
o Unsure  
 
Q2.10 If yes, why and if no, why not? Please provide details. 
 
Q2.11 What are the problems or barriers in accessing or using PAEDS data or reports? Please 
select all that apply. 
▢ Difficult to access, please explain further 
▢ Data or reports not relevant to my work, please explain further  
▢ Unaware of resources available, please explain further  
▢ Unavailability of timely reports, please explain further 
▢ Other, please specify   
▢ There are not any problems or barriers in accessing or using PAEDS data or reports 
 
Q2.12 What do you suggest could improve the usefulness of the PAEDS system? 
 
Q2.13 Please provide any feedback, comments or suggestions regarding PAEDS data and/or 
reports. 
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The following questions are regarding the ACCEPTABILITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q3.1 Please rate your view on the importance of the PAEDS system as a whole. 
o Extremely important  
o Very important  
o Moderately important  
o Slightly important  
o Not at all important   
o Unsure 
 
Q3.2 Please explain your response. 
 
Q3.3 Please rate your view on the importance of the vaccine preventable disease (VPDs) 
included in PAEDS. 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important  Unsure 
Acute flaccid 
paralysis (AFP) o  o  o  o  o  o  
Varicella zoster 
virus  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Pertussis  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Pandemic influenza  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Seasonal influenza o  o  o  o  o  o  
Invasive 
meningococcal 
disease (IMD) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q3.4 Please rate your view on the importance of the adverse events following immunisation 
(AEFI) included in PAEDS. 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important  Unsure 
Intussusception o  o  o  o  o  o  
Febrile seizures o  o  o  o  o  o  
Severe acute 
neurological 
events (SANE) e.g. 
Guillain-Barré 
Syndrome (GBS), 
Transverse Myelitis 
and Acute 
Disseminated 
Encephalomyelitis 
(ADEM) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Q3.5 Please rate your view on the importance of the other conditions included in PAEDS. 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important  Unsure 
Acute childhood 
encephalitis (ACE) o  o  o  o  o  o  
Invasive group A 
streptococcal 
(IGAS) disease 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Kawasaki disease o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q3.6 Do you think participating in PAEDS is a good use of your time? 
o Definitely yes   
o Probably yes   
o Might or might not   
o Probably not   
o Definitely not   
 
Q3.7 If you answered 'Definitely not' or 'Probably not' please explain your response. 
 
The following questions are regarding the SIMPLICITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q4.1 Please rate how much you agree with the following statements: 
 Strongly agree  
Somewhat 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree  
Somewhat 
disagree  
Strongly 
disagree  Unsure 
The flow of data in 
the PAEDS system is 
sufficient  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The flow of data in 
the PAEDS system is 
simple  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
PAEDS processes are 
simple  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q4.2 If you answered 'Strongly disagree' or 'Disagree' please explain your response. 
 
Q4.3 What do you suggest to improve the ease, efficiency or flow of information in the 
PAEDS system? 
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The following questions are regarding the FLEXIBILITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q5.1 Please rate the flexibility of PAEDS in response to various system changes: 
 Excellent  Good  Average Poor  Very poor Unsure 
Adding new PAEDS 
conditions o  o  o  o  o  o  
Removing PAEDS 
conditions  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Staff changes  o  o  o  o  o  o  
PAEDS case definition  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Adding new PAEDS sites o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q5.2 Please explain your responses. 
 
The following questions are regarding the STABILITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q6.1 In your opinion, how would you rate the stability of the PAEDS system as a whole? 
Thinking about data collection and reporting in times of both low and high stress. 
o Very stable  
o Stable  
o Neither stable nor unstable  
o Unstable  
o Very unstable  
o Unsure   
 
Q6.2 If you answered 'Very unstable' or 'Unstable' please explain your response. 
 
Q6.3 Do you believe that PAEDS is currently adequately resourced, in terms of staff, training 
and other resources? 
o Yes  
o No  
o Unsure  
 
Q6.4 Please explain your response. 
 
The following questions are regarding the SENSITIVITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q7.1 In your opinion, does PAEDS effectively detect outbreaks of PAEDS conditions or 
changes in PAEDS condition trends? 
 Yes No For some conditions but not all conditions Unsure 
Outbreak of PAEDS 
condition o  o  o  o  
Change in PAEDS 
condition trends o  o  o  o  
 
Q7.2 Please explain your response. 
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Q7.3 Do you think that PAEDS is capturing all true cases of the PAEDS conditions who 
present to your PAEDS site? 
o Yes   
o No  
o Unsure   
 
The following questions are regarding the TIMELINESS of PAEDS: 
 
Q8.1 In your opinion, does PAEDS provide timely information regarding PAEDS conditions 
that is not otherwise available? 
o Yes  
o No   
o Unsure   
 
Q8.2 Please explain your response. 
 
Q8.3 Does your site have defined protocols for the timeliness of data flow? 
o Yes  
o No   
o Unsure   
 
Q8.4 If yes, please describe the protocols in place. 
 
Q8.5 On the occasions when data collection and reporting takes longer than expected, what 
factors contribute to this? 
▢ Difficult to access, please explain further 
▢ Lack of staff   
▢ Insufficiently trained staff  
▢ Delays in patient testing  
▢ Delays in laboratory tests  
▢ High volume of PAEDS-appropriate patients  
▢ High patient load in flu season  
▢ Unsure 
▢ Other, please specify  
 
The following questions are regarding the DATA QUALITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q9.1 How satisfied are you with the reliability of data reported by PAEDS? 
o Very satisfied   
o Satisfied   
o Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
o Dissatisfied  
o Very dissatisfied   
o Unsure   
 
Q9.2 If you answered 'Very dissatisfied' or 'Dissatisfied' please explain your response. 
 
Additional comments: 
 
Q10.1 In your opinion, what are the strengths of PAEDS? 
 
Q10.2 In your opinion, what are the limitations of PAEDS? 
 
Q10.3 In your opinion, how could PAEDS be improved? 
 
Q10.4 Further comments? 
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Appendix 3. Participant questionnaire for PAEDS collaborators 
Welcome to the PAEDS Stakeholder Evaluation survey for PAEDS surveillance funders! 
As you are aware, the Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) system allows 
for the rapid collection of timely detailed clinical, vaccination and laboratory data of severe 
childhood conditions (listed below). 
PAEDS aims: 
- to actively collect detailed information that isn’t available from other surveillance 
systems, about children hospitalised with vaccine preventable diseases and potential 
adverse events following vaccination;  
- to inform vaccination policy and practice, including vaccine safety; and 
- to improve child health outcomes. 
PAEDS operates using dedicated surveillance nurses at each participating site who search 
through hospital admissions to identify cases for recruitment. 
PAEDS conditions under surveillance:  
Vaccine preventable disease 
(VPD) 
Adverse event following 
immunisation (AEFI) Other Condition 
Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) Intussusception Acute childhood encephalitis (ACE) 
Varicella zoster virus (VZV) Febrile seizures Invasive group A streptococcal (IGAS) disease 
Pertussis Severe acute neurological events (SANE) Kawasaki disease 
Pandemic influenza   Seasonal influenza   Invasive meningococcal disease 
(IMD)   
PAEDS currently operates at 7 sites in 6 states and territories which account for >75% of all 
admissions to hospitals providing specialist paediatric services in Australia; these sites are 
Children’s Hospital at Westmead in New South Wales, Royal Children’s Hospital and Monash 
Children’s Hospital in Victoria, Women’s & Children’s Hospital in South Australia, Princess 
Margaret Hospital for Children in Western Australia, Lady Cilento Children’s Hospital in 
Queensland and Royal Darwin Hospital in the Northern Territory. 
PAEDS contributes to academic research as well as public health policy and practice. Such 
activities include influenza reporting with FluCAN, AFP reporting as part of the national 
surveillance requirements for WHO's Global Polio Eradication Initiative, and identifying the risk 
of intussusception following rotavirus immunisation with RotaShield, amongst many other 
contributions. 
If you would like more information prior to completing the questionnaire, please visit the 
PAEDS website or search for the PAEDS annual reports published online in the Communicable 
Diseases Intelligence journal. 
We appreciate your honest input as we hope to make accurate conclusions and helpful 
recommendations for the benefit of PAEDS. Please allow 10-15 minutes to complete this 
questionnaire.  
If you have any questions please contact the Chief Investigator, Julia Maguire, at 
Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au or 02 9845 0191. 
Do you agree to participate?  
o Yes 
o No 
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The following questions are regarding GENERAL aspects of PAEDS: 
 
Q1.1 In which jurisdiction are you based? 
o Australian Capital Territory   
o New South Wales 
o Northern Territory   
o Queensland  
o South Australia 
o Tasmania  
o Victoria 
o Western Australia   
 
Q1.2 How would you rate the importance of each aim/objective of PAEDS? 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important Unsure 
Provide high quality, 
real-time data on 
selected serious 
childhood 
conditions obtained 
through active 
surveillance, in 
particular on VPDs 
and serious AEFI  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Describe longer 
term clinical 
outcomes of 
children who 
present, or are 
admitted to hospital 
with any of the 
PAEDS conditions  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Identify pathological 
agents or other key 
laboratory markers 
that contribute to 
disease severity and 
vaccine effectiveness 
in the PAEDS 
conditions 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Improve knowledge 
around the social 
determinants of 
childhood disease 
and vaccination  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q1.3 If you answered 'Not at all important' or 'Slightly important' please explain your 
response. 
 
Q1.4 Do you think there are any other aims/objectives that PAEDS could or should be trying 
to achieve? 
o Yes  
o No  
o Unsure  
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Q1.5 Please list these additional aims/objectives and provide reasoning. 
 
The following questions are regarding the USEFULNESS of PAEDS: 
 
Q2.1 How would you rate the overall usefulness of the PAEDS system? 
o Extremely useful   
o Very useful  
o Moderately useful  
o Slightly useful  
o Not at all useful  
o Unsure 
 
Q2.2 Please explain your response. 
 
Q2.3 What gaps does PAEDS fill that are not filled by any other surveillance systems in 
Australia? Please explain your response 
 
Q2.4 Do you use the PAEDS data and/or reports? 
o Yes  
o No   
o Unsure   
 
Q2.5 Which PAEDS data and/or reports do you use? Please select all that apply. 
▢ PAEDS Annual Report   
▢ PAEDS monthly reports  
▢ PAEDS newsletters   
▢ PAEDS conference presentations   
▢ Journal articles relating to PAEDS   
▢ Ad hoc data requests  
▢ PAEDS website  
▢ Other, please specify  
▢ I do not use PAEDS data or reports  
 
Q2.6 What do you use these data and/or reports for? Please select all that apply. 
▢ PAEDS related research   
▢ Non-PAEDS-related research  
▢ Conference presentations  
▢ To respond to media inquiries  
▢ Develop briefings  
▢ General interest   
▢ Other, please specify   
▢ I do not use PAEDS data or reports 
 
Q2.7 Has your use of PAEDS data or reports led to any public health action? 
o Yes   
o No  
o Unsure  
 
Q2.8 If yes, why and if no, why not? Please provide details. 
 
Q2.9 Has your use of PAEDS data or reports led to any public health policy changes? 
o Yes   
o No  
o Unsure  
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Q2.10 If yes, why and if no, why not? Please provide details. 
 
Q2.11 What are the problems or barriers in accessing or using PAEDS data or reports? Please 
select all that apply. 
▢ Difficult to access, please explain further 
▢ Data or reports not relevant to my work, please explain further  
▢ Unaware of resources available, please explain further  
▢ Unavailability of timely reports, please explain further 
▢ Other, please specify   
▢ There are not any problems or barriers in accessing or using PAEDS data or reports 
 
Q2.12 What do you suggest could improve the usefulness of the PAEDS system? 
 
Q2.13 Please provide any feedback, comments or suggestions regarding PAEDS data and/or 
reports. 
 
The following questions are regarding the ACCEPTABILITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q3.1 Please rate your view on the importance of the PAEDS system as a whole. 
o Extremely important  
o Very important  
o Moderately important  
o Slightly important  
o Not at all important   
o Unsure 
 
Q3.2 Please explain your response. 
 
Q3.3 Please rate your view on the importance of the vaccine preventable diseases (VPDs) 
included in PAEDS. 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important  Unsure 
Acute flaccid 
paralysis (AFP) o  o  o  o  o  o  
Varicella zoster 
virus  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Pertussis  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Pandemic influenza  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Seasonal influenza o  o  o  o  o  o  
Invasive 
meningococcal 
disease (IMD) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Q3.4 Please rate your view on the importance of the adverse events following immunisation 
(AEFI) included in PAEDS. 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important  Unsure 
Intussusception o  o  o  o  o  o  
Febrile seizures o  o  o  o  o  o  
Severe acute 
neurological events 
(SANE) e.g. Guillain-
Barré Syndrome 
(GBS), Transverse 
Myelitis and Acute 
Disseminated 
Encephalomyelitis 
(ADEM) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q3.5 Please rate your view on the importance of the other conditions included in PAEDS. 
 Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not at all 
important  Unsure 
Acute childhood 
encephalitis (ACE) o  o  o  o  o  o  
Invasive group A 
streptococcal 
(IGAS) disease 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Kawasaki disease o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q3.6 Do you think participating in PAEDS is a good use of your time? 
o Definitely yes   
o Probably yes   
o Might or might not   
o Probably not   
o Definitely not   
 
Q3.7 If you answered 'Definitely not' or 'Probably not' please explain your response. 
 
The following questions are regarding the STABILITY of PAEDS: 
 
Q4.1 In your opinion, how would you rate the stability of the PAEDS system as a whole? 
o Very stable  
o Stable  
o Neither stable nor unstable  
o Unstable  
o Very unstable  
o Unsure   
 
Q4.2 If you answered 'Very unstable' or 'Unstable' please explain your response. 
 
Q4.3 Do you believe that PAEDS is currently adequately resourced, in terms of staff, training 
and other resources? 
o Yes  
o No  
o Unsure  
Q4.4 Please explain your response. 
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The following questions are regarding the TIMELINESS of PAEDS: 
 
Q5.1 In your opinion, does PAEDS provide timely information regarding PAEDS conditions 
that is not otherwise available? 
o Yes  
o No   
o Unsure   
 
Q5.2 Please explain your response. 
 
Additional comments: 
 
Q6.1 In your opinion, what are the strengths of PAEDS? 
 
Q6.2 In your opinion, what are the limitations of PAEDS? 
 
Q6.3 In your opinion, how could PAEDS be improved? 
 
Q6.4 Further comments? 
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Appendix 4. Participant information sheet 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Non-Interventional Study 
National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance 
The Australian National University 
Title 10 years of PAEDS – Paediatric Active Enhanced 
Disease Surveillance 
Principal Investigator Ms Julia Maguire 
Associate Investigators 
 
Associate Professor Kathryn Glass 
Dr Helen Quinn 
Dr Aditi Dey 
Ms Jocelynne McRae 
Professor Kristine Macartney 
 
Researcher:  
My name is Julia Maguire. I am a Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) scholar 
at the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health (NCEPH) at the Australian 
National University (ANU). I am currently on a field placement at the National Centre for 
Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS). This research is being conducted by study 
investigators located at NCIRS in Westmead, NSW. 
Part 1  About the project 
1 Introduction 
You are invited to take part in this research project to evaluate the Paediatric Active Enhanced 
Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) system. This will be the first whole system evaluation of PAEDS 
which will involve collecting stakeholder views via a questionnaire and analysing hospital 
surveillance, clinical and vaccination data. We are contacting you, as a stakeholder, to provide 
feedback on PAEDS. 
This Participant Information Sheet tells you about the research project. It explains the 
questionnaire and research involved. Knowing what is involved will help you decide if you want 
to take part in the research. 
Please read this information carefully. Ask questions about anything that you don’t understand 
or want to know more about regarding the study by contacting the chief investigator, Ms Julia 
Maguire at Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au.  
2  What is the purpose of this research? 
The research project aims to evaluate the extent PAEDS is achieving its aim and its overall 
performance as a public health surveillance system.  
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Part 2  Participant Involvement 
3 What does participation in this research involve? 
Participation in this study involves completing a 15 minute questionnaire, providing 
information regarding you experiences and opinions regarding PAEDS. You can complete this 
short questionnaire online via the link in the invitation email or via telephone or face-to-face if 
you prefer. We will ask for your consent to participate in this study via a tick box at the 
beginning of the questionnaire.  
There are no costs associated with participating in this research project, nor will you be paid 
for participating. 
4 What do I have to do? 
Along with this information sheet you have been sent an email with a link to the online survey 
for your completion. This questionnaire will require up to 15 minutes of your time.  
If you have any difficulties with the online questionnaire, one of our friendly research team is 
able to phone you at your convenience to complete the questionnaire. To complete the 
questionnaire by phone, please email Ms Julia Maguire at Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au 
with your contact details and preferred time of call, or phone Julia on (02)98450191 during 
business hours. 
5 Do I have to take part in this research project?  
Participation is voluntary. If you do not wish to take part, you do not have to. If you commence 
the questionnaire, you are free to withdraw before submitting. Once the survey is submitted 
you will be unable to withdraw from the study since all responses will be anonymous. 
Your decision whether to take part or not will not affect your relationship with PAEDS, NCIRS 
or any other affiliations you have.  
If you decide you want to take part in the research project and provide consent you are telling 
us that you: 
• Understand what you have read in this information sheet 
• Agree to complete the questionnaire 
• Agree that we can use the information you provide for the purposes of this study 
6 What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Your participation will help ensure the quality of this study, making its results as robust as 
possible. The results from this study will provide recommendations for the improvement of 
PAEDS hence strengthening the usefulness of the system and the surveillance of childhood 
diseases in Australia. 
7 What are the possible risks and disadvantages of taking part? 
There are no risks to you from participation in this study, however if you feel uncomfortable 
with any questions you are free not to answer. There is no risk of being personally identified 
from your questionnaire responses. 
Privacy Notice: 
In collecting your personal information within this research, the ANU must comply with the 
Privacy Act 1988. The ANU Privacy Policy is available at 
https://policies.anu.edu.au/ppl/document/ANUP_010007. It contains information about how 
a person can: 
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• Access or seek correction to their personal information; 
• Complain about a breach of an Australian Privacy Principle by ANU, and how ANU will 
handle the complaint. 
8 What if I withdraw from this research project? 
Once completing the questionnaire you will be unable to withdraw from the study due the 
anonymity of the responses. However if you begin the questionnaire and then choose not to 
complete the questionnaire, there are no consequences to you from withdrawing from the 
study. 
 9 What happens when the research project ends? 
This study does not require follow-up with study participants. The findings of the study will be 
collated into a summary report that will be distributed to all participants. 
Part 3  How is the research project being conducted? 
10 What will happen to information about me? 
Information provided by you in the questionnaire will only be used for the purposes of this 
study. All information will remain anonymous and only the study investigators will have access 
to the responses. All information will be securely stored until its destruction 5 years after study 
completion. No individual will be identified in any reports of the results of this study, including 
in any journal articles or conference presentations. 
11 Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research project is being conducted by Ms Julia Maguire in her capacity as a Master of 
Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology student at ANU, and her colleagues and supervisors at 
NCIRS and ANU. The study is not grant funded. 
12 Who has reviewed the research project?  
This study has been approved by National Mutual Acceptance (HREC/18/SCHN/72) and the 
Australian National University (2017/909). This project will be carried out according to the 
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). This statement has been 
developed to protect the interests of people who agree to participate in human research 
studies. 
13 Further information and who to contact 
If you want any further information concerning this project you can contact the chief 
investigator, Ms Julia Maguire, on (02)98450191 or Julia.Maguire@health.nsw.gov.au. 
Ethics Committee Clearance: 
The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee (2017/909). If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has 
been conducted, please contact: 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: +61 2 6125 3427 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
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Appendix 5. PAEDS condition recruitment: network summary 
CHW – Children’s Hospital at Westmead, MCH – Monash Children’s Hospital, NSW – New South Wales, NT – Northern Territory, PCH – Perth Children’s Hospital, Qld – Queensland, 
QCH – Queensland Children’s Hospital (Queensland), RCH – Royal Children’s Hospital, RDH – Royal Darwin Hospital, SA – South Australia, Vic – Victoria, WA – Western Australia, 
WCH – Women’s and Children’s Hospital. 
 
 
 
 
Paediatric Active 
Enhanced Disease 
Surveillance sites 
Condition Recruitment Commencement Date 
HOSPITAL STATE Acute flaccid paralysis 
Acute 
childhood 
encephalitis 
Influenza 
Invasive 
group A 
streptococcal 
disease 
Invasive 
meningococcal 
disease 
Intussusception Pertussis 
Pertussis 
vaccine 
effectiveness 
Varicella 
zoster virus 
Social 
research 
CHW NSW 1-Aug-07 1-May-13 7-Apr-14 1-Jul-17 1-Jul-17 1-Aug-07 1-Jan-12 1-Jul-17 1-Aug-07 1-Jul-16 
RCH Vic 1-Aug-07 1-May-13 3-Apr-18 1-Jul-17 1-Jul-17 1-Aug-07 1-Jan-12 1-Jul-17 1-Aug-07 1-Jul-16 
WCH SA 1-Aug-07 1-May-13 3-Apr-17 1-Jul-17 1-Jul-17 1-Aug-07 1-Jan-12 1-Jul-17 1-Aug-07 1-Jul-16 
PCH WA 1-Aug-07 1-May-13 7-Apr-14 1-Jul-17 1-Jul-17 1-Aug-07 1-Jan-12 1-Jul-17 1-Aug-07  
QCH Qld 1-Jan-13 1-Jan-13 3-Apr-17 1-Jul-17 1-Jul-17 1-Jan-13 1-Jan-13 1-Jul-17 1-Jan-13  
RDH NT 1-Jul-16  1-Jul-16 1-Jul-16 1-Jul-16 1-Jul-16 1-Jul-16 1-Jul-16 1-Jul-16  
MCH Vic 13-Feb-18 13-Feb-18 1-Aug-17 13-Feb-18 13-Feb-18 13-Feb-18 13-Feb-18  13-Feb-18  
291 
Chapter 5  Evaluation of a Surveillance System 
292 
Appendix 6. ICD-10-AM code audit list (2018) used to evaluate PAEDS sensitivity  
PAEDS 
condition 
Hospital condition ICD-10-AM code 
ACE Tuberculous meningoencephalitis A17.82 
 Central nervous system syphilis A50.42, A50.49, A52.14 
 Subacute sclerosing panencephalitis, Creutzfeldt-
Jakob Disease 
A81.1, A81.9 
 Rabies A82.0, A82.1, A82.9 
 Mosquito borne encephalitides A83.x 
 Tick borne encephalitides A84.x 
 Viral encephalitides A85.0, A85.1, A85.2, 
A85.8 
 Unspecified viral encephalitis A86 
 Other specified viral infection central nervous 
system 
A88.8 
 Unspecified viral infection central nervous system A89 
 West Nile A92.3 
 Herpes simplex virus B00.4 
 Varicella Encephalitis/Encephalomyelitis B01.1, B01.11 
 Zoster Encephalitis B02.0 
 Human herpes virus-6, other herpes viral B10.0, B10.01, B10.09 
 Measles encephalitis/Encephalomyelitis B05.0 
 Human immunodeficiency virus B20 
 Mumps encephalitis B26.2 
 Cryptococcal B45.1 
 Chagas B57.42 
 Toxoplasma meningoencephalitis B58.2 
 Amoebic meningoencephalitis B60.11, B60.2 
 Sequelae of viral encephalitis B94.1 
 Sequelae of infectious and parasitic disease B94.8 
 Acute disseminated encephalomyelitis, bacterial 
meningoencephalitis NOS, Acute necrotising 
encephalopathy, Other specified encephalitis, 
Encephalitis NOS 
G04.0, G04.2, G04.3, 
G04.8, G04.81, G04.9 
 Encephalitis/Encephalomyelitis in diseases 
classified elsewhere,  
G05, G05.3, G05.4 
 Encephalitis unspecified G93.4 
 Influenza encephalopathy J10.8, J11.8 
AFP Acute Poliomyelitis A80 
 Acute paralytic poliomyelitis, vaccine associated A80.0 
 Acute poliomyelitis, unspecified A80.9 
 Acute transverse myelitis  in demyelinating disease   
of central nervous system 
G37.3 
 Guillain-Barré Syndrome G61.0 
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 Other myositis M60.8 
IGAS Sepsis due to streptococcus, group A A40.0 
 Necrotizing fasciitis M72.6 
 Streptococcus, group A, as the cause of diseases 
classified to other chapters 
B95.0 
IMD Meningococcal infection (main category) A39 
 Meningococcal meningitis A39.0 
 Waterhouse-Friderichsen syndrome 
(meningococcal haemorrhagic adrenalitis or 
meningococcic adrenal syndrome) 
A39.1 
 Acute meningococcaemia A39.2 
 Chronic meningococcaemia A39.3 
 Meningococcaemia, unspecified A39.4 
 Meningococcal heart disease A39.5 
 Other meningococcal infections A39.8 
 Meningococcal infection, unspecified A39.9 
*ISS Intussusception K56.1 
*PSS Whooping cough due to Bordetella Pertussis A37.0 
 Whooping cough, unspecified A37.9 
VZV Varicella pneumonia B01.2 
 Varicella with other complications B01.8 
 Varicella without complication B01.9 
 Zoster ocular disease B02.3 
 Disseminated zoster B02.7 
 Zoster with complication  B02.8 
 Zoster without complication  B02.9 
*Require request for emergency department presentation codes in addition to inpatient codes. ACE – 
acute childhood encephalitis, AFP – acute flaccid paralysis, IGAS – invasive group A streptococcal 
disease, IMD – invasive meningococcal disease, ISS – intussusception, PSS – pertussis, VZV – varicella 
zoster virus. 
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Abbreviations 
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Deployment with the World Health Organization’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh 
Summary 
People of the Rohingya ethnic minority, originally from Myanmar, fled their home country due 
to the increased and substantiated threat of violence and death. This mass migration to the 
surrounding regions of Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, largely occurred in August 2017. As per the 
Bangladesh population census data from 2011, the total population of the Cox’s Bazar district 
was 2.4 million people. As of 1 November 2017, a total of 819,917 Forcibly Displaced Myanmar 
Nationals (FDMN) were living in the Cox’s Bazar district.1 The majority of the new arrivals were 
in the mega site of Kutupulong extension (429,000 people), with ten other camps varying in 
size from 10,000 to 50,000 people. This unprecedented and crowded situation severely 
compromised hygiene and sanitation practices in the settlements. An outbreak of diphtheria 
was identified in late 2017 and continued into 2018 with cases reported on the Early Warning, 
Alert and Response System (EWARS) (Figure 1, data as of 16 April 2018).2 
In response to the health needs that emerged among the FDMN, the World Health 
Organization South-East Asian Region - Bangladesh mobilised a team of 50 staff (with high 
turnover of staff) to the Cox’s Bazar field office in September 2017. Since then, the WHO Cox’s 
Bazar Emergency Office provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare and coordinated the health sector response across 120 partner organisations to 
ensure optimum access and level of health care services to the FDMN and the host 
Bangladeshi community. The WHO Cox’s Bazar Emergency Office had 21 international staff, 
eight national staff and ten drivers as of 18 February 2018.  
The overall goal of the WHO emergency response strategy was, and is continually, to reduce 
morbidity and mortality among the FDMN population in Cox’s Bazar by providing support to 
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, the Civil Surgeons Office, the Refugee Relief and 
Repatriation Commissioner’s Office, and to work in conjunction with sector partners, in 
particular those in the health sector. 
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Figure 1. Confirmed, probable and suspected diphtheria cases by epidemiological week, 
Cox’s Bazar, week 48 of 2017 (20/11/2017) to week 15 of 2018 (15/04/2018) My role 
I joined the Epidemiology Team in Cox’s Bazar on Wednesday 28 March 2018 (Figure 2). I was 
deployed via the Global Outbreak, Alert and Response Network, fulfilled the role of an 
epidemiologist for 3.5 weeks and departed Cox’s Bazar on Saturday 21 April 2018.  
The following is a summary of the activities in which I participated:  
• Update of the Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD) Preparedness and Response Plan 
An original AWD Preparedness and Response Plan was prepared by the WHO and 
disseminated to partners in November 2017. My role was to update this report to incorporate 
monsoon preparedness and the impending likelihood of an outbreak of severe AWD in the 
camps. I reviewed AWD Preparedness and Response Plans from countries who had previously 
experienced similar circumstances and used these to inform our Preparedness and Response 
Plan. I updated the population estimates and needs analysis regarding expected AWD case 
load and the requirement of supplies such as oral rehydration salts and cholera beds. I 
updated and expanded upon the preparedness and response strategies for the four different 
stages of a cholera outbreak; (a) AWD rates remain constant, (b) AWD rates escalate, (c) initial 
case of cholera is confirmed, and (d) multiple cases of cholera are confirmed.  
• Update of disease case report forms and case investigation forms  
I reviewed the case report forms and case investigation forms produced by other countries and 
organisations to inform the WHO’s forms. I updated the forms for acute watery diarrhoea, 
enteric fever and viral haemorrhagic fever which were added to EWARS for use by reporting 
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partners. Updating these forms aimed to enhance the efficiency, accuracy and relevancy of 
data collection, correlation, analysis and interpretation.  
• Diphtheria epidemiology analyses  
I performed weekly and ad hoc analyses of diphtheria epidemiology. I used data extracted 
from EWARS diphtheria case report forms. The cases were analysed by case classification 
(confirmed, probable or suspected), age, gender, vaccination status, treatment and mortality. 
These reports were disseminated and provided updates on the current status of diphtheria 
among FDMN. 
• Suspected cholera case investigation  
Following an Event Based Surveillance alert on EWARS of a suspected case of cholera, a field 
investigation was undertaken by a WHO colleague and me in collaboration with two field team 
members of Médicins Sans Frontières-Holland (an epidemiologist and a water, sanitation and 
hygiene [WASH] specialist). A household risk assessment, including WASH assessment and 
WASH promotion session with the household members, was conducted.  
In response to case reports of disease, such as suspected cholera, we regularly employed 
several of the ten steps of outbreak investigation. 
1. Determine existence of an outbreak – by liaising with the responding medical facility 
and examining recent trends in that facility. 
2. Confirm the diagnosis – by verifying the result of the rapid diagnostic test that had 
been immediately performed on presentation and then following up the confirmatory 
laboratory culture results; a positive culture result was considered essential in 
confirming a case of cholera. 
3. Define and count cases – by referring to the Acute Watery Diarrhoea Preparedness 
and Response Plan that describes the established definition of a confirmed cholera 
case and a cholera outbreak. 
4. Orient the data by time, place and person – by examining the information received on 
the EWARS case report form report and, if necessary, subsequently completing a case 
investigation form. 
5. Determine who is at risk – by visiting the household and conducting a field 
investigation and risk assessment of the water source, cooking facilities and latrine 
used by the affected patient and surrounding families. 
6. Develop and test hypotheses – for the transmission of infection based on the field 
investigation and risk assessment findings. 
7. Compare hypotheses with facts – by assessing the biological aspects of the infection 
and the likelihood of transmission and continued infection. 
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8. Plan a systematic study – this step was not often achieved due to the nature of the 
emergency situation in Cox’s Bazar and the constant infectious disease threats that 
required response. 
9. Prepare a written report – reports were submitted to the WHO epidemiology team 
lead and Incidence Manager following each field investigation and risk assessment. 
10. Execute control and prevention activities – follow steps described in the Acute Watery 
Diarrhoea Preparedness and Response Plan which I updated. 
 
• Acute watery diarrhoea cluster risk assessment  
Following an Event Based Surveillance alert on EWARS of a household cluster of four AWD 
cases (three children and one adult), a risk assessment was conducted by myself, two WHO 
colleagues (doctor/epidemiologist and WASH specialist) in collaboration with two field team 
members of the International Organization for Migration (outbreak response doctor and 
health promotion officer). A household risk assessment, including WASH assessment and a 
WASH promotion session with the household members, was conducted (Figure 3, Figure 4).  
• EWARS alert verification and follow-up  
Communicable disease alerts that are reported and notified on EWARS are verified by the 
Epidemiology Team. The process allows for efficient use of the early warning system, EWARS, 
for epidemic and pandemic-prone disease for early detection and response. When Event Based 
Surveillance alerts were reported, I, along with the team, verified the alerts by assessing the 
information provided by the reporting partner and following up by phone to obtain additional 
information as soon as possible. This can lead to a formal field investigation or risk assessment. 
In addition, Indicator Based Surveillance alerts were verified on a weekly basis as reporting 
partners reported their weekly cases of conditions at the end of each week via the EWARS 
weekly reporting form. These alerts are verified similarly to the Event Based Surveillance alerts 
with assessment of information provided and email or phone follow up if necessary.  
• Proportional morbidity analysis  
I conducted trend analysis of all Indicator Based Surveillance conditions reported using the 
EWARS weekly reporting form. I constructed an Excel spread sheet that could easily be 
updated with new data. The document visually displayed disease trends by age and gender, 
and provided the proportional morbidity of each condition of the overall disease case load, i.e. 
the proportion of mumps cases of all of the reported cases of all diseases in the population, to 
get an indication of the burden of mumps. This document is an additional tool to be used in 
disease surveillance within the FDMN community.  
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• Event Based Surveillance case report form on EWARS  
I updated and improved the Event Based Surveillance reporting form on EWARS to allow for 
enhanced disease reporting. This form is currently in use on EWARS.  
• Indicator Based Surveillance poster of case definitions for EWARS reporting  
I created a poster of case definitions of all Indicator Based Surveillance conditions to be used 
by EWARS reporting partners. This poster, along with the Event Based Surveillance equivalent, 
was in the process of being finalised for dissemination to reporting partners when I departed 
Bangladesh. These posters aim to increase knowledge regarding appropriate reporting of cases 
and improve the quality and accuracy of data collected through EWARS. 
  
Figure 2. The WHO Emergency Office in Cox’s Bazar 
 
Figure 3. A risk assessment of a household cluster of acute watery diarrhoea in Kutupalong 
Camp 5, 19 April 2018 
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Figure 4. A risk assessment of a household cluster of acute watery diarrhoea in Kutupalong 
Camp 5, 19 April 2018 
 
Figure 5. Epidemiology Team dinner Lessons learned 
This deployment was my first experience working in a humanitarian emergency situation and 
provided an invaluable experience for me, both professionally and personally. I learnt many 
things during my time in Cox’s Bazar; clinical and epidemiological knowledge of many 
communicable diseases, EWARS surveillance, the workings of a WHO Emergency Office, 
outbreak response in a refugee camp situation, and all of the associated complexities in terms 
of political, governmental and financial influences. I witnessed the impact of health 
organisations in a resource poor setting and the kindness of people during difficult and trying 
circumstances.  
A major limitation of emergency responses is the inevitable deficiencies of the workforce. 
Wherein people are deployed with potentially little previous contextual experience and are 
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only available for short deployments due to competing work commitments. For example, 
when I arrived, the Epidemiology Team did not have a Lead and the previous person in my role 
had already left. The resultant lack of handover, leadership and direction limited the work I 
was able to perform when I hit the ground. 
Myself and fellow Australian deployees, comprising alumni and current Master of Philosophy 
in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) scholars, published a perspectives piece regarding the 
emergency response in Cox’s Bazar in the first edition of the Global Biosecurity journal 
(Appendix 1).3 In this piece, we addressed the challenges of working in an emergency context 
as well as the value of collaborative efforts and capacity building, especially in a crisis that is 
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team leader (Figure 5), as well as the entire WHO Emergency Office team in Cox’s Bazar, 
especially the local and long-term staff who consistently do an amazing job. I hope to work 
with them again in the future. Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology core requirements 
This chapter is included in my bound volume to fulfil the requirements of the Master of 
Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology to: 
• Conduct or participate substantively in a field investigation of a potentially serious public 
health problem that requires a rapid public health response 
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Assisting the ‘Surveillance and Monitoring to Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis and Scabies from Samoa: SaMELFS Samoa’ study 
Summary 
Lymphatic filariasis (LF) is caused by Wuchereria bancrofti and Brugia species of helminth 
worms. The disease is transmitted by Aedes, Anopheles, Culex and Monsonia species of 
mosquito and an estimated 68 million people are infected worldwide; half of whom are 
microfilaemic (i.e. asymptomatic) and half of whom are disabled or suffering from one of the 
possible sequelae such as elephantiasis, lymphoedema or scrotal hydrocoeles.4,5 In Samoa, W. 
bancrofti is the filarial species causing disease and is transmitted by the Aedes and Culex 
mosquito vector, with Ae. polynesiensis as the primary vector species. 
In 2000, the World Health Organization launched the Global Programme to Eliminate 
Lymphatic Filariasis which aims to eliminate LF as a public health problem by 2020.6 The 
Surveillance and Monitoring to Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis and Scabies (SaMELFS) study is 
applied field research which aims to develop a monitoring and evaluation strategy to inform 
decisions to stop the use of triple drug mass drug administration for LF. This project is part of 
the Task Force for Global Health – Neglected Tropical Diseases Support Centre with funding 
from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the United States Agency for International 
Development and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development. 
The objective of the study is to develop a monitoring and evaluation strategy that enables 
Samoa’s LF elimination program to determine when the risk of ongoing transmission of LF has 
been reduced, so that mass drug administration using ivermectin, diethycarbamazine, and 
albendazole (IDA) can be stopped with little risk of resurgence of transmission. 
This study involves two mechanisms of testing the prevalence of LF antigen and antibodies in 
Samoa: a mosquito survey and a human survey. The mosquito survey involves capturing 
mosquitoes and the human survey involves collecting human blood and testing both for the LF 
parasite, as well as observing the prevalence of lymphoedema and scabies in affected 
individuals. Across Samoa, thirty villages were randomly selected to be surveyed plus, for the 
human survey only, five purposely-selected villages of suspected high transmission. In each 
village, households were randomly selected using detailed village maps; 15 households in the 
human survey and ten in the mosquito survey. 
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My involvement with this study was in the baseline prevalence survey of LF in mosquitoes, via 
molecular xenomonitoring. This baseline survey, along with the subsequent human baseline 
survey which was conducted in September-November 2018, will enable a comparison of the 
impact of IDA on LF transmission. We surveyed the same locations planned for the subsequent 
human survey with the hope that measuring the LF levels in the mosquitoes could be a more 
cost-effective and less invasive future strategy for monitoring LF in Samoa rather than 
additional human blood testing. My role 
I was contracted as an epidemiologist to assist in the mosquito survey of the SaMELFS study on 
the island of Upolu. I arrived in Apia, the Samoan capital, on Wednesday 18 July 2018 and 
departed two weeks later on Wednesday 1 August 2018.  
During my time in Apia, I worked closely with Dr Kei Owada, epidemiologist and team lead, and 
Dr Silvia Ciocchetta, entomologist. Unfortunately, only a few days after my arrival Silvia 
unexpectedly returned to Australia due to acquiring an injury while in Samoa. Prior to her 
departure it became necessary for Silvia to conduct a crash course in entomology for myself 
and Kei so that the processing of mosquitoes could resume in the absence of a trained 
entomologist. 
The schedule for the survey was as follows: we would survey 40 households in four villages per 
week. This was accomplished by two teams each visiting one village from Monday to 
Wednesday and a subsequent village from Thursday to Saturday (Figure 6). One team 
consisted of a team lead (myself or Kei), at least one Samoan Red Cross team member and one 
Samoan Ministry of Health representative between the two teams (Figure 7). At each visit we 
collected data via the Secure Data Kit phone application, a health data management tool, to 
input information such as GPS coordinates, time of collection and name of head of household 
which are later uploaded to a secure online system for analysis.7 
 
Figure 6. Weekly schedule for molecular xenomonitoring  
The first village visit occurs on the Monday or Thursday morning where a BG Sentinel Trap was 
set up at each household (Figure 8). This initial contact with the household provided an 
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opportunity for the Samoan Red Cross team member to discuss the study with the head of the 
household and gain permission to set the trap on their property. Once traps were set at all 
households we would travel back to the hotel in Apia.  
The subsequent village visits were for the purpose of mosquito collection. On the 
Monday/Thursday evening, the teams would head back out to the households and collect the 
net inside the trap, insert an empty net and replace the used battery with a charged battery. 
This step was repeated on Tuesday/Friday morning and evening. On Wednesday/Saturday 
morning the households were visited for the final time when the net was collected, and the 
trap was disassembled and removed from the household. Each mosquito collection process 
involved returning to the hotel in Apia with ten nets of trapped insects per team. These nets 
were placed into the freezer for at least 20 minutes to kill the insects and then the sorting 
process could begin.  
Once the mosquitoes were dead, Kei and I would begin the mosquito processing: emptying 
nets, disposing of non-mosquitoes, disposing of male mosquitoes and sorting mosquitoes by 
genus (Culex mosquitoes and Aedes mosquitoes) (Figure 9, Figure 10). Kei and I did not possess 
the required skills to further sort the Aedes mosquitoes by species so we stored them to be 
processed later by an entomologist who would count and separate these into groups of Ae. 
polynesiensis, Aedes (Finlaya), Ae. aegypti, Ae. albopictus, Ae. upolensis, Ae. vexans and other 
Aedes species. Since my departure from Samoa, an entomologist joined the study and 
reported that the Aedes mosquitoes sorted by Kei and myself were 99% accurate – an 
impressive effort by two epidemiologists! 
We counted and stored the Culex mosquitoes by household and collection time (morning or 
evening). Once the collection for the village was complete on either Wednesday or Saturday, 
the Culex mosquitoes were pooled into groups of a maximum 25 mosquitoes within each 
village where morning collections and evening collection were pooled separately. If a 
household did not have 25 Culex mosquitoes collected in the mornings then they would be 
mixed with Culex mosquitoes collected in the mornings of a nearby household – mosquitoes of 
a different genus, village or collection time (morning or evening) were never pooled together. 
Once the pools were complete, these mosquitoes were cooked in an oven so they could be 
safely stored before being sent overseas for testing to identify the LF antibodies and antigens 
in the mosquitoes. 
In addition to the bi-daily field visits and the mosquito processing, another major part of my 
role was preparing for the field visits. This involved determining the teams for the upcoming 
village visits, planning departure times, charging batteries for the traps, preparing the 
paperwork, charging field phones, refuelling vehicles, buying refreshments for the field and 
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packing the cars for the next collection with the required supplies and materials such as nets, 
torches and iceboxes.  
Dealing with the challenges of field work in this remote part of the world also became part of 
the job. On a daily basis we struggled with car maintenance and safety, and were forced to 
exchange the rental cars on several occasions, sometimes on the same day. I was fortunate to 
work closely with local Samoan people which came with some challenges due to cultural 
differences. I am used to working in an environment where a strict schedule is followed, but 
this is not a part of the Samoan lifestyle. As a result, there were many collections that started 
several hours after the agreed upon time. This conflict was resolved during my time in Samoa. 
Kei and I adapted to become more flexible with our schedule, and we explained to the team 
the reasoning for the planned times and the implications of starting late. The relaxed nature of 
the local Samoans is ingrained in their culture and is not something we tried or wished to 
change.  
I wrote a ‘Samoan Field Guide of Molecular Xenomonitoring for Non-Entomologists’ that will 
be edited and published at a later date. This guide will be used in future surveys of this study, 
planned to be performed in six and 18 months, and this guide will serve non-entomologists 
who wish to conduct similar studies. Anecdotally, field entomologists are rarer than field 
epidemiologists hence a guide helping epidemiologists to process mosquitoes could be useful. 
I remain involved with the study and its outputs. I performed data entry of the paper-based 
mosquito Pooling Form into the online Secure Data Kit system for the entomology survey. I will 
continue to contribute to related reports and publications. 
Figure 7. Planning village visit with the Samoan Ministry of Health and Red Cross team 
members 
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Figure 8. Setting a trap at a household 
Figure 9. Separating Aedes and Culex mosquitoes 
Figure 10. Our lab and hotel room 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Global Biosecurity publication 
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Prologue Preface 
Teaching is a core competency of the Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) 
program where scholars must lead a teaching session for their peers regarding an 
epidemiological concept they have come across during their placement, known as lessons from 
the field (LFF). This exercise gives scholars the opportunity to spread their knowledge and key 
learnings, and also to learn from several other scholars’ experiences. Second year MAE 
scholars must also conduct a teaching session for the first year MAE scholars regarding a 
practical topic of choice that may is not covered during the first courseblock. My role 
For teaching purposes, I was required to: 
• develop and conduct a LFF (Appendix 1); 
• participate in LFF conducted by fellow MAE scholars; 
• prepare a teaching exercise for the first year MAE scholars – Ethical Considerations in 
Study Participation (Appendix 2, Appendix 3) with fellow MAE scholars Kelley Méder, 
Kaitlyn Vette and Brigitta Osterberger; and 
• provide and receive evaluation of the LFF (Appendix 4) and the teaching exercise 
(Appendix 5). Acknowledgements  
I wish to acknowledge Associate Professor Katie Glass from the Australian National University 
for her assistance in approving these teaching exercises. 
I wish to thank my LFF group; Cushla Coffey, Bernadette Kenny, Charlee Law, Belinda Jones 
and, most of all, Jana Sisnowski for initiating our LFF group and organising the timetable and 
technology of the sessions. 
I wish to thank my MAE teaching group; Kelley Méder, Kaitlyn Vette and Brigitta Osterberger 
for their co-authoring of the teaching presentation and worksheet. In addition, I want to thank 
the MAE 2017 cohort for working together to effectively produce an informative, interactive 
and fun three hour teaching session for the first year MAE scholars.  Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology core requirements 
This chapter is included in my bound volume to fulfil the requirements of the Master of 
Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology to: 
• Complete a lesson from the field 
• Run a teaching session on an epidemiological topic 
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Lessons learned Lessons from the field 
I developed an LFF session, ‘Linked data analysis’, and participated in five LFF during the MAE, 
including: 
• Investigating cancer clusters (Belinda Jones – Hunter New England Local Health District) 
• Clinical epidemiology: preventative screening (Cushla Coffey – Health Protection Branch, 
Queensland Health) 
• Nginda MAE waala wiitha! (Throwing the MAE into the fire!): The implications of 
investigating disease with limited Indigeneity data (Charlee Law – Communicable Diseases 
Branch, Health Protection New South Wales) 
• Causal diagrams in epidemiological research (Jana Sisnowski – Kirby Institute, University 
of New South Wales) 
• Communication and documentation during outbreak investigation (Bernadette Kenny – 
Communicable Disease Control Branch and Prevention & Population Health Branch, South 
Australia Health) 
MAE scholars compiled interesting and thought-provoking exercises to teach each other about 
specific issues in applied epidemiology. I used lessons learnt from Charlee’s LFF in my own data 
linkage projects regarding Indigeneity data and missing data in general. These sessions 
provided an opportunity to learn skills that I was not exposed to during my MAE field 
placement, such as Belinda’s lesson on cancer clusters and Cushla’s clinical epidemiology 
session. 
My LFF aimed to teach my fellow MAE scholars about data linkage in research. We explored 
the use of linked data, ethical considerations in data linkage, various methods of linking data, 
as well as its strengths and limitations. I based the scenario on my data analysis project of 
rotavirus epidemiology in New South Wales where I linked notification, hospital admission and 
emergency presentation datasets. 
I found the process of writing a lesson plan for my peers quite challenging. I wanted to make 
sure it would be informative and comprehensive but not overwhelming. I am not an expert in 
data linkage so the process also increased my own knowledge and understanding of linking 
data and the potential uses for linked data analysis.  
The participating MAE scholars seemed to appreciate the lesson on data linkage. A number of 
them were planning to complete some sort of linked data analysis as part of their MAE core 
projects. They provided suggestions for possible applications of linked data that I had not 
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considered. We were able to have discussions regarding their specific projects and sort out 
data merge issues in Stata. We discussed thought provoking ethical issues associated with data 
linkage and the strict procedures in place to ensure data security.  
I provided feedback for each LFF and also received feedback. Comments included: 
• “Data linkage seems to be increasingly important in health research, so it was a great 
choice of topic for a LFF. I appreciated that the lesson took some time to also consider 
ethical and legal aspects of data linkage.” 
• “The parts about ethics and policy will definitely inform any future ethics applications that 
I may be involved in.” 
• “This LFF would have been extremely useful prior to my previous project. It strengthened 
my existing understanding of data linkage and provided important additional knowledge. I 
revisited the notes and Julia’s LFF recently while I was linking data relating to capillary 
blood lead levels. The LFF was useful in planning and justifying methodical linkage.” 
• “It was useful to consider ethical implications as this is something that is often 
overlooked.” 
• “I really liked the practical part of the session with the chance to practice skills.” 
• “Julia was good at explaining concepts and presented the LFF in a clear logical manner.” 
• “We had the opportunity to learn and understand Stata coding for linking datasets.”  
• “A well organised and clearly presented LFF.” First year MAE teaching 
The 2017 MAE cohort prepared a teaching session for the 2018 MAE cohort. The sessions 
included: 
• Communication as a field epi during public health emergencies (Patiyan Andersson, 
Aurysia Hii, Sophie Phelan and Ximena Tolosa) 
• Writing tips (Roxy Jones, Bernadette Kenny, Natalie Strobel and Gabi Willis) 
• Evaluating complex public health interventions (Cushla Coffey, Bobby Maher and Jana 
Sisnowski) 
• Ethical considerations in study participation (Kelley Méder, Brigitta Osterberger, Kaitlyn 
Vette and myself) 
• MAE17 Hot Tips (2017 MAE cohort) 
• ‘Pub Quiz’ (2017 MAE cohort) 
I made and disseminated a Survey Monkey questionnaire to evaluate the teaching sessions. 
This survey asked participants, first and second year MAE scholars, to evaluate the format, 
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presenter’s style and content of each group’s session. These questions were Likert-style with 
rankings from ‘not of use’ to ‘highly useful’. There were additional free text questions seeking 
comments on lessons learnt, suggestions for improvement and whether they felt the sessions 
were successfully interactive. 
Evaluation comments of our group session and the overall teaching session included: 
• “Great to get some practical tips based on the second year's experiences.” 
• “I really liked all the hands-on activities, and that the information wasn't provided during 
course block and came from experience.” 
• “…I think everyone was able to interact and it looked like everyone got involved.”  
• “Sessions were very interactive which I think…encourage and enhance learning.” 
Table 1. Evaluation responses to our teaching session, ‘Ethical considerations in study 
participation’  
My group’s lesson and the overall session received favourable feedback (Table 1). Over 80% of 
responding participants indicated that our group teaching session was either ‘useful’ or ‘highly 
useful’ in each evaluation category. Summary 
I appreciated the opportunity to learn and improve my teaching skills, in addition to learning 
additional epidemiological skills, throughout the teaching requirements of the MAE. 
 
The 2017 MAE cohort at the 2018 February-March courseblock 
 
Responses Highly useful Useful Neutral 
Format of session 
Presenter’s style 
Session content 
10 (37%) 
10 (37%) 
11 (40.5%) 
13 (48%) 
12 (44%) 
11 (40.5%) 
4 (15%) 
5 (19%) 
5 (19%) 
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Appendices Appendix 1. Lesson from the field including suggested answers 
Lessons from the Field 
Linked Data Analysis 
Julia Maguire 
7 March 2018 Instructions 
In this LFF we will work through a case study to look at some of the aspects of undertaking 
linked data analysis and consider some of the different concepts, uses, ethical implications and 
limitations of linking data. 
Please note this scenario is based on one of my current projects but the data have been made 
up for the purpose of this exercise.  
There are four readings which you may find useful for this LFF that are attached to the email.   
Suggested readings:  
1. B. Sibthorpe et al. Record linkage in Australian epidemiological research: health benefits, 
privacy safeguards and future potential. This paper is a bit old but the theory is still 
applicable. 
2. LinkageWiz Software. Overview of Record Linkage Techniques. 
Pages 1-4 
3. Methodology: Data Linkage. 
Pages 1-3 
4. Kelman CW, Bass AJ and Holman CDJ. Research use of linked health data – a best practice 
protocol. 2002. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health. 26:3;251-255.  
Page 2, paragraph 2 
There are 3 Stata data files you will use in this LFF:  
• LFF_Dataset1_Notifications.dta 
• LFF_Dataset2_Hospitalisations.dta 
• LFF_Dataset3_Linked.dta  
Learning objectives 
At the end of this exercise, participants should be able to understand: 
• the basic concepts of data linkage 
• the different methods of data linkage 
• the ethical issues associated with data linkage 
• the steps in data linkage 
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You are the new MAE working in a top secret vaccine preventable disease research 
organisation, let’s call it NCIRS. Following a dramatic rise in rotavirus notifications, the 
Director has tasked you with investigating the re-emergence of this common vaccine 
preventable disease (VPD) in NSW. 
The situation is as follows: 
NSW experienced a higher than usual number of rotavirus notifications in 2017. Notifications 
peaked in September with over 3 times the average for September 2012–2016. The cause of 
the recent surge of notifications in NSW is undetermined and the epidemiology of the 
outbreak needs to be characterised. General demographic information is required as well as 
any information on disease severity and potential risk factors. 
After consultation with your experienced colleagues, you decide that a number of datasets are 
required and that a linked data analysis is the best way forward in order to thoroughly assess 
the outbreak. 
Your role in this is to: 
• Think about what datasets are required 
• Assess and avoid ethical issues associated with data linkage 
• Link two datasets 
• Critique a linked dataset 
Part 1:  Data preparation for linkage 
1) Why are you conducting linked data analysis? I.e. what are the advantages of linking 
data? 
We will make use of already collected administrative data to describe the outbreak at a 
population level and for sub-groups such as children. By using linked data, we will be able to 
identify risk factors for disease and the potential underperformance of immunisation 
programs. 
2) What datasets would you use in this analysis or, if you can’t specifically name them, 
what variables would you like to include? 
Note that this specific analysis is focusing on a disease almost only seen in children. 
Databases: 
• Hospital Admitted Patient Data Collection 
• Emergency Department Data Collection 
• Any others that you see a need for 
Variables: 
• Any identified risk factors: comorbidities, DOB, place of birth/residence, sex, age, 
Aboriginality, maternal smoking status, SES, birth weight, gestational age, parity, date 
of rotavirus notification, vaccine type, date of hospital admission/presentation, length 
of stay, diagnoses, presenting problems, death outcome 
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3) What are common variables to link the data on? 
ID, name, DOB, sex 
4) What factors do you need to consider when researching vaccine preventable 
diseases, in particular? 
Vaccine schedule: number of doses, age at dose, changes to vaccine schedule over years, 
changes to vaccine used. 
5) What are the ethical issues with data linkage? And what policies/processes are in 
place to minimise these potential problems? When wouldn’t it be ethical to link 
data? 
Reading #1: B. Sibthorpe et al. Record linkage in Australian epidemiological research: health 
benefits, privacy safeguards and future potential. 
We do not seek consent from the individuals in the datasets so they are essentially unaware 
that their personal information is being used for these purposes. We must ensure the research 
is beneficial and the data are not being misused. 
The Privacy Act – “a record keeper shall not disclose personal information about an individual 
to another person, body or agency, unless the individual concerned knows that the 
information is usually passed to that person, body or agency (clause A), the individual has 
consented to the disclosure (clause B), or the record keeper believes the disclosure is 
necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent danger to life or health (clause C).” 
The Privacy Act – “the Privacy Commissioner can approve record linkage by Commonwealth 
agencies if satisfied that the public interest in an agency disclosing information ‘outweighs to a 
substantial degree’ the public interest in privacy. Second, information can be released for 
medical research conducted outside a Commonwealth agency under particular conditions.” 
(Note that the word ‘substantial’ is very open to interpretation). 
The data are de-identified to reduce the possibility of personal health data being exposed. 
There are many data protection Acts and Policies in place to protect the privacy of the public. 
Data linkage projects go through many ethical reviews where the number of people with 
access to the data is very limited. There are data managers such as the Centre for Health 
Record Linkage (CHeReL) and the Secure Unified Research Environment (SURE) and data 
custodians such as the researchers, which are separate entities, to remove the possibility of 
personal identification.  
Data that I have used for another data linkage project is through a SURE virtual workspace that 
I log onto with a long password and another password that changes every 30 seconds. I cannot 
access the internet from this workspace and I cannot copy anything from the workspace onto 
documents outside of the workspace such as email. I also completed SURE training before 
getting access to the data. 
It would not be ethical to link data in small community analyses where a small amount of data 
could identify a patient even if the data are de-identified. It would not be ethical to link data 
when it is used to increase stigmatism of a minority group. 
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Part 2: Data linkage 
You have considered the ethical aspects of data linkage and it is now time to look into how you 
will actually link the datasets. You investigate the different linkage methodologies and 
construct a descriptive table that will help you decide which method to choose as well as 
including words that frequently emerge during your data linkage research 
Reading #2: LinkageWiz Software. Overview of Record Linkage Techniques 
Reading #3: Methodology: Data Linkage. 
1) Please fill out the table below of data linkage terms and identify variables which 
relate to that term. 
Term Brief description Advantages Disadvantages  Variables 
Deterministic 
record 
linkage 
Exact matching of 
unique identifiers 
where identifiers 
must match 
perfectly 
- Simple 
- High 
specificity, i.e. 
should have a 
very high 
proportion of 
true positives 
- Works well for 
unique 
identifiers (i.e. 
numbers) 
- Does not work 
well for non-
unique 
identifiers such 
as name or DOB 
- Does not deal 
well with data 
errors 
- Requires 
variables that 
may not always 
be available 
- Requires high 
quality data that 
is stable 
overtime 
Driver’s 
license 
number, 
Medicare 
number 
Probabilistic 
record 
linkage 
Mathematical 
probabilities and 
weighting is used to 
assess record 
agreement for 
linkage 
- Deals well 
with errors 
such as 
incomplete or 
misspelt data 
and allows for 
partial 
matching 
- Can be used 
when limited 
identifying 
data are 
available 
- Can use more 
readily 
available 
variables 
- Can adjust the 
true linkage 
threshold to 
suit your 
needs 
- Complicated 
- There are no 
hard and fast 
rules for 
agreement 
threshold  
- Higher chance of 
false positives 
and false 
negatives. A give 
and take is 
required when 
determining true 
linkage 
threshold. 
- Can require 
manual review 
Name, DOB 
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Term  Brief description Variable 
Blocking Uses generally reliable variables that usually match well. At 
least one blocking variable must match exactly for the 
records to move on the next step in data linkage.  
 
This is the first step in the linkage process. Fields are chosen 
that have a high level of uniqueness and the computer runs 
this process looking at a match between a record in dataset 
1 and a record in dataset 2 by considering if there is a match 
in at least one of the blocking fields you have chosen. If there 
is then they are marked as a YES (=possible match between 
datasets) and if not they are marked immediately as a NO (= 
non-match). Only those records that are marked YES at this 
stage continue through to matching. 
Last name, 
DOB 
Matching After blocking, matching variables are compared and the 
likelihood of the records being for the same person is 
assessed and scores are attributed (1 for agreement and 0 
for disagreement). These scores are weighted and total 
agreement is measured to determine an overall weighted 
agreement score. 
 
Matching occurs in a two-step process to increase the 
validity of matches and non-matches and to decrease the 
time and computer power needed to link large data sets. 
 
In this step fields are also chosen that have a high level of 
uniqueness but are considered in combination. Based on the 
level of similarity between a record and a potential match it 
is scored on its probability of being a match. These records 
are then considered a definite or possible match based on 
the pre-defined cut off score. As the cut off score increases 
so does the specificity of the linkage but also the possibility 
of false-negatives. Conversely as the cut-off is lowered the 
sensitivity increases along with the possibility of false-
positives. Possible matches are reviewed manually to decide 
if they are a match or not. 
Last name, 
first name, 
middle 
name, sex, 
DOB, 
address 
True linkage 
threshold 
Cut-off score for matching records; above the score the 
records are linked and below the score the records are not 
linked. 
N/A 
At NSW Health, the notification dataset and the hospitalisation dataset share a unique 
person identifier (the variable ID in your supplied datasets). I.e. a person has the same ID in 
the notification dataset as in the hospitalisation dataset. This reduces the common linkage 
errors associated with misspelled names and incorrect data entry.  
In order to test your newly learned methodologies, you begin your analysis by 
deterministically linking the two attached datasets (Dataset 1 - Notification and Dataset 2 - 
Hospitalisation). You are aiming to match the rotavirus notification to the relevant 
hospitalisation, as well as pick up any rotavirus cases that were hospitalised (ICD-10 coded as 
rotavirus) but may not have been notified. 
Using Stata, link the two datasets LFF_Dataset1_Notifications.dta and 
LFF_Dataset2_Hospitalisations.dta by deterministic record linkage.  
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Use the commands:  
use "LFF_Dataset1_Notifications.dta" 
merge 1:m ID using "LFF_Dataset2_Hospitalisations.dta"  
Note: you will have to type in the actual location of the dataset within your own computer 
such as “C:\LFF\6. Julia\LFF_Dataset2_Hospitalisations.dta". 
2)  
a. Describe the code. 
The notification dataset is the primary dataset (1) and the hospitalisation dataset is the 
secondary dataset (many). 1:m refers to the one notification to many hospitalisations link. We 
were linking on the exact matches of ID number. 
b. Describe the linkage output in the table below (in terms of how the data linked 
rather than a description of the data). 
c. For the purpose of our study, would you say the linked data are ready for analysis? 
Why/why not? 
This link did not work that well and as a result there are a number of duplications and 
unrelated hospitalisation records (i.e. not related to the rotavirus notification or an in-hospital 
rotavirus diagnosis). 
d. What would you do differently to link the datasets?  
If you feel capable, please include any Stata code you would use to more effectively 
link the datasets. 
Looking for ideas from MAEs 
- Could link on date such as date of rotavirus hospitalisation is within a certain time period 
of the rotavirus notification (E.g. onset date – 7 days to onset date + 7 days). This should 
eliminate the irrelevant hospitalisation records. 
- Could limit to hospitalisation records that have rotavirus as the primary diagnosis (but 
what about secondary diagnoses?) plus all notifications. That way you will have all linked 
records of cases with a rotavirus notification and rotavirus hospitalisation, all rotavirus 
notifications without a hospitalisation and all rotavirus hospitalisations without a 
notification. In addition, you will have discarded all ID links of hospitalisations that were 
not related to the rotavirus notification.  
//I chose to link the records based on date proximity - A rotavirus 
notification that falls between the hospitalisation date minus seven 
days and the hospitalisation date minus seven days. This time frame is 
an arbitrary period I thought would capture a related rotavirus 
notification. 
Result Number Description 
Matched 55 There are many hospitalisation records that are not related to the 
rotavirus notification where the timing of the hospital admission is 
months/years from the notification date – clearly not a related hospital 
stay.  
Not matched 9 There were 9 hospitalisation records that did not match to a notification 
record. We still need to keep these records since they represent 
rotavirus diagnosis that was not notified. 
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//Creating new variable of hospital onset date + 7 days (need date 
variables in the same format)  
gen long hosponset_add7 = date(dateofhospitaladmission, "DMY") 
format hosponset_add7 %td 
replace hosponset_add7 = hosponset_add7+7 
//Creating new variable of hospital onset date - 7 days (need date 
variables in the same format) 
gen long hosponset_less7 = date(dateofhospitaladmission, "DMY") 
format hosponset_less7 %td 
replace hosponset_less7 = hosponset_less7-7 
//Need date variables in the same format 
gen long onsetdateNEW = date(dateofonset, "DMY") 
format onsetdateNEW %td 
//We want to see if the rotavirus onset date is around the hospital 
admission date by creating a flag variable that is ‘1’ if the 
hospitalisation date minus 7 days is less than or equal to the 
rotavirus onset date, and creating a flag variable that is ‘1’ if the 
hospitalisation date plus 7 days is more than or equal to the 
rotavirus onset date 
 
 
gen keep1=1 if hosponset_less7<=onsetdateNEW 
gen keep2=1 if hosponset_add7>=onsetdateNEW 
//The rotavirus onset date is around the hospital admission date if 
both of these flags are equal to ‘1’, so I create another flag that is 
‘1’ if both the previously made flags are ‘1’ 
gen MATCH=1 if keep1==1 & keep2==1 
//Therefore the correct match is all records where the rotavirus onset 
date is within 14 days of hospital admission. We also need to keep the 
records of notifications who were not admitted to hospital 
keep if MATCH==1 | PrimaryDiagnosis=="Rotavirus" 
Part 3: Linked data analysis 
Now that you know the basics of data linkage you may be able to apply it to your own work. 
1) Can you think of a project at your placement where data linkage would be useful? 
Describe the project including potential databases and why linking data would be 
beneficial? 
MAE scholars will answer this question in order to get them to think about the possibilities of 
data linkage. 
Hospitalisation date – 7 days Hospitalisation date + 7 days Onset date 
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Appendix 2. Teaching presentation slides 
Ethical Considerations in 
Study Participation:
What YOU need to KNOW! 
Brigitta Osterberger
Julia Maguire
Kaitlyn Vette
Kelley Meder
 
2
Learning Outcomes
• To understand:
o the need for a participation information sheet
o the ethical considerations when producing a participant 
information sheet
o what voluntary participation involves
o the difference between confidentiality and anonymity 
o the implications of participant withdrawal
• To be able to identify misleading information in a participant 
information sheet and ways to improve it
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Overview
3
• Participant Information Sheets - inform your participants!
• Considerations for a Participant Information Sheet:
o Clear, easy to understand, transparent!
o Comprehensive
o Purpose, methodology, benefits, result distribution, risks 
and implications
• Key for ethical approval
 
Confidentiality & Anonymity
4  
Chapter 7  Teaching Experience 
335 
Confidentiality & Anonymity
• Not the same thing
• Anonymous – cannot be identified
• Confidential – identifiable, but kept private
• Confidentiality can only be protected as far as the law allows
• It’s ok not to protect confidentiality, as long as you are clear 
about it
5  
Voluntary Participation & Withdrawal
6
• Remuneration
• Withdrawal without consequence
• Collecting anonymous information 
has implications for withdrawal
• Informed consent
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Data Storage & Security 
Where and how
How long
Handling of data following the required storage period
7  
Exercise
8
Augustus Gloop, MAE Scholar at the Willy Wonka Institute of 
Chocolate Science
The influence of child freckles on the consumption of Theobroma 
cacao: A randomised controlled trial.
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Wrap Up
There is more involved with information sheets..
ANU PIS and consent form template online
https://services.anu.edu.au/research-support/ethics-integrity/information-sheets-consent-
forms
ANU Code of Research Conduct 
https://policies.anu.edu.au/ppl/document/ANUP_007403
Australian National Data Service Guide - ‘Indentifiable, re-
indentifiable, non-identifiable’ data 
https://www.ands.org.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/737211/De-identification-edit-
2018.pdf
9   
10  
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Appendix 3. Group worksheet for students 
Participant Information Sheet 
Researcher:  
My name is Augustus Gloop and I am a Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) scholar at 
the Willy Wonka Institute of Chocolate Science. 
Project Title:  
The influence of child freckles on the consumption of Theobroma cacao: A randomised 
controlled trial. 
General Outline of the Project:  
Description and Methodology: I am conducting research on how freckles in children impacts 
chocolate consumption. This research seeks to understand how physical features influence 
chocolate consumption in children. I intend to interview 10 children with visible facial freckles 
under the age of 10 years. 
Participants: 10 children with visible facial freckles under the age of 10 years. Children will be 
recruited from the confectionary aisle of a grocery store in the Sydney CBD. 
Use of Data and Feedback: I will use the data collected for advertising purposes and to 
produce peer-reviewed published articles. Individual participants will not receive any feedback 
regarding their involvement or of the study findings. 
Project Funding: I have raised money via a golden ticket competition sponsored by Willy 
Wonka’s Chocolate Division. 
Participant Involvement: 
Voluntary Participation & Withdrawal: (what is important to explain?) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
What does participation in the research entail?  
You are invited to take part in an interview with the chief investigator, Augustus Gloop, about 
your chocolate eating habits in day-to-day life. With your consent, I will record the interview so 
that I can accurately transcribe it, and the recordings will be destroyed after transcription. 
During the interview, I may ask some personal questions about how freckles on your face have 
impacted your chocolate consumption, including your relationship with other food.  
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Confidentiality: (how would you phrase this?) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Location and Duration:   
Interviews are expected to last approximately 10 minutes, and will be conducted at a place of 
your choosing – for example, your primary school, at the local supermarket or in a place we 
can talk in private. I may contact you for another 10 minute interview if I would like to follow 
up on anything from the first interview. 
Remuneration:  
In recognition of your time, participants will be offered a Willy Wonka chocolate bar. 
Risks: (which 3 points would you mention?) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Benefits: 
It is unlikely that you will personally benefit from participation in this research other than 
happiness after eating the complementary chocolate bar. However, the work will support the 
chocolate industry. 
Data Storage: (what are the 3 headings that you would include?) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
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Privacy Notice: 
In collecting your personal information within this research, the ANU must comply with the 
Privacy Act 1988. The ANU Privacy Policy is available at 
https://policies.anu.edu.au/ppl/document/ANUP_010007 and it contains information about 
how a person can: 
• Access or seek correction to their personal information; 
• Complain about a breach of an Australian Privacy Principle by ANU, and how ANU will 
handle the complaint. 
Queries and Concerns: 
Contact Details for More Information:  
Call 1800 CHOCOLATE for more information 
Ethics Committee Clearance: 
The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Protocol XXXX/XXXX). If you have any concerns or complaints about how this 
research has been conducted, please contact: 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: +61 2 6125 3427 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
 
Modified from Australian National University - Information Sheets and Consent Forms 
https://services.anu.edu.au/research-support/ethics-integrity/information-sheets-consent-
forms 
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Appendix 4. Lesson from the field evaluation questionnaire 
1. What did you like about this LFF? 
 
2. Which aspects of the LFF could be improved? 
 
3. To what extent has this LFF been useful for your work (workplace and/or academic)? 
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Appendix 5. Teaching evaluation questionnaire 
1. Are you…? 
o First year MAE 
o Second year MAE 
For the following questions you will be asked to rank your responses as follows; not of use, 
minimal use, neutral, useful or highly useful. 
Communicating as a field epi during public health emergencies 
2. Please rate how you found the format of the session 
3. Please rate how you found the presenter’s style 
4. Please rate how you found the session content 
Writing tips 
5. Please rate how you found the format of the session 
6. Please rate how you found the presenter’s style 
7. Please rate how you found the session content 
Evaluating complex public health interventions  
8. Please rate how you found the format of the session 
9. Please rate how you found the presenter’s style 
10. Please rate how you found the session content 
Ethical considerations in study participation  
11. Please rate how you found the format of the session 
12. Please rate how you found the presenter’s style 
13. Please rate how you found the session content 
Pub quiz 
14. Please rate how you found the format of the session 
15. Please rate how you found the presenter’s style 
16. Please rate how you found the session content 
For the following questions you will be asked to provide free text responses. 
Summary 
17. Overall what did you learn from the sessions? 
18. What did you think needed improvement? 
19. Do you think the student had an opportunity to interact throughout the sessions? 
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